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Summary 
This thesis analyses the ways in which desire has been 
traditionally configured in terms of its relation to both 
being and becoming. Techniques for the domestication of 
desire through idealized concepts of community, the subject, 
the body, life and ethics, are analyzed in respect of their 
transcendental construction and the practices of power which 
they legitimate. The critical texts of Immanuel Kant are 
taken as the primary focus of an attempt to separate the 
negative values implicit in Humanism from the positive 
project of Enlightenment thinking. This separation, it is 
argued, effects a reconceptualization of the classical 
opposition between Man and Nature, allowing us to elaborate 
new definitional structures of the above themes (community, 
the subject, the body, life and ethics). In a postmodern era, 
these new formulations enable philosophical thought to accept 
the de-centering and dispersal of the subject without 
abandoning the critical project of self-experimentation, 
together with the political and ethical demands produced in 
the interactions and associations of selves in becoming. 
In the attempt to open up a space for thinking the desiring 
self of post-humanism, this writing follows a two-fold 
course. On the one hand, it argues against the internal 
organization and rationality of subject-producing ideologies. 
On the other, it seeks to elucidate the points of resistance 
in and against the power structures inherent in our societies 
and at work in our procedures of representation and 
objectification. 
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Introduction 
Desire is the name of a place without boundaries. It is at 
once the delirious plane of immanence and the treacherous 
scene of transcendence. In Western philosophy, desire is a 
battlefield where Being and Becoming are in constant contest 
for supremacy. It is to the task of facilitating a 
cartography of this battlefield that this writing is 
committed. 
In what follows we will critically examine the most powerful 
strategies, utilized in the name of Being, which have sought 
to configure the landscape of desire by domesticating its 
inherent force, producti vi ty and transformational creati vi ty. 
The structures wrought in this way fall under five main 
headings; community, subjectivity, the body, life and ethics. 
The aim of this project is to gain an understanding of the 
way in which these five ideas emerge in Enlightenment, modern 
and postmodern thought; the nature of their interdependence 
and the manner of their seeming demise. 
The central figure of the text is Immanuel Kant, whose 
critical writings can be seen to articulate the methodology 
of desire's domestication and suppression in the name of 
human progress. The birth of the Kantian Enl ightenment 
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subject conjoined with the exposition of the being of 
community as the foundation of societal life and bodily 
experience gives us, at once, both the prescription for the 
advance of reason and understanding, and a partial diagnosis 
of the symptoms indicating an immanent collapse of the 
classical subject (his identity and values) in postmodernist 
thought. 
In the first chapter, we will explore the way in which the 
Kantian thought of community favors an idea of communi ° , a 
unity of Being, whose universality is premised upon the 
internalization of moral law and the aesthetic compromise of 
sensuality and imagination. The tenor of earlier works on 
community by Althusius, Rousseau, Hobbes and Locke, in 
conjunction with the repositioning of the subject in Kantian 
thought will be seen to have broke red a vacancy in the 
history of ideas, assuring credibility and influence to a 
transcendental formulation of community for Enlightenment 
thought. In the latter part of this chapter we will consider 
the failure of quasi-Kantian conceptions of community in our 
era to accommodate the complex subject of postmodernity and 
the consequent drive to re-assess, through feminist theory 
(Braidotti and Haraway), justice ethics (Lyotard and Nancy), 
apocalypse culture (Krockers ) and information networking 
(Rheingold), the basis for commercium, interaction and 
association at the end of the millennium. 
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In the second chapter, the inadequacies exhibited by many 
postmodern and post-humanist formulations of community will 
be shown to stem from a continued reliance upon the positing 
of a transcendental and teleologically inclined subject, 
whether this being be designated as ideal, real, other, 
lacking or lost. In following through the concatenations of 
this thought, we will move on t.o consider the differing ways 
in which the modern and postmodern subject has been 
formulated, laying particular stress upon the importance for 
its deliberation, of the classical divisions between man and 
woman, man and nature, man and machine. The collapse of these 
distinctions occurring, as they have done, across a broad 
spectrum of discourses and practices will lead, in the third 
chapter, to an examination of the role of the body for 
postmodern theories of the self (particularly as emerging out 
of the works of Lingis, Baudrillard, Butler, Deleuze and 
Foucault). We will consider the efficacy of the bodies 
metaphorization through theories of becoming and the 
resistance exhibited in its self-transformations, attacking 
and de-legitimating those institutions of power which seek to 
keep it passive. 
Continuing the theme of a re-conceptualization of nature, in 
the final chapter we will examine the ways in which the 
concept of life has been extended, on the one hand, through 
the collapse of earlier definitions of community, 
7 
theorizations of the subject and delimitations of the body, 
and on the other, in respect of developments in evolutionary 
biology, artificial-life programming and advances in 
reproducti ve, medical and genetic technologies. In this 
context we will lend breadth to the postmodern landscape of 
desire, mapping upon it those configurations specific to our 
own time with the range of novel associations and 
interactions encountered wi thin and promised by it. Our 
exploration of the postmodern terrain of desire will conclude 
by addressing the problem of the viability and expediency of 
re-configuring an ethics of the self for beings-in-becoming 
in a post-human society for whom the transcendent guarantor 
and transcendental arbiter of Being have been consigned to 
the tomb of humanist thought. 
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1. Desire and Community 
In the great narratives of Western socio-political philosophy 
'man' works towards the construction of a community that 
would reflect his own image as fully constituted subject and 
sovereign being. To this end he has employed and worked upon 
all that is not called man (all that is not-human), those 
elements of his world that exemplify unpredictability, 
disorder, dislocation and breakdown (primarily machines, 
animals, nature and woman) .J. Man believed that by shaping and 
standardizing these entities in his own image (to reflect his 
own semi-divine visage) he could somehow control them, thus 
bringing the world itself under his sway and fulfilling his 
destiny of becoming like-God. 2 But it is these very elements 
that, in our era of advanced Capitalism, elude the historical 
imperative that would mediate and control them. As animal and 
machine parts replace and synthesize human organs, and 
computer technology melts the boundaries between work and 
play, war and diplomacy, life and process, etc., the 
distinctions that have maintained man in a position of 
seeming superiority are disrupted and the relation of user to 
used is blurred into insignificance. Man is finding himself 
dispossessed of control, just one partially constituted 
entity amongst others in the post-human community. 
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Community is becoming schizophrenic3 as non-human life 
forms 4 combine ever more effectively in fluid advances of 
information technology that refuse to be employed within the 
terrestrial confines of socio-political or ethical projects. 
The real is becoming indissociable from the virtual as the 
future floods the present with digitalized promises of 
immanent dystopia. 
Those who refuse and attempt to refute of the coming5 of the 
post-human community delude themselves with myths of 
appropriation (re-appropriations of new configurations of 
Nature as Other), collating addendums to the body politic and 
social contract, regrouping in technophobic garrets under the 
protection of largely defunct institutions, adopting ever 
more complex and verbose models of exchange in the attempt to 
protect an illusive identity, reciting the name of 'Justice' 
in the hope of conjuring up a new politics and a reformed 
ethics. The sad fact is that we are not yet free from the 
fetters of the generation of Humanist Enlightenment projects 
whose ethico-political aspirations continue to orbit a space 
of ideality that has no place in the postmodern world. 
Adapting the words of Hobbes, we have yet to "cut the 
umbilical cord of universalism of Enlightenment" [Leviathan. 
p.122] 
"We are all longing to go home to some place we 
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have never been - a place, half-remembered, and 
half-envisioned we can only catch glimpses of from 
time to time. communi ty . Somewhere, there are 
people to whom we can speak with passion, without 
having the words catch in our throats. Somewhere a 
circle of hands will open to receive us, eyes will 
light up as we enter, voices will celebrate with 
us whenever we come into our own power. Community 
means strength that joins our strength to do the 
work that needs to be done. Arms to hold us when 
we falter. A circle of healing. A circle of 
friends. Someplace we can be free." [starhawk. 
p.82] 
Of the seminal texts of Enlightenment philosophy, Immanuel 
Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, Critique of Judgement and his 
essay on "What is Enlightenment?"*1 are pivotal to the 
trajectory of this writing. In the first of these, Kant 
elucidates the categories of the understanding, under one of 
which headings is drawn the distinction between communio and 
commercium. communi 0 , meaning communion, mutual participation 
and fellowship (also fortification or entrenchment) ; 
* Reference to these and other of Kant's texts will be abbreviated 
as fOllows: 
Critique of Pure Reason: CPR. critique of Judgement: CJ. 
"What is Enlightenment?": Essay. Anthropology: A. 
"The Idea for a Universal history from a cosmopolitan point of 
view.": Cosmo. Conflict of the Faculties: Conflict. 
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Commercium, 
intercourse 
meaning communication, correspondence, 
and commerce, also signifying a dynamical 
community which makes possible the empirical knowledge of any 
local community. It is through an elaboration of these two 
notions (in the CPR), their problematization (in the CJ), and 
their relation to a particular era of thought (in the Essay), 
that we may begin tracing a cartography of the landscape of 
desire, where the essentialist construction of community can 
be seen to engender the birth of the subject (of community) 
as the Being of domesticated communal desire. 
Communi ty is given in the CritiQue of Pure Reason as the 
third division of the logical moment of relation in the table 
of categories (pure concepts of the understanding). These 
categories, we are told, are to be discovered by means of "an 
exhaustive statement of the functions of unity in judgement" 
[CPR B94]; they are functions which "specify the 
understanding completely, and yield an exhaustive inventory 
of its powers." [CPR B105] The category of Community is thus 
deemed to be an original pure concept of synthesis, contained 
a priori in the understanding and necessarily so if we are to 
be able to think an object of intuition. Whereas in the 
CritiQue of Judgement the Idea of Community will be shown to 
function as the condition for the possibility of there being 
a transcendental subject (a transcendental unity of 
apperception), in the CritiQue of Pure Reason, as a category, 
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it's apparent role is that of condition for the coming into 
being of the transcendental object (as that which makes it 
possible to think an object of intuition). 
Tracing the development of this latter, we must begin by 
considering the logical form of judgement from which the 
category of community is derived, this being the form of the 
disjunctive (the third form under the heading of relation, 
the other two being those of the categorical and 
hypothetical). In a disjunctive judgement, Kant tells us, the 
relation between two or more propositions is not that of 
logical sequence but of logical opposition, 
"in so far as the sphere of one excludes the 
sphere of the other, and yet at the same time of 
community, in so far as the propositions taken 
together occupy the whole sphere of the knowledge 
in question. The disjunctive relation expresses, 
therefore, a relation of the parts of the sphere 
of such knowledge, since the sphere of each part 
is a complement of the sphere of the others, 
yielding together the sum-total of the divided 
knowledge." [CPR B99] 
As an example of this, Kant gives us a disjunctive judgement 
concerning the existence of the world where three 
possibilities are presented: "The world exists either through 
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blind chance, or through inner necessity, or through external 
cause." [ibid] The sphere of possible knowledge about the 
existence of the world is circumscribed by the community of 
these dis juncti ve propositions, each of which occupies a 
separate sphere within such knowledge. As separate spheres, 
each of these propositions about the world mutually excludes 
the others such that: "To take the knowledge out of one of 
these spheres means placing it in one of the other spheres, 
and to place it in one sphere means taking it out of the 
others." [ibid] 
Disjunctive judgement, as constituting knowledge through the 
unity of its components, thus presupposes a certain original 
belonging together of these parts, that is, there is in play 
an original synthetic unity of dis juncts that binds them 
together, in their exclusivity. The nature of this synthesis 
presupposes a territoriality of knowledge that precludes 
productive exchange at a fundamental level, that is to say, 
the process of exchange or association will always be 
appropriative and cast in terms of an overarching systematic 
unity. 
This is indeed the very nature of synthesis, which, as Kant 
tells us is "in its most general sense, ..• the act of putting 
different representations together, and of grasping what is 
manifold in them in one [act of] knowledge." [CPR B103] 
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Difference in the manifold is thus reliant upon the 
presupposition of unity, indeed it is unity (as an act of 
synthesis) which makes difference possible by apportioning 
exclusive territorial rights to its component parts. 
Difference in this sense can never emerge from out of unity 
except as exclusive difference (binary opposition). Commerce, 
interaction or association between spheres will always be 
cast in terms of the relation of one to an other. As the 
condition required for the constitution of unity, difference 
then always presupposes lack. Community is thus the activity 
of overcoming an immediate or immanent lack through synthesis 
into a unity. 
The activity of synthesis, Kant makes clear, cannot be a 
self-emergent process, rather, "if this manifold is to be 
known, the spontaneity of our thought requires that it be 
gone through in a certain way, taken up, and connected." [CPR 
BI02] This "certain way" will be dictated by the 
temporalizing determinations of schematization, demanded by 
a "spontaneity of thought" that operates on the basis of 
differentiation through opposition. Logically, although not 
temporally prior to the knowable synthesis procured by the 
understanding is however, the operation of "synthesis in 
general" which is "the mere result of the power of 
imagination, a blind but indispensable function of the soul" 
[CPR BI03] The implication here is then that the originary 
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synthesis at work in the disjunctive judgement is an activity 
not of the understanding, but of pure productive imagination, 
and that it is only through this function carried out in 
accordance with the categories of the understanding (with 
community), that knowledge first becomes possible. And yet, 
because of the fact that the operation of productive 
imagination is constrained to relate to intuition only by 
means of the determining network of the schematized 
categories (and due to the primary relation between intuition 
and sensation being functionally blocked out of the 
explanatory hypothesis of communication in the CPR), the 
cognitively unfettered nature of the relationship between 
intuition and productive imagination can only remain a 
problem for Kant at this stage. As is shown above, Kant's 
very definition of the disjunctive judgement that makes the 
thought of community possible is conducted on the basis of 
there being a pre-established community of knowledge 
(communio intellectus). Such difficulties indicate that where 
statements, like the following, appear in the CPR, there is 
a community of thought that is in excess of the parameters of 
this First Critique: 
"The appearances might, indeed, constitute 
intuition without thought [gedankenlose 
Anschauung] , but not knowledge. . . . . . These 
perceptions would not then belong to any 
experience, consequently would be without an 
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object, merely a blind play of representations, 
even less than a dream." [~Alll-112] 
In the third analogy of experience, where Kant attempts a 
proof of the principle of coexistence in accordance with the 
law of reciprocity or community, we are told that, "the 
coexistence of substances in space cannot be known in 
experience save on the assumption of their reciprocal 
interaction". [~B257] Community understood as commercium, 
that is, reciprocal interaction "is therefore the condition 
of the possibility of the things themselves as objects of 
experience." [CPR B258] Kant goes on however, to qualify the 
nature of reciprocation on the basis of mutuality, "each 
substance ... must ... contain in itself the causality of certain 
determinations in the other substance, and at the same time 
the effects of the causality of the other." [ibid] The 
communi ty of substance is therefore mutually determined 
insofar as we are able to perceive any part of it: "the 
substances must stand, immediately or mediately, in dynamical 
community, if their coexistence is to be known in any 
possible experience." [CPR B259]. 
The commercium that is dynamical community, is however 
governed by the schematized category of coexistence and 
relates specifically to substance as that which is intuited 
accordingly. Community as commercium, can thus be taken as 
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something that is produced by the spontaneity of thought, 
whose transcendental determination of time--the time of such 
interaction--is possible only given that it rests upon an 
originary community as communio of apperception: 
"In our mind, all appearances, since they are 
contained in possible experience, must stand in 
community (communio) of apperception, in so far as 
the objects are to be represented as coexisting in 
connection with each other, they must mutually 
determine their position in one time, and thereby 
constitute a whole." [CPR B261. My emphasis.] 
The problematization of an original condition of community as 
commercium in the privileging of the communio of apperception 
remains unresolved in the text of the CPR. The next section 
will thus approach community through Kant I s later texts, 
where the being of apperception is more fully examined. 
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2. Sensus Communis: The Rational Community. 
Kant tells us that the minimal prerequisite for "claiming the 
name of man" is the possession of a "common understanding 
[gemeine Menschenverstand] " , and to this "mere healthy (not 
yet cuI ti vated) understanding" he gives the name sensus 
communis. 6 These claims are to be found in the Critique of 
Judgement [1790] and are dependent upon the following moves: 
(1) From sensus communis to a sense common to all [allgemeine 
sinne], thought of as Gemeinschaft [community] or 
Gemeinschaftlichen, [a sense of community]. (2) From this 
gemeinschaftlichen of sensus communis to the idea of a 
universal communicability [allgemeine mitteilbarkeit] , and of 
the universal voice [allgemeine stimmel that is a univocity 
in one voice (or attunement) [Einstimmung]. (3) From 
universal communicability or voice to society [Gesellschaft]. 
In order to elucidate the program of the sensus communis it 
is necessary to give consideration to some other of Kant's 
cri tical texts: The Anthropology [1798], "The Idea for a 
Universal history from a cosmopolitan point of view" [1784] 
and the Conflict of the Faculties [1798]. In combination, 
these works fill out the body of the sensus communis and 
enable us to better explore the purported linkages of common 
sense, community, communicability and society, revealing the 
tension at work in Kant's distinction between communio and 
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commercium in the CPR. This exploration will open up a 
cri tical space in relation to both pre- and post-Kantian 
thinkers of community, clarifying the myth of communio and 
the commemoration of, or mourning for, its lack, as a 
terminal (if not already defunct) thought of the human 
essence (as full body of the subject and as being-self). This 
in turn, will lead to an assessment of attempts to rethink 
the remaining possibility of community (qua commercium) as 
the only possibility left to us once politics, ethics and 
theology have been debunked as the outmoded rituals of a 
redundant humanism. 7 The trajectory out of the following 
sections will be concerned with the effectiveness of 
retaining a thought of commercium for a post-human community, 
and an assessment of the consequences of replacing the 
grounding Idea of an "in-common" with complex processes of 
life and force. 
The definition of the minimal conditions for entering into 
the species of the human, which is equally, in Kantian terms, 
the minimal condition for having experience (and thereby a 
sense of community), is to be a creature capable of 
Enlightenment; Man born unto himself. For man, as rational 
animal8 , is the only creature able to give to himself his own 
destiny; that is, able to give to himself the possibility of 
realizing the essence of his own humanity, through auto-
generation. 
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Across the literary divide from Kant stands Genet who 
expresses the same theme thus: 
"Insatiable jealousy, of oneself, already (I am 
missing, I miss myself): to knock down the thin 
walls, the clefts, the partitions in order to 
occupy all the places at once, to love (oneself) 
in (the) place of the other, to put an end to the 
worst suffering (to be jealous enough of not even 
being able to appropriate jealousy as one's 
suffering, one's evil, one's very own), to swallow 
oneself, to touch oneself, to deliver oneself, to 
give birth to oneself and to give oneself one's 
own, then to band oneself erect to death, finally 
to masturbate oneself or to fuck oneself or to 
fuck oneself by flowing out of oneself [en 
S ' ecoul ant] : je m' ec , je m' enc • " [ Genet. As 
quoted in Derrida's Glas p.180] 
For Genet, as for Kant, man comes into being with the thought 
of communing, that is, subject and community are born in the 
same instant through an antipathy or antagonism towards 
society which operates as both the expression and repression 
of their relation. 9 Kant tells us that we (a "we" that is 
almost Hegelian here), must strive hard to "maintain and 
restore to the mind ... that bare negative which properly 
constitutes enlightenment" [CJ. p.137ff.] That bare negative-
-the space of the noumenon, self-mastery through being--the 
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Idea of community spawned in the tensile structure of an 
exclusive yet essential disjunction (community, in this 
sense, will always remain and be that for which we labour). 
For Kant it is the dream of the cosmopolitan civil society, 
the society in concord, the state, the destiny towards which 
reason incessantly drives us by virtue of our rationality and 
against which our so called natural animal instincts (our 
selfishness and secrecy) are perpetually contested. 
In Cosmo, Kant states that all natural capacities of a 
creature are destined to evolve completely to their natural 
end, from the Anthropology however, we learn that whilst this 
may be the case for individual animals, for human beings (the 
only rational animals on this planet) our natural end can be 
achieved only as a species. 
"It could well be that on another planet there 
might be rational beings who could not think in 
any other way but aloud. These beings would not be 
able to have thoughts without voicing them at the 
same time, whether they be awake or asleep, 
whether in the company of others or 
alone •.. [However] Unless they are all as pure as 
angels, we cannot conceive how they would be able 
to live at peace with each other, how anyone could 
have respect for anyone else, and how they could 
get along with each other." [A. p.250] 
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The dream of total transparency is premised upon an ethical 
imperative of respect and undercut by the fundamentally 
unethical nature of the human animal. Man, as an individual 
terrestrial creature, is always at odds with himself in that 
he is stretched out between the extremes of animality and 
rationality, and the demands that are made by production at 
each of these two extremes. That he is able, however, to 
admit that "this [our] race of terrestrial rational beings 
deserves no honorable place among other rational beings of 
the universe (unknown to us) ... [is] ... such a condemning 
judgement [that it] reveals a moral capacity of the species, 
an innate summons of reason" which enables us to work 
"through progressive organization of the citizens of the 
earth within and towards the species as a system which is 
united by cosmopolitan bonds." [11. p.251. My emphasis.] 
Reason, Kant tells us, is the faculty of "widening the rules 
and purposes of the use of all its powers far beyond natural 
instincts." [Cosmo. p.416] It progresses by trial and 
practice (for it is not instinctual) and given that men are 
finite beings, it will take generations of the exercise of 
this power; generations of men who have attained their own 
enlightenment and passed this "seed" onto their sons, "in 
order finally to bring the seeds of enlightenment to that 
degree of development in our race which is completely 
suitable to Nature's purpose." [Cosmo. p.416] Nature is both 
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that from which we differentiate ourselves, as human beings, 
and that purposive state towards which we must direct 
ourselves as a species. 
The ideal of generation as progressive anthropomorphising 
concept so crucial to the event of enlightenment being--the 
passing on of pure uncontaminated (non-mutant) seed--
moreover, must be understood as a task, as the work of man, 
and a work that he gives to himself (for the realization of 
his essence). "[H]e should work himself upward so as to make 
himself, through his own actions, worthy of life and of well-
being." [Cosmo. p.417] Given the complex and internally 
competitive and antagonistic nature of man's natural 
tendencies however, this work is not readily undertaken but 
must be wrung from him under duress. It is providence that 
guarantees this by ensuring "that he be guided toward a civil 
constitution based on the principles of freedom, but at the 
same time [that] he expects that this constitution be based 
on a coercive principle of statutory equality." [6. p.245] 
And this because man has, on the one hand, a "propensity to 
enter society" [Cosmo. p.417], yet on the other is "bound 
with a mutual opposition which constantly threatens to break 
up the society" [Cosmo. p.418]. Man lives in society in a 
state of perpetual "antagonism" because of his fundamental 
"social unsociability". 
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The constant in Kant's analysis of the human condition in 
this respect is the propensity of man for entering into 
society and this, we are told, comes about because "in 
society he feels himself to be more than man". [Cosmo. p.418] 
It is this desire, we are told, that "awakens [mans] powers" 
bringing into being "the first true steps from barbarism to 
culture" [ibid]. In the Anthropology we are told that man 
"has a character which he himself creates, because he himself 
is capable of perfecting himself according to purposes which 
he himself adopts." [A. p.238] And here the birth, the auto-
production of the man of politics (aptly described for these 
purposes as the political animal), for it is by way of his 
entering into society that man realizes (awakens) his powers 
and his desire to be more that man, here his work, in Kant's 
words, to be able to "conquer his inclination to laziness 
and, propelled by vainglory, lust for power and avarice, to 
achieve a rank among his fellows whom he cannot tolerate but 
from whom he cannot withdraw." [Cosmo. p.418]. It is here 
that culture develops and refines man, here that he takes his 
first faltering steps towards enlightenment and effects 
"thereby a change of society of men driven together by their 
natural feelings into a moral whole." A most apt place for 
the birth of morality. "Thus a society in which freedom under 
external laws is associated in the highest degree with 
irresistible power (re, a perfectly just civil constitution) , 
is the highest problem Nature assigns for the human race." 
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[Cosmo. p.419] 
Perhaps the most repellent, and at the same time, most 
telling aspect of the immaculate conception and labour of the 
new-born subject of enlightenment is his need for a master. 
As Kant tells us in the 6th thesis of the Cosmo, for man to 
live amongst others he needs to be domesticated10 , to be 
held fast by a law-giveness that will prevent his "animal 
instincts" from destroying the very society into which (and 
by virtue of which ) he has been born as subject. Self-
othering, as a practice of the domestication of desire, is 
thus the means by which man is prevented from breaking those 
rules he would give to others in order to create himself in 
his own image, the image or Idea of the community as communio 
in the one, the antagonistic same (identical). 
Man "thus requires a master, who will break his will and 
force him to obey a will that is universally valid, under 
which each can be free." [Cosmo. p.418] Free for what? Free 
to be consolidated in that desire to be "more than man", yet 
separated, in this process of solidification, from what 
desire can do, 11 indeed we already know how this process 
begins. How to gain the voice of the universally valid 
command? Immaculate conception and a bag of nails!12 
"The highest master should be just in himself, [yet strive as 
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he might for the status of and reality of internal law-
giver] ... its complete solution is impossible" [Cosmo. p.419] 
For, as Kant tells us, judiciously in a footnote ..• where else 
to find the Nazarene ... "The role of man is very artificial". 
Everything by analogy: "Nature has planted in the species the 
seed of discord, and ... Nature has willed the human species, 
through its reason, [to] turn discord into accord, or at 
least to create a constant approximation to it." Artificial 
culture in the practice of the Idea of community, the civil 
constitution of the state "represents the highest degree of 
artificial enhancement of the good characteristics in the 
human species [the] final purpose of its destiny." [A. p.245] 
"Concord contains its purpose in its idea, whereas 
discord as action contains, wi thin the plan of 
Nature, the means of supreme wisdom. This wisdom 
is to affect the perfection of man through 
cultural progress, even if this should mean 
sacrifice of the pleasures of his life." [A. 
p.238] 
Here the pull of the sublime draws us. Sacrifice to the 
Allgemeine stimme/ung, the universal voice ~ univocal harmony. 
Not in the melodic topography of a chaotic strange attractor, 
but in the one, sovereign space, unpresentable within 
society, yet designated arena for communicability of the 
Idea. "The universal voice is only an idea" [CJ. #8], and the 
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Einstimmung or Allgemeine Stimmung is no more a social 
consensus made up of individual voices than it is a body-
without-organs, its universality is subjective. 13 It is 
unity as promise, the harmonious linear combination of the 
faculties (constitution of the very possibility of a 
cogni ti ve subject). The subject comes into being in the 
Einstimmung, in the univocity of the sensus communis which is 
the condition and actualization of its production. 
Einstimmung is the voice of the Law (of coercive 
harmony/concord), the law that cannot dictate at the level of 
the aesthetic (which is only a relation), but its promise 
which, by its seepage into and analogous relation with 
morality (through the interest of reason), will give it the 
power of unspeakable sovereignty.14 This voice speaks to and 
out of the subject that comes into existence with it, is co-
extensive with it. 
From the CJ we recall that: 
n[T]he satisfaction in the beautiful, like that in 
the sublime, is not alone distinguishable from 
other aesthetic judgements by its universal 
communicability, but also because it acquires an 
interest through this very property in reference 
to society (in which communication is possible).n 
[~. p.116] 
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Society provides for, but is not itself the space of 
universal communicability [allgemeine mitteilbarkeit] where 
the universal voice [allgemeine Stimme] gives the Law, the 
"ought" to itself .15 Society is that which marks us in 
accordance with our acceptance of the necessity of the 
universal prescriptive, of this regulative idea of reason. 
The aim of society (in our supposed desire, if not in its 
inception) is the "unattainable idea" [6. p.247] of 
community, a regulative principle demanding that we yield 
generously toward it as the direction of our natural 
inclination .16 
The exemplar of this societal marking (constitution of the 
subject beyond himself) is genius, for genius is publicly 
marked and its pain affords pleasure to others. The 
spectators watch its pain--the prime coding of socialization-
-with eyes and bodies already under contract and obligation, 
already socialized, and derive from the spectacle the surplus 
value of pleasure that shores up and legitimates the promise 
of (the possibility of) the sublime; of access to the 
ultimate pain, the void--noumenon, death, sovereignty, 
community--experienced through a perverse form of fraternity 
(in the brotherhood of Ideas). 
In the .c.J: #20 and #21 of the "Analytic of the beautiful" we 
find that Gemeinschaftlichen, the feeling of community, is 
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that which lies at the basis of and grounds the possibility 
of a Gemeinsinn, a common sense. In the "Analytic of the 
Sublime" CJ #40 and #41 we are told that the feeling of 
community is something basic to the definition of a human 
being, a being possessing sensus communis, which is expressed 
through that which it brings about in the realization (the 
birth into) that which makes possible an approximation to its 
essence (the "more than man"), namely Gesellschaft, society. 
These assertions that found the aesthetic and merely 
reflecti ve judgement, have no conceptual basis, but are 
rather felt in the pleasure of the free-play of the faculties 
(in the experience of the beautiful) and in the pain (and 
consequent pleasure) of the experience of the sublime. 
The moves are as follows: For the non-cognitive aesthetic 
judgement to have necessity it must lay claim to the "idea of 
a common sense [die Idee eines Gemeinsinnes] " [CJ #20] and it 
is the presupposition of this idea that represents as 
objective the, in fact subjective (and exemplary) necessity 
of the judgement. [QJ #22] The aesthetic judgement thus has 
"a necessity of the assent of all to a judgement which is 
regarded as the example of a universal rule that we cannot 
state" [CJ #18], and the form of this agreement is that of an 
"ought". Gemeinsinn (common sense) is then a principle whose 
anticipation enables us to judge not according to concepts 
but by feeling. Moreover "this common sense is assumed ... 
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simply as the necessary condition of the universal 
communicability of knowledge, which is presupposed in every 
logic and in every principle of knowledge that is not 
sceptical." [CJ #21] The mighty power of the "ought", 
universal communicability in the role of a thought police 
delimiting and legitimating the creativity of what can be 
felt and what can be known, these exemplify the power of 
domesticated imagination captured by the name (the essence) 
of Man. 
The CJ presents us with the free and indeterminate accord of 
the faculties as an a priori harmony lying at the very basis 
of the subject. 17 This accord cannot be known intellectually 
but only felt, and it is felt, as has been said, in two ways: 
As the pleasure that results from the experience of the 
beautiful (imagination in its pure freedom in agreement with 
the understanding in its non-specified legality), and as the 
pain felt in the experience of the sublime. Aesthetic common 
sense (as opposed to the common sense of the intellect in the 
QER) cannot represent an objective accord of the faculties, 
(in that it has no legislative power), thus the accord of the 
faculties must be spontaneously exercised. It is this 
aesthetic common sense that makes possible the common sense 
of the CPR by establishing an original Einstimmung, an 
attunement, which first makes possible the "I think" of the 
knowing subject. 18 
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In the sublime, accord or harmony is only a secondary feeling 
however, the initial feeling is that of discord, where the 
imagination seems to lose its freedom by being forced by 
reason to unite the immensity of the sensible world into a 
whole, that is, into a presentable Idea thereof. It is only 
in the wake of this discord that accord ensues, as 
imagination, confronted by its limit goes beyond that limit 
and represents to itself the inaccessibility of the rational 
idea (as something itself present in sensible nature), the 
negative presentation of the infinite that "expands the 
soul". [~ #29] 
The feeling of a supersensible destination (even if this is 
only a negative and painful presentation) is the basis of the 
accord of reason and the imagination in the sublime. The 
possibility of articulating a "more than man" is projected in 
the form of the soul as the indeterminate supersensible unity 
of the faculties finding its seat in the sensus communis. 
This accord is then something engendered through the feeling 
of discord (and, as with the concord of man in the civil 
society, it is effected by means of the violence and 
coercion, of internally imposed law); a law of culture and 
destiny as the movement of its genesis, speculatively 
indeterminate perhaps, but practically determined through 
preparation and preparedness for the moral law. 
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In the sublime, aesthetic common sense is thus engendered, 
whereas in the beautiful it is rather assumed or anticipated. 
The interest of the beautiful--its relation to society as the 
place of the possibility of communication--is however, only 
empirical (a posteriori), and it is to that interest that is 
united with the beautiful--that is the Idea of community 
within a philosophy of nature--that we must look for its a 
priori principle. 19 The interest of reason, as that which is 
united with the beautiful does not bear upon its form as 
such, but is rather the content used by nature to produce 
objects capable of being reflected formally (ultimately 
reducible to prime matter, fluid substance). 
interest of reason then (concerned as it 
production of the beautiful in nature) that 
It is this 
is with the 
serves as a 
principle in us for a genesis of the feeling of the beautiful 
itself. What is produced is thus a contingent accord of 
nature wi th all our facul ties together, of nature 
fortuitously adapted to the harmonious exercise of our 
facul ties. Our rational interest lies in the contingent 
accord of nature's productions with our disinterested 
pleasure. Such accord is felt rather than cognized and whilst 
it is presented to the understanding, which it thereby 
excites, it is also related to the Ideas of reason which it 
awakens (and whose object is merely the analogue of the 
beautiful object perceived). It is then the Ideas of reason 
that are the objects of an indirect presentation in the free 
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materials of nature. 
It is in this way that the interest united in the beautiful 
refers us to the accord of subjective harmony in the 
supersensible, this however, given the dominance of an 
already constituted faculty of reason. There is then an 
inescapable synthetic relation between the interest of the 
beautiful and the good, in the destiny of the human being to 
the moral sphere, to be more than man. 
"[T]o take an immediate interest in the beauty of 
nature ... is always a mark of a good soul; 
and ••• when this interest is habitual, it at least 
indicates a frame of mind favorable to the moral 
feeling if it is voluntarily bound up with the 
contemplation of nature." [~ #42] 
It now seems clear that the empirical connection between the 
universal communicability of the aesthetic judgement and the 
place of communication within society has in fact a priori 
status, this, at least so long as reason and the ends of man 
are bound to it to secure its legitimacy. 
"Taste ... is just that one [faculty] which most 
needs examples of what has in the progress of 
culture received the longest approval, that it may 
not become again uncivilized and return to the 
crudeness of its first essays." [CJ #32] 
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Culture is the ultimate end pursued by nature in the human 
race because culture is what makes men "susceptible to 
ideas", it is the condition that opens onto the thought of 
the unconditioned. 
We are now perhaps better prepared to return to that place 
from whence we began in the CJ, #40, entitled "Of taste as 
a kind of Sensus Communis." Here Kant tells us that sense, 
properly understood, has not the least capacity for 
expressing universal rules, for such representations as 
truth, beauty or justice, we must "rise beyond sense to 
higher faculties of cognition." wi thin what "we regard as the 
least to be expected from anyone claiming the name of man", 
that is "the common understanding of men [Der gemeine 
Menschenverstand] " which is the "mere heal thy (not yet 
cultivated) understanding", and is given the general name of 
a common sense [Gemeinsinnes] sensus communis, there is 
thereby included "the feeling of community 
[gemeinschaftlichen]", of the idea of community. 
The presentation of this idea (which as the ends of man is 
never fully realizable) comes about through the coding of 
socialization, which (under the name of the event of 
Enlightenment) is prescribed in three maxims, the "maxims of 
human understanding", which Kant elucidates for us: 
"( 1) to think for oneself; [understanding] 
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(2) to put oneself in thought in 
the place of everyone else; 
(3) always to think consistently." 
[judgement] 
[reason] 
These three maxims20 clearly delineate the roles of the 
faculties in the pursuit of an Enlightenment project which 
refuses its own virtual status--society as "artificial 
enhancement" through the characteristics of the human 
species--resigning itself instead to a politics, a theology, 
that will maintain man within the confines of the tensile 
community. The contract is binding and there is an endless 
supply of nails. 
"[H]uman nature does not of its own proper motion 
accord with the good, but only by virtue of the 
violence that reason exercises upon sensibility." 
[CJ. p.124] 
Insofar as Kant thinks community (qua sensus communis) by way 
of communio, his bequeathment to modern and postmodernist 
thought orientates desire around the concept of a lack or 
loss of the in-common (the vanishing point of the focus 
imaginarius held in place by the tensile structure of the 
human/animal in its compromised rationality). The movement of 
humani ty, by way of its reason, towards harmony, is made 
Possible only by way of the violence that reason exacts upon 
the productive imagination. Reason forces the imagination, by 
means of this violence, to accept its limits and its 
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inability to produce (to represent) the fully constituted 
object of the Ideas of reason, a failure that results in a 
feeling of insufficiency. This is turn produces a 
construction of community as the communion of humanity (aimed 
at full communication within then cosmopolitan society) in 
pursuit of a supersensible goal (a transcendental Ideal), as 
that which is both (supersensible) destiny and the reason for 
existence (which is by definition unattainable). 
"Everyone expects and requires from everyone else 
this reference to universal communication as it 
were from an original (com) pact [Vertrage] 
dictated by humanity itself." [CJ. #42] 
In this way then, a triple curse is cast upon desire: 
firstly, it is constituted as Lack in accordance with the 
unpresentabili ty of the Ideas of reason; secondly, the 
unpresentability is guaranteed as the Ideas are made 
external, that is, they are posited as transcendentally Ideal 
(supersensible substrate or noumenal) and thus capable, by 
definition, of only negative presentation; thirdly, desire in 
the real is confined to the satisfaction in the beautiful (in 
the harmony of the faculties), and in the feeling of pain and 
pleasure derived from the sublime in the repression of the 
imagination. 
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3. The "lost" community of Post-modernism. 
Current (allegedly post-humanist) debates on community, 
reacting against a Kantian Enlightenment inheritance, locate 
traditional theories of community in a history of political 
philosophy, hermetically sealing these within the confines of 
the designation of communio. Such theories are then rebuked 
as totalizing (non-differentiating, non-emancipatory) 
constructions and a move is made towards thinking community 
on the basis of a dynamics of commercium. The motivation for 
this is to a large extent driven by feelings of guilt and 
failure (particularly in the face of names like "Auschwitz" 
and the aftermath of "May 68") and the consequent desire to 
accommodate minority groups in non-Absolutist political 
discourse that would expiate the consciences of those who 
still participate in an unsuccessful mourning for the death 
of Socialism and Communism in the West. 
This process of mourning is rooted in a call to 
Gemeinshaftlichen [sense of communi ty] which cannot 
ultimately, be disassociated from its Kantian foundations in 
the universal voice [die allgemeine Stimme] that is, the 
harmonious univocity or attunement (the Stimmung) of the 
Sensus Communis- the founding moment of the \ I think I as 
Subject. The failure of this mourning is indicated by way of 
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the encystment of the stimme ,21 of the dead universal 
subject which prevents the proposed dynamics of commercium 
from being communicated by any being other than the fully 
consti tuted subject (co-existent of communi 0 ), which is 
itself only an Idea. 22 Furthermore, the defensive hostility 
of many thinkers towards current developments in 
biotechnology, medicine, science and global marketplace 
economics, of patterns of ever more complex and in-human 
associations emerging in a counter-culture that has become 
high trans-multi-culture only further elaborates this 
encystment of the historico-political subject, dictating the 
limits and exclusivity of its communicability. 
In his Preface to The Inoperative Community, Jean-Luc Nancy, 
despite having decried traditional theories of the subject 
and the "desire for consensus" implicit in their thought of 
community, its loss or lack, seems to take his place in the 
funeral cortege: 
"One thing at least is clear: if we do not face up 
to such questions [of revolution], the political 
will soon desert us completely if it has not 
already done so. It will abandon us to political 
and technological economies, if it has not already 
done so. And this will be the end of our 
communities, if this has not yet come about. 
Being-in-common will nonetheless never cease to 
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resist, but its resistance will belong decidedly 
to another world entirely. Our world, as far as 
politics is concerned, will be a desert, and we 
will wither away without a tomb--which is to say, 
wi thout community. " [The Inoperati ve Community 
Preface] 
This lament echoes the "problem" of Jean-Francois Lyotard's 
Differend: "to find, if not what can legitimate judgement 
(the 'good' linkage), then at least to save the honor of 
thinking." [Preface]. The proximity of "Being-in-common" to 
"the honor of thinking" recalls the Kantian demand for 
respect which entails, if not an ethical imperative, then at 
least a certain logic of esteem, of veneration and integrity; 
of that which is given as a given to les tres honorable, to 
his honor the judge, that is, the encysted universal subject 
(of the Kantian lawgiver). This is the regulation of and by 
a community founded upon a historical inheritance of 
resistance to immanence and antagonism to Nature as Same-
Other, that cannot escape resurrecting or re-birthing the 
thought of the subject as the site of justice and ideational 
contestation. 
The postmodern ethico-political subject23 is not however 
identical with its historical forebears, but is construed in 
the light of structuralist and post-structuralist models of 
exchange. It is a subject that is both constituted and 
40 
disassembled or dislocated in its historical specificity. 
Before elaborating further however, it is worth looking back 
once again to the subject whose birth concurred with the 
sense of community constituted out of Lack, this time 
formulated explicitly by way of social contract theory. This 
exposition is performed in order to trace the structure of 
inheri tance and encystment that pervades theories of the 
postmodern community prescribing a particular relation to 
Kantian critique and precluding advancement into the terrain 
of the post-human. 
Hobbesian conceptions of the body politic tend to consider 
the community in essentialist or organicist terms with all of 
its constituent parts absorbed into a wholeness or Oneness of 
the social body. In such theories, the body is ruled by the 
head under which its members are subsumed and the whole is 
taken to precede its parts. Enlightenment social contract 
theory, on the other hand, sees the community as being formed 
out of a mutual indebtedness (bond and obligation), these 
theories assume some prior constitution of freely determining 
Subjects aggregating to form a community, whereby the part is 
alre~dy a whole before its encounter with other parts. 
(Extreme versions of these theories are to be found in 
fascism and possessive individualism respectively. ) What both 
theories have in common is that they position the subject as 
an organizing category prior to any relation. Each operates 
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in such a way as to either reduce or wholly eliminate social 
difference, the result being an overwhelming sense of loss, 
of the feeling of what it is that is constituted in and by 
community. 
Johannes Althusius24 , in his Politica Methodice Digesta 
[1603] was the first thinker to speak of politics as a 
science of symbiotics, positing association through contract 
as its fundamental category. He was also the first, however, 
to strictly delineate association into the realms of the 
public and the private. Private association being where 
indi vidual men covenant among themselves in respect of family 
and trade, professional and other civil associations. Public 
association resulting from the linking together of many 
private associations to form an inclusive political order. 
This distinction bred further, now traditional disjunctions, 
'including the separation of public associations into the 
particular and universal, Michael Less noff explains: 
"Families and collegia •.• unite to form ..• a 
community, a category which embraces hamlets, 
villages, towns and cities. These are particular 
public associations, constituted by 'fixed laws', 
and their members are not individuals but private 
associations .•• Uni versal public authority - the 
realm, commonwealth or people - consists of a 
number of provinces and cities, united by a 'tacit 
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or express promise' in which they bind themselves 
'to hold, organize, use and defend ... the law of 
the realm'. Thus a people is constituted, with its 
own law, and capable of contracting with a future 
ruler. But the terms of that future contract [and 
indeed all contracts after the original one] are 
already determined by the prior contract by which 
the realm and its law, were instituted. It is the 
people that are sovereign, and the ruler is only 
their supreme magistrate, charged with 
administering the laws of association. " 
[Lessenoff. p.37] 
Despite debacles (from Locke, Hobbes, Rousseau and Kant on to 
Rawls and beyond) as to the historical reality, ideality or 
hypotheticali ty of the original contract (and the tacit 
consent assumed of future generations), along with the right 
of resistance relating to the positioning of inviolable 
rights (as pre- or post-political), the birth of community in 
the configuration of a full or whole body held together by 
associations that are not themselves reducible to the 
cOuplings of body parts, has operated as the glossy surface 
upon which the various permutations of social contract theory 
have reflected and legitimated the vision of the fully 
constituted subject lending to man his legislative and 
juridical authority. 
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The implicit assumption - the ghost in the mirror - is the 
redemptive figure of the Nazarene in the spirit of 
Christianity; morality as binding categorical imperative, the 
immaterial bond of association (promise, debt, obligation, 
duty) that has glued together partial and diverse forces of 
humanity into the single image of the social community as 
adolescent Body Politic. 
Thomas Carlyle in Sartor Resartus (over 200 years after 
Althusius) writes: 
"[I]f government is, so to speak, the outward SKIN 
of the Body Politic, holding the whole together 
and protecting it; and all your Craft-Guilds and 
Associations for Industry, of hand or head, are 
the Fleshy Clothes, the muscular and osseous 
tissues (lying under such SKIN), whereby society 
stands and works; - then is Religion the innermost 
Pericardial and Nervous Tissue, which ministers 
Life and warm Circulation to the whole. Without 
which Pericardial Tissue, the Bones and Muscles 
(of Industry) were inert, or animated only by a 
Galvanic Vitality; the SKIN would become a 
shrivelled pelt, or a fast-rotting raw-hide; and 
Society itself a dead carcass, - deserving to be 
buried." [Sartor Resartus Bk III. p.172] 
Life is blown into the multiplicity in the form of the sticky 
ectoplasm of moral association and promise of the coming 
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communi ty . 25 
Whilst Locke, Hobbes and Rousseau establish civil society by 
providing for centralized government (differentiating it from 
the state of nature by way of the latter's absence of Power 
[Hobbes] or Judge [Locke]), it is the myth of obligation to 
the whole - spirit glue or sensus-in-common (most fully 
explicated by Kant and the sons of Enlightenment Humanism) 
which permeates their contracts and institutes the image of 
the community as semi-divine social body and subject. 
As the sketch of the universal subj ect26 or ghost in the 
mirror is fleshed out however, the fully integrated subject 
born of it is confronted with only partially constituted 
others, that is, with (social or machinic) difference. Such 
partial (or schizophrenic) images instead of forming 
determinate parts of the reflection, begin to scatter and 
reformulate themselves in ever more perverse forms for which 
no blueprint can be located. The unity of man is shattered 
and the Gemeinshaftlichen becomes orientated around a sense 
of lack or loss. (Thus the lucrative business of Freudian 
damage limitation in the form of Oedipus.) This is the loss 
that results from the myth of a prior or original unity, the 
unity whose glue was not strong enough to prevent the 
mutation and spontaneous emergence of demons occurring 
alongside the birth of an individuated 'whole' and 
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'psychically integrated' subject. Lyotard refers to this 
sketch of the subject in his essay on the sensus communis, 
whereby: 
"A subjectivity hears itself from far off and 
intimately at the same time, in this frail and 
singular unison, the subject is being born, but it 
will never be born as such. Once born, the subject 
is only the Ich denke." 
[Who Comes after the Subject? p.l33] 
Theories purporting to bring into being a fully constituted 
subject, in requiring the collapse of both transcendent 
(Noumenal) and empirical (experiential) subjectivity into the 
space of the transcendental, merely project a space for the 
coming subject who can, by definition, never arrive. 
The texts of social contract theory, rather than describing 
the dynamic commercium of community in the real, limit such 
community 
within the bounds of a political or juridical authority 
abstracted from or constituted by means of the myth of the 
full body and the desire (through lack) of a reformulated 
Subject yet to arrive. The unity constituted in this 
secondary process of socialization through the construction 
of the community as civil society of individuated subject-
citizens is then taken as a re-formation (and reformulation) 
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of that prior (pre-subjecti ve) unity, the redemption of 
original community. In this sense both body politic and 
social contract theories in being founded upon the thought of 
community as (lost) communio are indebted to the redemptive 
narrative of Christianity. Georges Van Den Abbeele notes: 
"Consensus, communism, and communion, [are] 
subtended by a myth of immanence that would 
explain their coming into being as but the 
unravelling or disclosing of what already is, the 
underlying com-unis whose full revelation awaits 
the Second Coming, the Revolution, or the 
compromise of consensus." [Abbeele. The Community 
at Loose Ends Introduction] 
In postmodernity (advanced or late Capitalism) constructions 
of community based around or regressing towards totalizing 
structures of communio have become evermore mystical as a 
result of the serial killings of God, history and 
metaphysics, culminating in the death of the classical 
Subject as organizing principle of transcendence. It is the 
demise of this last and its inseparability from the 
disintegration of private/public and inner/outer 
distinctions, that have resulted in the collapse of the 
categories of particularity and universality and demanded a 
move towards a more radical thinking of singularity. 
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It is largely as a result of the privileging of singularity 
particularly in respect of Levi-straussian exchangist models 
that current theorists of community have succeeded in 
escaping from positing the centrality of the fully 
constituted historical subject as the measure or mediator of 
commercium. As the subject is dispersed and dispossessed of 
his identity, his politics, ethics and theology are consigned 
to ashes, to be scattered upon the corpse of the 
transcendental subject. What has emerged out of Exchangist 
models of society however, is a thinking that binds itself to 
rituals and the rapture of commemoration, of 'crisis' and 
mourning; a thinking that forces the possibility of 
commercium back within the categorical framework of a 
metaphysics of existence and an ontology of Man. 
The community is born-again, no longer on the theatrical 
stage, but this time within the format of the soap opera; its 
sensus communis elaborated in a series of (non-interactive) 
wri tten or viewed tasks, advertised in the titillating 
ti tIes: "the inoperati ve communi ty" , "the unavowable 
community", "the community at loose ends"; each episode 
promising new forms of horror and alienation. Abbeele, in his 
introduction to The community at loose ends writes: 
"impersonali ty, anonymity, and soli tude are the 
lot of a modern community crowded into ever-
expanding urban conglomerates, .•. the very bonds 
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of social interaction are sundered by the 
multifarious dislocations, disruptions, and 
disappropriations that characterize life in 
postindustrial societies. " [Abbeelee. The 
Community at Loose Ends. Intro] 
To refuse one's invite to the funeral party mourning beside 
the grave of a father who, never having been born, can never 
be successfully commemorated, requires that we incinerate our 
boxes of man-sized tissues. Man has been more radically re-
configured in relation to nature in our century than in any 
other: He is becoming other-than and not more-than man, he is 
turning away from representation and learning the art of 
simulation, an art that 'Woman' has practiced on the surface 
of and behind the matrix and the mirror (the focus 
imaginarius) since her inception as logical function of 
Otherness (both sacred and profane) in metaphysics. If 
humanity is not to be obliterated by the community that has 
no time for its progress and destiny, then it has to learn 
the practices of becoming-post-human. It has to learn that 
the only thing that it has "in common" is the ability to 
become. It is time for us to re-map, re-spatialize and re-
think desire, and push community, force and life into the 
realm of the post-human. To make such a move necessitates 
that we relinquish the Kantian dream of being "more than 
man", that we de-essentialize not just the thought of the 
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subject, but also of that destiny, that telos of community 
that designates his time of birth and place of death. 
In his Preface to the Inoperative Community, Nancy asserts 
that "the political is the place where community is brought 
into play". The playground, or space, as a "dimension of the 
'in-common'" does not occur in relation to a subject, nor is 
the subject its product. Nancy tells us that "being self", is 
"co-originary and co-extensive with it". Insofar as "being 
self" can be equated with the deferred originality of the I 
(and the reflexive aesthetic I) of Kantian critique, we can 
trace the lineage from the ~ where this being emerges in 
relation to the space of the in common as sensus communis 
logically prior to any attempt to conceptualize the 
transcendental unity of apperception. 27 
For such post-Kantian thinkers it should not be thought that 
this space of the political is simply "one political place 
among others", it is rather, suggestive of that nothingness 
to which Lyotard refers in the Differend: 
"politics is not at all a genre, it bears witness 
to the nothingness which opens up with each 
occurring phrase and on the occasion of which the 
differend between genres of discourse is born." 
[Lyotard The Differend p.199] 
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In "bearing witness" however, a certain ability to connect, 
to link onto (to listen into) the stimme (the harmonious 
voice) of community is assumed (and stratification is evoked 
if not encrypted). Nancy claims that he is writing from a 
"definite political determination •.. from the left ... [this 
meaning] at the very least, that the political, as such, is 
receptive to what is at stake in community (On the other 
hand, 'right' means, at least, that the political is merely 
in charge of order and administration)". Order and power 
relations are placed in the sphere of politics as genre 
(juridical, administrative, etc.) and equated with the birth 
of the subject (the determination of a being self). The 
notion of force however is separated off from this production 
and even from the political as such, the political, being 
that which, as metadiscourse, allows one to bear witness, or 
to pose the possibility of a differend, without itself being 
that space or nothingness. 
With this in mind it is possible, desirous even, to 
understand community (in terms of what is at stake) as a 
space of possible linkage - a flow of force(s). The community 
thought as sensus communis would then be a pre-judgement of 
the place in which community may arrive (where linkage occurs 
- and it is always occurring, now), for the sensus allocates 
it a seat or territory (by way of and in relation to the 
birth of the subject). 
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The play of forces in the coming community (of those with 
nothing in common) then precedes any right/left political 
distinction and the formulation of a logos; exceeding a 
metaphysics of the subject, in the play of the dynamic 
nonlinear interweaving of forces. 
"But there would be no power relations, nor would 
there be such a specific unleashing of power 
(there would be merely a mechanics of force), if 
the political were not the place of community 
in other words, the place of a specific existence, 
the existence of a being-in-common, which gives 
rise to the existence of being-self." 
[Nancy. The Inoperative Community. Introduction.] 
Against this 'mere mechanics of forces' (where mechanics is 
just the name for the recording, channeling and regulating of 
coded flows), Nancy posits an "in-common" which gives rise to 
the singular being rather than being co-originary with it. In 
this sense, it is the emergence of order from the mere play 
of forces, already determined as in-common, that produces 
singular being as a being that is dislocated in its sharing 
of the in-common. 28 The 'specificity' of this being - its 
existence - in terms of stability and identity consists only 
in the space of anticipated linkage, so long as the space of 
its ordering and empowering (its being in power relations) 
remains immanent to it. An immanence which, for Nancy, can 
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only be secondary in relation to the transcendence (the 
unrepresentability) of the space of the political. 
Denying the viability of this transcendental self-othering of 
the subject requires that one not simply refuse a role to 
politics (in the sense given), but recognize that politics 
and the political become indistinguishable as a means of 
judging or determining the operation of encrypting codes for 
social organization, whereby the play of forces becomes 
synonymous with its emergence into order. As Brian Arthur 
points out, "the political system isn't some exogenous thing 
that stands outside the game [it] is actually an outcome of 
the game - the alliances and coalitions that form as a result 
of' it." [Complexity. p. 332] For post-human desire, insofar as 
the self is always in a state of becoming (-woman, -machine, 
-animal, -alien, etc.), we can follow Donna Haraway in 
stating that "the cyborg is our ontology, it gives us our 
politics" [Simians. Cyborgs and Women p.191] and it does so 
by being party to inclusive rather than exclusive 
disjunctions. The cyborg defies categories of finitude, 
alterity and generation - it is not subject to (bound by) 
politics, but simulates it. 
In this way, the political can be viewed as a way of linking 
that attempts to give meaning in advance to the space in 
which community may arrive, in terms of an exposure of a 
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dislocated in-common. The task that both Nancy and Lyotard 
set themselves is to "bear witness" to community, to the 
differend, to "the interruption of singularities, or the 
suspension that singular beings are." [Nancy The Inoperative 
Community p.31] And thus it is for both a political project. 
"Politics ... is the threat of the differend. It is 
not a genre, it is the multiplicity of genres, the 
diversity of ends, and par excellence the question 
of linkage. It plunges into the emptiness where 
"it happens that ... " ... Politics consists in the 
fact that language is not a language, but phrases, 
or that Being is not being but There is's. It is 
tantamount to Being which is not. It is one of its 
names ... Everything is political if politics is 
the possibility of the differend on the occasion 
of the slightest linkage." [Lyotard The Differend 
p.138-9] 
But this cannot be asserted whilst Nancy claims that 
"community ... is given to us with being and as being", as 
"the sacred stripped of the sacred" [The Inoperative 
Community p.35]. Resistance to immanence is itself 
transcendent in claiming the status of metadiscourse that 
allows it to judge its own space of arrival. Lyotard, at the 
end of the Differend seems to recognize this problem when he 
remarks, "the occurrence doesn't make a story ... You can't 
make a political 'program' with it, but you can bear witness 
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to it. -- And what if no one hears the testimony, etc. -- Are 
you prejudging the Is it happening?" [The Differend p.18l] 
Community, for the like of Nancy, and arguably in the case of 
Lyotard, is not a play of forces but entails participation in 
propriety, in a justice that requires the "exposition" and 
the "sharing" of a logos. 29 The work of logos moreover, 
tends towards the assigning to community a "common being", 
despite Nancy's claim that: 
"Being in has nothing to do with communion, with a 
fusion into the body, into a unique and ultimate 
identity that would no longer be exposed. Being in 
common means, to the contrary, no longer having, 
in any form, in any empirical or ideal place, such 
a SUbstantial identity, and sharing this 
(narcissistic) 'lack of identity'." [Nancy ~ 
Inoperative Community Preface] 
Sharing in this lack (the sharing out of lack) is not 
associated with the celebration or commemoration of a lost 
communal fusion (whether real, ideal or hypothetical) in the 
common body. Rather, it is a task, a task of triple mourning 
in the face of the experience of finitude as that which it is 
impossible to make a work out of (whether as resurrection or 
burial). The community is not a project of recovering an 
experience of concealed immanence, it is not a work of death, 
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absolute or individual. Yet it is a task, a response to a 
historical narrative, a reactive sensus in which communal 
fusion is encysted by way of this unsuccessful triple 
mourning ("the death of the other ... my birth ... and my 
death" ) 30 • 
The historically informed encystment of finitude, the 
schematization of the classical subject, binds not only the 
political, but the body of the singular being: 
"Communi ty .•• is what happens to us - question, waiting, 
event, imperative - in the wake of society." [ibid] This wake 
is also the funeral wake of humanity, but one that Nancy does 
not bring to a close, despite having earlier informed us 
that: 
"the community presupposed as having to be one of 
human beings presupposes that in effect, or that 
it must effect, as such and integrally, its own 
essence, which is itself the accomplishment of the 
essence of humanness." [The Inoperative Community 
p.3] 
Community is still (s)cited as a "community of existence", 
and in his paper "Being in Common", Nancy states explicitly, 
"I am here bracketing out the question of whether to extend 
'existence' to all beings or only to certain of them such as 
people, animals and so forth." [p.l]. This then follows on 
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from his assertion in the Inoperative community that 
"community means ... that there is no singular being without 
another singular being and that there is what might be 
called, in a rather inappropriate idiom, an original or 
ontological 'sociality'." [Preface] Inappropriate indeed. 
Singular being, as a response and reaction to the failure of 
a metaphysics of the subject to appropriate that finitude 
which exceeds it, continues to privilege a stimmung in the 
death-knell of that like-subject. 31 
Nancy, along with other quasi-Kantian sons of the Schematism, 
poses community in crisis in the face of the new 
"imperialisms" of "techno-economics". Verena Conley, in the 
coliection Community at loose ends suggests an alternative 
view, "perhaps there is no crisis, no resolution and no 
destiny, only a trembling, an agitation in the wind, and the 
question would be less that of a gap than of a continuous 
linking, unlinking, in a movement, and of a (non-) communal: 
qU'est-ce nous agite?" [Community at Loose Ends p.69. Quote 
amended] . 
The social body, of the body pol i tic and social contract 
theory is the body of secondary processes (premised upon the 
myth of an originary transcendental unity, real, ideal or 
hypothetical). In our era - having cut the umbilical cord to 
the Humanist universal body without suturing the ends - there 
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is proffered an alternative to the celebration, commemoration 
and mourning over this unburied corpse, namely, the anorganic 
or orgasmic body of libidinal economy, defined not by its 
consti tuti ve organization, but by its states, (i ts 
trembling) . Community as the commercium upon this 
undifferentiated body involves processes of excitation 
conducted through codes and patterns of intensity (where 
socialization is the marking and being marked through 
linkage, de- and re-codification). 
The anorganic body is no more subsumable under the exchangist 
model of society than it is under Hobbesian body politic or 
the Lockian social contract. De-codified flows do not become 
properties or belongings of a privatized subject, for in 
advanced capitalism there is no reconstitution of parts 
dispersed across a social field, but rather a freeing up of 
them for ever more diverse couplings and linkages in 
extension, elaboration and transformation. There is a problem 
with this body however, for in separating itself off from the 
project of Humanist Enlightenment (where the theory of 
Humanism and the event of Enlightenment thought are deemed 
inseparable), it runs the risk of being bled of all measure 
of critical thought, becoming just another exercise in 
postmodern apocalypse banality. A fuller exposition of this 
point will be returned to in the chapter on ethics and life. 
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There is no need to protect or save community in the name of 
justice, for as Al Lingis points out, "The sense of justice 
is the sense that certain couplings ... are right ••. The 
tourist's aging white throat and the knife in the [Brazilian] 
adolescents fist, for example." [Lingis. Unpublished work] 
There is no subject accredited with moral being--being there-
-by rational communitarianism. To 'be there' as a whole, is 
an ethical demand, a demand to be responsible, to answer for 
what one sees, and says and does, in terms of which being a 
member of society means to exist and act under accusation. 
Society is becoming-schizophrenic. The notion of an 
integrated 'being there' is no longer dissociable from the 
alienated body, of man estranged from both the instruments 
and resources of his work and from the fruits of his labour, 
as well as from his own body-parts, forcing him to sell his 
arms, his back, his brain, his imagination. The two are 
indissociable because it is the notion of alienation that 
invokes the notion of the integral man who would belong to 
himself, possess his own body parts, his own imagination 
whims and will. These dreams of alienation and integration 
are more than ever finding themsel ves confronted with a 
reality where parts are no longer parts of a full body (a 
body that is 'mine'), but are always interchangeable. 32 What 
is sold in prostitution models of capitalist society is 
always 'oneself' and yet there is no self that is not an 
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interchangeable part. Lingis again: 
"There is no longer any oneself involved •.. Or 
rather there is a self but it is another: the 
client does not just want wet meat to masturbate 
against, he wants a Brazilian mulatta, a Parisian 
tart, and it is these selves that organize the 
kisses, caresses, lubrications, and discharges and 
materialize in them. The young law-school graduate 
gives over his intelligence, his imagination, his 
thespian skills, his cordiality to the company, 
and there forms a self that answers for the things 
seen, said, and done for the company. Another self 
that may form, after hours, on week-ends, finds 
itself more and more absorbed into the self that 
was sold to the company." [Lingis. Unpublished 
work] 
Is not this space, this non-place of othering-self-other the 
prescribed abode of Woman? Is this not that demarcated zone 
on the boundary of subjectivity where the concept of Woman 
has been used to practice the art of simulation through 
generations of a time she has been outside of? If this is her 
simulation however, it cannot be absorbed (as is the law 
student's), and yet it may be appropriated by those who would 
bring into being a seductive vista of community-in-crisis, a 
unified schizophrenia for the consumer 90's. The necessity of 
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examining in depth the concept of Woman in the light of this 
assertion is clear. This task must however be postponed a 
little, for in order to understand the significance of its 
role for the postmodern subject, we must first come to a 
better understanding of that which it is being appropriated 
in order to replace. 
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1. In the Observations, Kant says of woman, "they contain the 
chief cause in human nature for the contrast of the beautiful 
qualities with the noble, and they refine even the male sex." 
[p. 77-8] Yet these beautiful qualities are exemplary of 
woman's essence only insofar as she is defined in relation to 
man's destiny. "The principle object is that the man should 
become more perfect as a man, and the woman as a wife." 
[p.9S] The essence of woman is made non-threatening in its 
reciprocal (reflective) organization. Woman is culturally 
constructed, and it is man's role to "cuI ti vate their 
[women's] beautiful nature." [p.79-80] 
2. Habermas, in Legitimation Crisis quotes P. Berger on the 
chaotic nature of reality: "Men are congenitally compelled to 
impose a meaningful order upon reality. This order, however, 
presupposes the social enterprize of ordering world-
construction ••. The ultimate danger of such separation [from 
society] however, is the danger of meaninglessness. This 
danger is the nightmare par excellence, in which the 
indi vidual is submerged in a world of disorder, senselessness 
and madness." [Legitimation Crisis p.118] 
Habermas himself then goes on to remark "The fundamental 
function of world-maintaining interpretive systems is the 
avoidance of chaos, the overcoming of contingency ... 
contingencies of an imperfectly controlled environment could 
be processed simultaneously with the fundamental risks of 
human existence." [ibid p.118-9] 
3. Schizophrenia is being used here in a Deleuzian sense, as 
that which demands a practice of schizoanalysis. Mark Seem 
explains schizoanalysis thus: "A schizoanalysis 
schizophrenizes in order to break the holds of power and 
institute research into a new collective subjectivity and 
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revolutionary healing of mankind. For we are sick, so sick, 
of our selves!" [Anti-Oedipus p.xxi] 
4. Life tends to be categorized by the bio-sciences in terms 
of its being wet or dry, natural or artificial. The competing 
definitions in these areas will be examined at length in 
section 19, but for the present a provisional outline will 
sUffice: i) The essence of life lies in process, not physical 
structure. ii) Since the process is the essence, the medium 
in which the process occurs is merely a matter of 
convenience. iii) The self-organizing aspect of life is a 
consequence of a natural law or laws and should operate in 
any system of comparable complexity. 
5. This "coming" is not to be thought of temporally in 
relation to a linear progression of past-present-future, but 
as a collapse of the transcendental into immanence. 
6. It is sensus communis that grounds the very possibility of 
Taste, indeed "taste [is] a kind of sensus communis". [CJ 
#42] 
7. Humanism covers a wide range of views based upon a belief 
in the power of human agency in history. The principle shared 
assumptions of these views are: i) The belief that human 
beings (as a universal category) have a potential value in 
and of themselves and that it is respect for this potential 
which is the source of all other human values and rights. 
Communication (qua sensus communis) reason (rationality) and 
adherence to human moral law in freedom of choice and action 
are the usual contents of this potential. ii) A rejection of 
any theories with nihilistic tendencies. A rejection of 
theories placing the foundation of value outside the human 
condition. A rejection of materialism and other proclamatory 
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determinist or reductionist accounts of consciousness. 
8. "[M]an as an animal endowed with the capacity of reason 
(animal rationable) can make himself a rational animal 
(animal rationale). On these grounds he first preserves 
himself and his species; secondly, he trains, instructs and 
educates his species for social living; thirdly, he governs 
the species as a systematic whole (arranged according to 
principles of reason) which belong to society." 
[Anthropology. p.238] 
9. Both Kant and Genet make explicit the fundamentally 
unsociable nature of the human animal. This is then held in 
tension with their inclination toward brotherhood; for Kant, 
through the necessity of socialization to achieve a moral 
destiny; for Genet, through criminality in the pursuit of the 
unethical. 
10. The notion of domestication referred to here is not that 
of sheep but rather of bees or ants: "Man was not meant to 
belong to a herd like the domesticated animals, but rather, 
like a bee, to belong to a hive community. It is necessary 
for him always to be a member of a civil society." [A. p.247] 
11. Desire is not a projection towards this "more than man" 
for it does not lack anything; it does not lack its object. 
It is, rather, the subject that is missing in desire, or 
desire that lacks a fixed subject. 
12. This need not be the story of the Nazarene, though that 
tale is perhaps its ideal epistle. In a contemporary case: 
"David shook, and willed himself not to shake. Every needle 
blazed. Every needle froze. The skin around the piercing's 
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heated and swelled. The rest of his skin was clammy and cold. 
And she was perfect, in front of him, her face a bestial mask 
of sadistic lust. Lena was masturbating at the spectacle of 
his willing vulnerability, the suffering he offered up to 
her, the bleeding wounds he had held still for her to make, 
and allowed her to bind. He wanted .•• everything. Consumption. 
To be used, to be used up completely. To be absorbed into her 
eyes, her mouth, her sex, to become part of her substance." 
[Califia. Melting Point p.10S] 
13. The necessity that is thought in an aesthetic judgement 
is exemplary, being neither derived from concepts nor 
inferred from the universality of experience. It is "a 
necessity of the assent of all to a judgement which is 
regarded as the example of a universal rule that we cannot 
state." [CJ. p.74] This requirement of universal judgement 
take~, however, the form of an "ought", that is, it has at 
its basis a subjective principle determining what pleases or 
displeases in respect of feeling (not a concept), which 
possesses universal validity. We can thus make a firm 
distinction between Gemeinsinn thought of ( i ) as common 
understanding where one judges by concepts; (ii) as a 
principle through which one judges by feeling. It is this 
latter as both the (presupposed) condition and as the product 
of pure aesthetic feeling in the judgement of taste that 
gives it its necessity: "It is only under the presupposition 
that there is common sense (by which we do not understand an 
external sense, but the effect resulting from the free play 
of our cognitive powers) •.• that the judgement of taste can be 
laid down." [CJ. #19] 
14. The aesthetic judgement, in having no (determinate) 
concept for its use, is unable to occupy a realm but it must 
make do with a field, and this determined reflectively (that 
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is, to a second degree), 
"not by the commensurability between a 
presentation and a concept, but by the 
indeterminate commensurability between the 
capacity for presenting and the capacity for 
conceptualizing. This commensurability is itself 
an Idea, its object is not directly presentable. 
It results from this, that the universality 
invoked by the beautiful and the sublime is merely 
an Idea of community, for which no proof, that is, 
no direct presentation, will ever be found, but 
only indirect presentations." 
[Lyotard. Political Writings. p.168] 
In the dynamical antinomy of taste, the thesis states that 
the universality of the beautiful requires a consensus 
identical to the one obtainable for the true; the antithesis, 
that there is no concept corresponding to aesthetic 
presentation and therefore that there can be no consensus of 
that kind, and hence, no universality. The solution to this 
antinomy resides in the claim that there must be ~ present a 
"feeling" possessed even by those in dissent, for otherwise 
they would not be able to disagree. This feeling is the bond 
of "communicability" which maintains itself as a feeling 
whilst at the same time attempting to transform itself into 
an explicit consensus over what motivates it, namely, the 
Idea of the beautiful. 
"The phrase of taste is a phrase in suspense or in 
suspension onto which each of the interlocutors 
links in a heterogeneous way, but a phrase whose 
sense each ought to try to formulate completely. 
Communicability is thereby required "as a duty so 
to speak" [#40] and taste is the faculty that 
judges it a priori." [ibid. p.169] 
In this sense then, the role of the sensus communis in 
aesthetical judgement functions as an appeal to community 
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carried out a priori and judged without rule of direct 
presentation. But where in the case of ethics and moral 
obligation, community is required by the mediation of a 
concept of reason, the Idea of freedom; in the aesthetic of 
the beautiful it is called forth immediately without 
mediation (of concepts or sensations) but by feeling alone, 
insofar as this feeling can be shared a priori. Thus 
communi ty is already present as taste, but not yet as 
rational consensus. 
15. It is because of the "ought" of the aesthetical judgement 
that this judgement has exemplary validity and cannot be 
grounded upon experience. It is "a mere ideal norm, under the 
supposition of which I have a right to make into a rule for 
everyone a judgement that accords therewith" [~. p.76] The 
principle of assent is "subjectively universal •.• and thus can 
claim,universal assent (as if it were objective) provided we 
are sure that we have correctly subsumed [the particulars] 
under it." [ibid] Such surety is the result of the 
internalization of a certain terror of the power of reason, 
a terror that is more powerful than any experienced in 
nature, and with which we are able to mutilate ourselves. It 
is this internalization of terror and its basis in the higher 
realms of the moral law that are produced in the feeling of 
the sublime. 
16. Our initiation into society takes the form of a 
contractual agreement, it is not simply an attachment to the 
closed plenum of the transcendental body. We partake in a 
mimetic relation with the supersensible (as prescribed by 
law) through a reciprocal relation with nature (seen as 
mediator between man and the divine). Our markings, as 
distinct from those of savage societies, express ideas and 
are profoundly related to the voice [Stimme]. They do not 
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express a dexterity of the hands but a mastery of "dead and 
learned languages" [CJ #47] inspired anew to life by the 
aesthetic ideas passed on to us by the divine through the 
workings of a (purposive) nature that we cannot comprehend. 
The mark of the poet is not his signature but the very 
production of his labour which stretches his being out 
(martyring him by way of his imagination) between the poles 
of animal existence and the purveyor of the regulative idea 
of reason. Entering into society meaning signing and abiding 
by the contract of self-inclined-mutilation. 
17. Lyotard puts it thus: "The sensus communis as unanimity 
about the beautiful, unanimity required and promised in each 
singular aesthetic judgement, is the witness or the sign (and 
not the proof) 'at the heart of/ ... subjectivity, the witness 
or sign of an Idea that relates itself to this subjectivity 
and tnat legitimates this requirement and this promise." 
[Lyotard. Sensus communis p.230] 
18. In the CPR the I can never present or properly anticipate 
itself as it is always in some sense behind itself on its 
self-knowledge in that such knowledge requires a 
determinative synthesis. In the aesthetic experience of the 
~ however, there is no determination, the synthesis is 
rather reflexive and does not presuppose a prior unity, it is 
only ever a singular incidence of unison that can be neither 
prepared for nor forestalled. The heterogeneous faculties 
that are brought into play in the aesthetic state of mind are 
never homogenized but play together as one in harmony. Should 
the understanding succeed in recuperating the forms (of the 
aesthetic occasion) intellectually, it can only do so by way 
of introducing the determinative mechanism of the schematism, 
in which case the experience is no longer aesthetic but 
intellectual (as the form moves into a space where it has 
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already been prepared fori its parameters determined by the 
categories), and punctuated by the temporality of a 
transcendental unity of apperception. 
19. "[I]t is not the pleasure, but the universal validity of 
this pleasure, perceived as mentally bound up with the mere 
judgement of upon an object, which is represented a priori in 
a judgement of taste as a universal rule for the judgement 
[to say] that I perceive and judge an object with pleasure. 
But it is an a priori judgement [to say] that I find it 
beautiful, i.e. I attribute 
everyone .... If we could assume 
this 
that 
satisfaction to 
the mere universal 
communicability of a feeling must carry in itself an interest 
for us with it (which, however, we are not justified in 
concluding from the character of a merely reflective 
judgement), we should be able to explain why the feeling in 
the jqdgement of taste comes to be imputed to everyone as a 
duty." [~. #37] 
But this, as Kant says, is something we cannot do, firstly, 
because to invest the sensus communis with an interest would 
be to give it a conceptual basis, and to do so would be to 
prevent it from being able to excite the understanding into 
play (the understanding being already in action)i secondly, 
and more importantly, it would not be possible because we are 
here dealing with a secondary process. The primary process, 
that is the primary repression of the productive imagination 
that constructs the underlying notion of community (as lack) 
and that dishes out the morally prescriptive "ought", cannot 
be accessed other than indeterminately. At this level of 
sensus communis we can speak only of communication, society 
and culture. Existence comes after taste. 
20. In more detail these maxims run as follows: (1) To think 
for oneself, to have unprejudiced thoughti Enlightenment, 
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clear-sightedness; Understanding. The maxim of "unprejudiced" 
thought is that of a never passive reason (as distinct from 
superstition, a blindness in which one "represents nature as 
not subject to the rules that the understanding places at its 
basis by means of its own essential law. " [CJ #40]). 
Enlightenment is deliverance from superstition, unprejudiced 
thought is "that bare negative which properly constitutes 
enlightenment" [CJ #40ff]. (2) To be in the thought of 
others, to have enlarged thought, to think from a universal 
standpoint; Judgement. Enlarged thought stands in opposition 
to narrowmindedness (limited thought), "whose talents attain 
to no great use (especially as regards intensity)" [ibid]. A 
man of enlarged thought is able to disregard the subjective 
private conditions of his own judgement and reflect from a 
universal standpoint (from nowhere) which he attains by way 
of placing himself in the place of others. (3) To think 
consistently, to have consecutive thought. This comes about 
from the combination of (1) and (2) in "habit". Its faculty 
is that of reason; it is the ability to think for oneself and 
(yet) to do so from a universal standpoint. 
21. Encystment is a term relating to the process of 
unsuccessful mourning as described by Freud (and Derrida). In 
successful mourning there is a gradual withdrawal of 
investment from the dead one and a becoming free of them. In 
unsuccessful mourning, the disinvestment is sudden and 
entails an incorporation of the dead one in the form of 
encystment. The encysted dead one (usually the parent) 
survives in the interior crypt of the living mourner who is 
then (himself) swallowed up through a process of 
exteriorization. 
22. As Lyotard remarks in reference to the sensus communis of 
the Critigue of Judgement: 
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"The sensus communis ... remains a hypotyposis: it 
is a sensible analogue of the transcendental 
euphony of the faculties, which can be only the 
object of an Idea, and not of intuition. This 
sensus is not a sense, and the sentiment that is 
supposed to affect it ... is not common, but only in 
principle communicable. There is no assignable 
community of sentiment, no affective consensus in 
fact. And if we claim to have recourse to one, or 
a fortiori to create one, we are victims of a 
transcendental illusion and we are encouraging 
impostures." [Who Comes after the Subject p.233] 
23. There is no firm distinction drawn in this writing 
between the modern and postmodern subject. Both modes of 
thought can and often do refer to the same notion of 
subjectivity in crisis, however, where the modern theory of 
the subject might cling on to some notion of possible 
progress and development, its postmodern heir is either 
already dispersed to the point of irrecoverable or is on a 
perpetual suicide binge. 
24. Al thusius organized his Politics according to Ramist 
logic (based on Peter Ramus' logic of invention and 
disposition [judgement]). Its general principle was that the 
matter of organization of political science be in accord with 
the maintenance of social life among men (ie. in terms of 
justice, truth and method). He states that: "Politics is the 
art of associating men for the purpose of establishing, 
cultivating and conserving social life among them. Whence it 
is called 'symbiotics'." [quoted in Less noff p.xix] 
25. The theme of spirit performs the circulatory role binding 
moral association, as when Kant claims that "spirit .•• is the 
animating principle in the mind" [.cJ: p.157], and again, 
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elsewhere, that "spirit is the animating principle in a 
person" [6 p.124]. 
26. cf. Lyotard. "Sensus Communis" in Who Comes after the 
Subject. p.232. 
27. Nancy claims that consciousness and communication, as 
ecstasy, is never 'mine', but that I have it only in and 
through community. "[I]t is not an unconscious - that is to 
say it is not the reverse side of the subject, nor its 
splitting. It has nothing to do with the subjects structure 
as a self; it is clear consciousness at the extremity of its 
clarity, where consciousness of self turns out to be outside 
the self of consciousness. Community, which is not a subject, 
does not have or possess this consciousness; community is the 
ecstatic consciousness of the night of immanence insofar as 
such a consciousness is the interruption of self-
consciousness." [The Inoperatiye Community p.19] 
28. Exposition through sharing and dislocation are Kantian 
predicables of the category of community. In the ~, it is 
stated that there belongs to each of the categories pure 
deri vati ve concepts - predicables - which (although Kant 
refuses to deal with them at any length) are named, for the 
category of community, as being those of "presence" and 
"resistance". 
29. Justice, in this sense, is just another name for morality 
experienced as solidarity. Thus society maintains itself 
within a structure of fundamentally interpersonal 
relationship with morality as its regulative principle. 
30. "Only the community can present me with my birth and 
along with it the impossibility of my reliving it, as well as 
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the impossibility of my crossing over into my death." [Nancy 
The Inoperative Community p.15] 
31. Nancy revivifies the movement of internalization through 
a thinking of alterity, calling for a "thinking of community 
in the proper sense ... shared between Daseins, between 
singular existences that are not subjects and whose relation-
-the sharing i tself--is not a communion, ... But these singular 
beings are themsel ves constituted by sharing, they are 
distributed and placed, or rather spaced, by the sharing that 
makes them others; other for one another, and other, 
infinitely other for the Subject of their fusion, which is 
engulfed in the sharing, in the ecstasy of the sharing: 
'communicating' by not 'communing'. These 'places of 
communication' are no longer places of fusion, even though in 
them one passes from one to the other; they are defined and 
exposed by their dislocation." [The Inoperative Community 
Preface] This might sound promising if it were not premised 
upon a fear of castration: it is too late to attempt to wed 
Woman to Heidegger, for there is no longer any such thing as 
'Woman'. Rapunzel has blown up the castle, shaved her head 
and persuaded the witch to move into silicon. 
32. A concrete example of this can be found in role of the 
human in manufacturing industry, where it is no longer simply 
a matter of the disembodiment of specific organs for 
allocated tasks. In 19th century, Eli Whitney put into 
practice his idea that if gun parts were machined accurately 
enough, guns could be assembled from the first parts that 
come to hand, rather than from parts tailored to the 
individual gun. This interchangeability of parts moved the 
worker away from his construing himself as a designated part 
by association with (and mimicry of) other specific parts (as 
in the mechanistic era). 
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4. The Kantian Subject 
In the previous chapter, we witnessed the failure of the 
traditional concept of community to ground an idea of 
community as a being-in-common (communio) of the post-
Enlightenment post-Humanist subject. communities attempt to 
domesticate and circumscribe desire within a communal 
structure of Being was shown to be successful only upon the 
presupposition of a Noumenal (transcendent) sphere wherein 
there is guaranteed the (unrepresentable) equi valence of 
transcendental subject with transcendental object. 
The productive space of the sensuous intuiting body opened up 
in the Transcendental Aesthetic of the Cri tigue of Pure 
Reason is immediately closed down with the assumption of a 
transcendental object once the pure concepts of the 
understanding have been imposed. As Schopenhauer famously 
remarks: 
"These later [the categories] become the fearful 
procrustean bed on to which he [Kant] violently 
forces all things in the world and everything that 
occurs in man, shrinking from no violence and 
disdaining no sophism in order merely to be able 
to repeat everywhere the symmetry of that table." 
[The World as will and Representation Vol.I. 
p.430] 
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The entrenchment of the categories in the experiential 
(knowable) world is then presented with a definitive game-
plan by means of the further imposition, upon a now passive 
faculty of sensation, of the transcendental schema (equating 
through determination the empirical subject with its object) . 
In her essay entitled "Paradox A Priori", Irigaray notes the 
consequences for unfettered sensation in its relationship to 
matter (a relation she conceives of in terms of an originary 
maternal link between Man and Nature)~, of this imposition: 
"Anything conceded to nature is immediately and 
imperiously taken back and will be found useful 
only insofar as it ensures more rigorous dominion 
over her. Thus, the function of the transcendental 
schema will be to negate an intrinsic quality of 
the sensible world, and this irremediably. Nature 
is foreclosed in her primary empirical naivete. 
Diversity of feeling is set aside in order to 
build up the concept of the object, and the 
immediacy of the relationship with the mother is 
sacrificed. . •. In this way the mul tiplici ty of 
unlabeled sensations is blacked out, reduced to a 
single entity that can be used to legislate--in 
the cruelty of the understanding--the bond to the 
empirical matrix, in other words, to hysteria." 
[Speculum p.204] 
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Schematization, as the mechanism of repression, by 
legitimating the categories of cognition, binds thought to a 
unitary and linear mode of progression that is both 
transcendentally determined and teleological. As can be seen 
from the very layout of the Critigue of Pure Reason, 
schematization only becomes possible once the division of 
thought between its twin operations in transcendental and 
empirical subjectivity has been elaborated. This division, by 
its very nature precludes a purely creative act of the 
imagination which is seemingly constrained, as slave to 
reason, to reproduction in the service of the understanding. 
Understanding, we are told in the "Transcendental Deduction" 
[~A97-8], is made possible by a threefold synthesis as the 
ground of the spontaneity of thought. These three synthetic 
operations are those of, "the apprehension of representations 
as modifications of the mind in intuition, their reproduction 
in imagination, and their recognition in a concept." [~ 
A97] The role of imagination in the second of these 
operations, whilst having the status of the a priori, in 
grounding the necessary synthetic unity of appearances, does 
so only on the level of representation, that is, in terms of 
already schematized determinations of inner sense. The most 
important principle a priori however, is that of the 
synthetic unity of the manifold in all possible intuition, 
which is supplied by pure apperception. The transcendental 
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unity of apperception, moreover, "relates to the pure 
synthesis of imagination as an a priori condition of the 
possibility of all combination of the manifold in one 
knowledge." [CPR Al18] What we are dealing with here is not 
the reproductive imagination involved in the second 
synthesis, but a purely productive imagination. In this sense 
then, and despite Kant's insistence upon the necessary unity 
of its power (a unity we assume to be imposed by reason and 
cannot yet think of in terms of harmonization or attunement), 
we witness the move that will eventually lead (in the 
Cri tiQue of Judgement) to the formulation of the idea of 
community from out of which the transcendental subject must 
emerge: "the principle of the necessary unity of pure 
(productive) imagination, prior to apperception, is the 
ground of the possibility of all knowledge, especially of 
experience." [ibid] 
Pure producti ve imagination in making possible the 
unrepresentable activity of the transcendental unity of 
apperception, (unrepresentable in that its action is always 
in advance of its product, empirical subjectivity), on Kant's 
own terms can have no temporal determination, but is rather 
the process of time determination for experience (as set out 
in the "Schematism"), thus, Kant asserts that it is a "pure 
original unchangeable consciousness" [Al07. my emphasis]. 
This notion of a unique, isolated and static apperception is, 
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of course, challenged by the very idea of an outside, an 
outside of its own activity and an outside of time. 2 In order 
to be receptive to "the given" of intuition, it must be 
empathetic, and for this to be possible, it must incorporate 
within itself some potential for development (rather than 
simply positing a totality through a transcendental idea).3 
In Kant's terms however, (and prior to the writing of the 
Critique of Judgement), such a claim involves the mistaken 
equation of empirical consciousness (apprehension of the 
manifold in intuition) with the transcendental unity of 
apperception, whose correlate is the transcendental object "= 
x", and/or a failure to appreciate the semi-divine quality of 
reason (having usurped the role of productive imagination) in 
relation to the unconditioned: 
"The concept of reason is ... none other than the 
concept of the totality of the conditions for any 
given conditioned. Now since it is the 
unconditioned alone which makes possible the 
totality 
totality 
of 
of 
conditions, 
conditions 
and, 
is 
conversely, the 
always itself 
uncondi tioned, a pure concept of reason can in 
general be explained by the concept of the 
unconditioned, conceived as containing the ground 
of the synthesis of the conditioned." [CPR B379] 
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Within the bounds of reason and the understanding, as drawn 
in the critique of Pure Reason, the radical potential for 
creati vi ty of the pure producti ve imagination cannot be 
explored. strict regulation of the sphere of reflection keeps 
its activity in check, re-configuring it in the form of a 
focus imaginarius for the territorializing claims of 
schematization. The options, elucidated here by Irigaray, are 
severely limited: 
"Either the 'mirror' has already been defined as 
inclusive of the object it must mirror, or it 
simply re-determines that object's intrinsic 
quali ty be framing it. Or the mirror does not 
'know' the 'object' proposed and has to constitute 
a general reproducible matrix while reflecting it. 
This requires the mirror to re-think it/himself, 
re-flect it/himself, so as to be able to 
subordinate to its/his unity and to the unity of 
its/his law this new diversion of nature which 
affronts it/him." [Speculum p.206] 
For Kant, the concept of the subject (as empirical, 
transcendental and Noumenal being) , was a radical 
formulation, a function of both universalization and 
individuation, whose purpose, at least in part, consisted in 
the renunciation of the simple idea of the soul as 
supersensible site for the being of community (at) one with 
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the divine. For Kant, the universal "I", that is the 
transcendental unity of apperception is both producer and 
product of the originary moment of communi ty , it 
determinations the time of experience and is thus motor of 
all schematization, unchallenged in its ascendancy once 
producti ve imagination has been suitably constrained and 
disenfranchised. The individuated "me" of the empirical 
subject, on the other hand, is the determined self, 
determined in time in its concrete engagement with the world 
through its senses, and thus the unwitting agent of 
schematization. 
The importance of the formulations arrived at in Kantian 
critique cannot be underestimated in the history of desire. 
The construction and emergence of the classical concept of 
the subject is generally held to have originated in the works 
of Descartes (and in a more complex and confused manner in 
Husserl's Cartesian Meditations). Its demise occurs (again 
debatably) somewhere between Nietzsche and Heidegger or 
Bataille. The occurrence of both its cUlmination--its 
sovereign moment in the articulation of Enlightenment thought 
(exemplified by Kant in his essay "What is Enlightenment?")--
and its downfall in the ideological destitution of the 
modernist subject and the de-centering, dispersion and 
disinheritance of its orphaned postmodern offspring however, 
must ultimately pay tribute to the critical inception of 
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Kantian philosophy into the machinations of western thought 
in its attempts to contain the forces of desire. 
Kant's schematism steadfastly differentiates between subject 
and object and fixes the (transcendental) subject firmly in 
the driving seat. With the elaboration of the true seat of 
community and determination of its subject in the critique of 
Judgement however, there emerges upon the critical scene an 
excess of matter, sensation and imagination (and ultimately 
thereby, practices of the self) escaping submission to 
schematization. 
In the decades since the Critiques, it has become 
increasingly obvious that the form of the object can no 
longer sustain the enterprise of truth. This being so, the 
subject itself, that is, the space of the subject in the 
process of schematization, has been de-objectified. In this 
movement, what we have seen is not what one might at first 
have expected, namely the denial of the efficacy of the 
empirical subject, the "me", although this may indeed be one 
of its effects. What has happened is rather a destabilizing 
(or, in a certain context, a deconstructive reversal) of the 
schematization itself and a freeing up of the productive 
imagination for non-objective association and interaction 
through commercium. The dism~ntelling of the schematism has 
effected (and is still in the process of affecting) a 
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collapse of the transcendental subject, the "I" onto the 
empirical "me" and a making immanent of the transcendental 
conditions for the continuation of a multiple self, no longer 
as universal and individuated being, but as singularity. 
Thinking the objectless subject entails that one can neither 
designate the subjects correlate in presentation, nor suppose 
that it answers to any of cognition's so-called objectives. 
The subject (thought of as a self) is freed up, dissociated 
from reflexive jurisdiction, and its focus imaginarius 
becomes a useless fiction of the ego. Retaining the concept 
"the subject" for the being whose conditions are immanent to 
it (the subject after the fall of the transcendental "I"), is 
thus feasible only when construed as that which Alan Badiou 
terms "what is locally born out". [After the Subject. p.25] 
"A subject is neither a result nor an origin. It is the local 
status of the procedure, a configuration that exceeds the 
situation." [ibid. p.27] 
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5. The Sensile Subject. 
The inadequacy of the traditional interpretation of the 
Kantian formulation of the subject can be thought of in terms 
of its failure to provide us with a satisfactory account of 
the experiential self, that is, the perceptual sensate 
embodied self. This failure, as we have highlighted, can be 
traced back to two problemmatics present in the first and 
third Critiques; the first concerning the ambiguous nature of 
the "given", and the second, the manner in which intuition is 
cast in a receptive role, in association with the synthetic 
function of the reproductive imagination, whose productive -
spontaneous - counterpart is disenfranchised. In light of 
this reading, it is important that we move now to a re-
assessment of the role played by intuition, or better, 
perception (vis-a-vis desiring production), in theories whose 
intent is not to ground or fall back upon a transcendental 
subject as the focal point of the experiential body. 
Merleau-Ponty, in his Phenomenology of Perception, focuses 
upon objects in the "sensible field" not simply as fixed 
spatio-temporal conf igurations or events, each particular 
(thing) is taken rather to be a generalization in process. In 
this way, the "given" in the sensible field is itself an 
attempted articulation of that field in becoming. Such a 
claim can be accommodated, to an extent, within the Kantian 
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framework by rephrasing the assertion such that each thing or 
event is the spatially punctuated moment in which the schema 
of being is elaborated. Unlike the ambiguous nature of the 
"given" in the critigue of Pure Reason however, here the 
sensible field is constituted as an active sphere of mass 
concretising commercium of becomings (becoming stable, fluid, 
coloured, rounded, deep, visible, audible, textual, etc.). 
When something in the sensible field touches the sensibility, 
all the sensitive surfaces of the body become fixated, moving 
so as to be centered upon it. The whole of sensibility 
converges, and what occurs is a certain stabilization, a 
normali?ing equilibrium is brought into effect, and this 
because, as a focal centre has been successfully pinpointed 
and homed in on, there is established as a base from which we 
can have a sense of what is up and down, right and left, near 
and far. There is no sense here in which what has been 
brought into being is to be thought of as a transcendental 
object, as reflection of the transcendental subject; focus 
imaginarius constructing by categorical demarcation the being 
of the object within the schematized environment. In Merleau-
Ponty's account, it is rather the body itself, as sensuous 
mul tiplici ty, that becomes a systems operator prescribing 
through systematization a hierarchy of levels and axes of the 
sensible field upon which things may materialize. 
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The surplus forces of the living body seek out configurations 
upon which to discharge themselves. Thus forces build up on 
the surfaces of the organisms boundaries whose accumulation 
and discharge affect themselves, intensifying in an immanent 
sensuality. This immanent (raw or original) sensibility is 
not a coalition for the comprehensive embrace of the real, 
but an anarchy without principles, a spiraling violence of 
pleasure and pain. And as Lingis tells us, 
"Our pleasures and our pains exhaust themselves; 
our laughter and our tears die away; our blessing 
and our cursing are carried away into the enigmas 
of the future and silences of the past. They are 
of , themselves gratuitous outpourings of force, 
expenditures without return. Their glory is purely 
worldly; their force does not hold or redeem." 
[Foreign Bodies p.l03] 
If the expanding aspect of reality is the real rather than 
ideal focus of sensibility, sensitivity and the sensuality of 
identity formation in its engaged commercium with others (its 
sensitivity towards and against, its tendencies and 
potentiali ties), then tension is maintained in the body 
through perpetual association or confrontation in differing 
interactions, that is, in the play of non-identicals. This is 
not to posit an essentializing aspect to perception, at least 
not as traditionally understood. If we must speak at all of 
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a sensuous essence of the perceived thing, then it must be 
thought of (following Lyotard and Lingis) as a musical theme 
that is one in all its variations. Essence, is itself 
evolutionary, it develops through commercium with other 
elements. There is never constituted in this way a complete 
unique and definitive article. 
According to Merleau-Ponty, a feature of the organism, as 
corporeal substance, is that it makes a sign for itself - "I" 
- to which it is itself witness, to which and with which it 
bears witness. Once the "I" is made from out of the corporeal 
substance it is possible to begin marking out a referential 
diagram,in relation to it. Such mapping looks suspiciously 
like the territorializing exploits of the focus imaginarius, 
although this time with a greater reflective distance (and 
thus not in the self identical relation of transcendental 
subject and object), where the outer environment, now 
designated as other, outer, not-I, can be mapped through the 
co-ordination of referents, partial objects and objectives. 
The making of the self is here the making of self into an 
object for self as for others, by becoming a referent of the 
sign put forth. 
In this account the environment is structured on the basis of 
an idea of repetition (re-iteration of the 'real'). Patterns 
are spaced, outlined and made distinct through referencing 
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objects to a quasi-Kantian, (but this time interpretive 
rather than schematic) focus imaginarius which presents us 
with signs of them. It is only by relating back through the 
silvered surface of the mirror to the sensual self, the 
surface of bodily sensation out of which the "I" was 
formulated; only by way of utilizing the movements and 
positions of this original crystallized sensual body, that 
such signing is possible. It is in the interconnection of the 
originary sensual body (which does not differentiate itself 
from any Other, but establishes difference in terms of 
differing potentials of force, expenditure and contentment), 
that the "I", that signing as a representational and 
reproduqtive method for producing objects, becomes possible. 
wi th this move however, we return inextricably back to 
witness the birth of a transcendental subject (the "I") from 
out of a Gemeinsinn of Gemeinschaft, that is, of community. 
The sensuous body is retained behind the silvered surface of 
the mirror, not as anorganic plenum, but as foetal corpse, a 
communio-social abortion. 
It is by no means necessary however, that an account of the 
formation of self on the basis of sensation, should return to 
the positing of a transcendental subject or schema (in 
whatever indirect or mystical form). In the following account 
(concerning the development of a baby), Brian Massumi 
presents us with an account of self founded upon the 
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conjunctive and connective syntheses of commercium: 
"So far, there is only a \ larval self'. It is 
ineffectual, fleeting, and strictly localized. It 
is tied to the conjunctive synthesis over which it 
hovers. It is actualized whenever that synthesis 
is actualized, in other words periodically, as the 
baby moves through the anticipated states its life 
is beginning to be. This self is not alone. There 
are many conjunctions of the same nature, and a 
similar self for everyone of them. The baby is a 
teeming mass of larval selves, each associated 
with a threshold state featuring a privileged 
organ on the way to satisfaction through 
connection with another privileged organ. On the 
feedback level of recognition, there are always at 
least two organs in play, usually nominally 
belonging to distinct bodies: mouth and breast. 
But it is no exaggeration to say that on this 
level the breast is as much a part of the baby's 
body as it is of the mother's. It is infolded in 
the infant brain. It is the inbetween of 
biological bodies, as infolded in memory." [A 
user's guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia p.?3] 
On the face of it, there is no necessity for phenomenological 
accounts of the self to stand opposed to Massumi's exposition 
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of the "larval self" in its states of becoming. The seeming 
focus imaginarius of the Phenomenologist need not function as 
a cognitive categorical nexus of power. For Merleau-Ponty it 
would be more accurate to speak of the focal point in terms 
of the integration of sensibility through a "postural schema" 
and not through conceptual mental operations, as that which 
helps explain the way in which we perceive one thing at a 
time within the multiplicity of the sensible field. There is, 
he claims, an internal systematics, or diagram of force 
orientated toward specific objectives that maintains itself 
in the systematic variation and redistribution of parts and 
powers. The body is in a perpetual state of tension. This is 
not to say that there is some central command system of will, 
it is rather the case that each energized part determines the 
force and orientation of the other powers; for the adult 
body, the foot stepping over the puddle induces a tilt in the 
axis of the torso and stabilizing displacements of the other 
leg, the head and arms. 
This idea of a motile body is, for Merleau-Ponty, neither a 
particular nor a universal, it is rather an element, a medium 
whose every particular position in a space and a time 
generalizes itself into a schema engendering a specific range 
of variations. As the same leg steps over a branch, it does 
not invent a new schema from scratch, but perfects an already 
existing one. Every occurrence of focusing upon something 
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creates anew, by picking up a schema, varying and actualizing 
it from others that have gone before. When I pass on this 
perception, sensation or experience, when I share it with 
others or force it upon them, I do not pass on qualia or 
sense-data, I do not exchange with them lithographs or maps 
of the world; I contaminate their sensibility with a virus, 
a viral schema that may work gradually, speedily or not at 
all on their schemas with which it is associated, drawing out 
new elements of force from patterns that lead back into past 
schematizations and forward into future compression. 
Engagement in the real environment, in this sense, involves 
participation (through synthetic operations) through a whole 
matrix of sensible levels. 4 
For Kant, man is the author of nature by virtue of his divine 
inheritance (his genius) and its judge by virtue of his 
humanity. Although he does not create the perceptible field 
of phenomena, it is he who gives it the coherence and 
consistency that make it realizable and meaningful through 
his perception of it, that is, through the cognitive ordering 
of what he senses. The sensible field is represented as a 
law-governed totality of nature. Schematization ensures the 
identification of sensations of things with concepts, under 
the overall command of the a priori imperative of 
universality and necessity (derived from the birth of the 
transcendental subject as being of community). If it is 
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possible, as has been attempted above, to transmute a 
Merleau-Pontian postural schema of the body into a viral 
schema, and to locate the mechanism of that schema in the 
attractor state of the body (the material and immaterial 
anorganic plenum variously mapped through the nervous system 
and synesthetic sensory apparatus), then the role of body 
itself must be more thoroughly analyzed than has so far been 
the case. For our project here, the phenomenological 
obsession with perception is too closely associated with an 
allegiance to a Kantian or quasi-Kantian subject by virtue of 
its problematic relation to consciousness and self-
consciousness. Its importance however, cannot be 
underestimated in terms of its introduction of non-cognitive 
schemas in the production of embodied selves. 
For Merleau-Ponty, the objective that demands coherence and 
consistency (of perception) lies in the object itself, or 
rather, is derived from the world-order and not from the 
subject as critical overseer. The (sensory-motor) body itself 
is part of this world-order and orients itself accordingly. 
In this way, what makes things the objectives of perception 
is the imperative force of the world, the world operating as 
imperative that drives perception ever further, and the world 
itself is evolving in commercium with 'us'. In formulating 
itself as a postural schema, this imperative integrates our 
sensibility and mobilizes our motor forces thereby ordering 
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our competence. 
To what extent can this theoretization of perception be 
carried over into post-modernity where the world is always 
virtual in its reality; with the world-order displaced in 
favour of an "order out of chaos" [Prigogene]? Do postmodern 
(impractical) spaces non-the-less enter into the imperative 
force of the practicable and real world? Should we re-assess 
the radicality of the move being addressed here and settle 
upon the claim that what is being effected is a retreat into 
the margins of the world and not an engagement with the 
virtual or a move into becoming, or assert that what is at 
stake is a necessary relationship with the power to advance 
into practicable reality and take hold of things? We must at 
least conclude that these options are unified in their 
failure to account for the complex nature of our engagement 
with a new order of realityS in our era of postmodernity so 
long as it is insisted upon that reality remain a 
fundamentally phenomenological concern where the 
unpracticable or non-place spaces of postmodernity are 
characterized as fragments of the perceived world. 
There are vortices towards which the body that lets loose its 
hold on predetermined and proscribed levels of the world--the 
dreaming, the visionary, the hallucinating, the lascivious 
body--gets drawn. As the body approaches these spaces and 
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sensibility enters into these vortices beyond the determined 
levels of world, it does so imperati vely ( al though not 
reactively). In these new spaces, these non-places of 
postmodernity, the phenomenology of the body is redundant. 
There is no demand for a focal point from which sight lines 
may be drawn and perspective (equilibrium and stability) 
ensured. In the non-place of cyberspace it isn't just that 
communication (as engagement with the environment) is 
changed, but the self, social space and interaction are 
themselves transformed. The socially situated self is 
intricately linked to other selves constructed in interaction 
with each other and the environment and influenced by the 
context· in which interaction unfolds, which includes the 
conditions (and limitations) of their production. Society and 
subjects are fragile constructions (of selfhood) dependent 
upon an interactive order. But the interactive event is no 
longer reliant upon a mystical or transcendent spillage in 
the form of the "given", nor upon a coercive imperative in 
the ordering of immanence for survival of the organism. The 
very identity allowing for composition of the organism is de-
programmed as the traditionally marked social values 
determining interaction drop away or become pawns in a game 
without any set rules. 
Our bodies as sensory-motor systems generate excess force, 
force that enables them to move towards perceived objectives 
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and in doing so, to code their own movements; as substances 
they can also be moved and coded by others. But this is no 
longer a process of subjectification through objectification 
(programming the de-coding of becoming), in the new 
cyberspace environment. The body of the post-human is a 
cyber-body, in process of becoming-woman that is immanent and 
non-schematizable as such. 
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6. Death and the Other: The end of Subjectivity. 
Human subjectivity, in its classical modus operandi marks out 
denizens of the terrain of transcendence,6 organisms bounded 
by identities forged from oppositional structures of 
difference that maintain the integrity of that over-mapped 
zone of incorporeal Being. Morality and control (or more 
specifically, the ethical law of practical reason and 
unifying categorical imperative of coherence and consistency) 
are inseparable in the historically constructed and 
aesthetically essentialised human subject. They are 
transcendental conditions, mechanisms of the transcendent 
figures.of Death and the Other whose Ideality functions in a 
regulatory mode to keep man in his place and all places 
subject to his Law. To be, is to act, and to act is always 
either to accord with or to go against the law. The 
imperative to think and to act thoughtfully is thus imposed 
unconditionally from the moment one accepts one's assigned 
place in human society. To be human is to act under the 
imperative and burden of self-imposed, self-reproducing 
guilt. The formulation of the imperative as an imperative for 
law - for the universal and necessary - is a product of 
thought, a program that thought itself legislates and 
maintains through representation. The force of the imperative 
that precedes its formulation as imperative for law is the 
force of the Noumenal, the transcendent double of Death and 
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the Other made manifest in the body's engagement with the 
world out there, the physical universe with its own order. 
This story of the birth of the Humanist ethico-poli tical 
Enlightenment subject is dependent upon the experience of 
alterity, achieved in the separation or the blossoming of 
communi ty into individuated organisms possessing both ego and 
a sensory-surface of desiring-production. What is effected 
through such organisms is a double association of reference 
compartmentalized within the space of the hive mind 
particularized into memory. This memory is on the one hand, 
the significant sign referring to a real or unreal referent 
via a meaning which is ideal; and on the other, an index, 
where the perceivable reality of the sign (the tone, 
emphasis, tempo, etc., as variant of the immediate 
instantiation of the particular - this memory) is associated 
wi th another reality particularized in a here and now (a 
different, an other memory). From this double association 
there results a hypostatization of another mind as a variant 
of mine own, an 'other', who can issue expressions that are 
in conflict with mine own and are only accommodated 
problematically to the consistent and coherent order of mine 
own experience. Only through such hypostatization is the 
imperative for law internalized. The Kantian transcendental 
unity of apperception of the ethical subject is thus born in 
such a way that its internal operations and maintenance will 
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always and necessarily be unrealisable to it, to the self of 
empirical consciousness. 
With the birth of this self there is grown a skin around the 
newly formed organism. A surface which can stage the 
traversals of the pain that both protects the inner ego and, 
at the same time, make it vulnerable to the surfaces of 
others, maintaining the necessity of acting in accordance 
with the internalizable law. The imperative of the law thus 
gains the weight of the force of exterioritYi the ideality of 
death (as radical exteriority) being a focused reality in the 
eyes of the other. This other, in being a reflection of the 
focus imaginarius of the Noumenal, transcendent subject of 
ethical law, is consecrated as both same and unapproachable, 
unattainable desired alien. When you see this other bleed, 
when you hear it scream, when you watch it die, you too will 
feel the pain, projected onto your own bodily surfaces, 
mapped onto them, and you will know and respect the law of 
man, the law of mortal beings. 
Morality and control are in symbiosis where screaming, 
burning, bleeding and death are explained in terms of 
volition - some act done or left undone. And as to be is to 
act under accusation, all pain becomes medium of the relation 
between body and internalized law, birthing a sufficiently 
self-reflective (ie. guilty) subject to be deemed a person 
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(an ethical being). This role that casts the body within a 
skin that is the conductor of exteriority, mediating pain 
through the nervous system or the eyes of another, to the 
inner sanctum, the noumenal self, subject of internalized 
law, has, at least since the event of Kantian Enlightenment 
thought, prefigured philosophical understanding of what it is 
to be human. 
There is no escape for the human from the infernal schema. No 
one gets out of the human condition alive. Every occurrence 
of focusing upon something creates anew, by picking up a 
schema, varying and actualizing it from others that have gone 
before. ,When humans pass on this perception they call 
sensation or experience, when it is shared with others or 
forced upon them, what is transmitted is not patterns, 
tactile impressions for desiring production and becoming, but 
codes for the maintenance of control, consistency and 
coherence of cognitively categorizable experience. 
Here is Man, author and judge of nature. Man who cannot 
create or feel the perceptible field of phenomena, but only 
give it the coherence and consistency that make it realizable 
and meaningful through his perception of it, that is, through 
the cognitive ordering of what he senses. The sensible field 
is represented as a law-governed totality of nature. 
Schematization ensures the identification of sensations of 
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things with concepts, under the overall command of the a 
priori imperative of universality and necessity. But systems 
failure is immanent, there is a defect. Real and abstract 
material yet incorporeal affects, exploring connections prior 
to selection resonate in, upon, and from bodies that bypass 
schematization, activating viruses at work in the sensory-
motor apparatus that generates excess force. Such force co-
ordinates movement towards perceived objectives 
(teleonomically and teleomatically as well as teleologically) 
and into engagements with unlegislated for matter where 
velocity outranks determinative progression and where 
couplings evolve their own codes in and through this excess 
as non-regulative modes of transcendence. 
Here are configured unlegislated for others, those for whom 
subjectivity is, if anything, merely a side effect of 
commercium, those whose conditions of becoming are immanent 
to their very existence. 7 The body of woman, cyberbodies, 
virtual bodies, bodies whose nervous system is knitted into 
data suits, Sado-Masochistic bodies, these are the bodies 
whose pain gets under the skin (which absorbs rather than 
deflecting or transmuting it). The categorical sheep-pens set 
up to discipline and maintain specific, stable identity 
constructs cannot contain these bodies. Even the barricades 
between well-institutionalized pens have become turnstiles 
spinning out of control. Fenced off and carefully maintained 
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pastures for superior beings are riddled with labyrinths 
resounding with the breath of the multitude. Gennels are 
discovered to have been channelled between the mother-pen and 
the executive-pen, worm-holes between the happily-married-
middle-aged-male-pen and the exhibitionist-weekend-drag-
queen-pen, to say nothing of the tunnels being dug out for 
those partaking in sex changes, longevity therapy and skin-
colouring treatments. Many structures, especially those 
intended for the protection of the humanist quarter, have 
collapsed through the sheer weight of ironic overuse. This 
has not however been achieved through the excavation or 
construction of passageways, transcendental or mystical, to 
enable movement from one level of existence to another8 • 
Unencumbered intuition and productive imagination maintain a 
fluidity of the landscape of desire. Kant was not unaware of 
this and threatened by the moral anarchy it might engender 
through the destruction of identity politics, maintains that 
it is reason in speculative mode, rather than the 
multiplicity of sensation in league with productive 
imagination, that is responsible for such unregulated 
connective and conjunctive synthetic operations: 
"For whereas, so far as nature is concerned, 
experience supplies the rules and is the source of 
truth, in respect of the moral laws it is, alas, 
the mother of illusion! ... we must meantime occupy 
ourselves with a less resplendent, but still 
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meritorious task, namely, to level the ground, and 
to render it sufficiently secure for moral 
edifices of these majestic [Platonic] dimensions. 
For this ground has been honeycombed by 
subterranean workings which reason, 
confident but frui tless search for 
in its 
hidden 
treasures, has carried out in all directions, and 
which threaten the security of the 
superstructures." 
[CPR B375-6] 
Identity and identity-loss correspond to being in or slipping 
out of one's assigned category-pen and the paths through the 
social field associated with it; but these are the side 
effects not the foundation, of the process of individuation. 
What is founding is the body's nonidentical threshold states, 
its potential for becomings of all kinds. As the categorical 
grids become dysfunctional in terms of social production, the 
apparatus of identity is forced beyond the threshold of 
sameness, into singularity and intensity, a moebius strip of 
hybrid carnal invention. Kate, a postmodern transsexual 
explains: "I went from being male to not-male, to female, and 
now to not-female." 
Bio-genetic cross-species fertilization, the radical data 
provided by genetic species profiling, the performance of 
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cosmetic surgery and reproductive technology, as well as the 
easy and anonymous availability of counter culture materials, 
have all but obliterated the means of establishing the 
identity of a being through its present bodily attributes or 
in relation to those with whom it currently shares its life. 
Sheep have become bulls, and bulls, cows, that have in turn 
become fences, seen lolloping away down the electric blue 
glade. 
Somnambulists caught up in an identity dystopia become 
control collaborators, averting their gaze from the 
lawlessness reflected in eyes that cannot be made Other-for-
them, reading crisis into each news headline, eating it for 
their dinner, and coating their thick reflective skins with 
its horror. They do not try to justify their dream-world, yet 
they know that if this fabrication of control is not 
maintained, if they don't somehow scare or seduce us into the 
cud chewing pleasure of counting sheep, they risk loosing the 
fictional bodily integrity that keeps them safe watching re-
runs of Star Trek and anticipating a large pension. 
With no Other and no Death, guilt is de-mystified and the 
status of moral discourse reliant upon imperative and law is 
open to question. We are faced with no absence or Lack by 
means of which to structure radical exteriority, grounding 
and focusing the production of subjectivity. The experience 
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of exteriority - cry of another - is not a moment of 
antagonism or confirmation, experienced by a well-assembled 
and well-ordered self finding its personal telos either 
threatened or legitimated. There is no perfectly ordered and 
integrated subject with a coherent and consistent life-story 
prior to commercium, any more than there is one produced by 
it. The self is merely one pattern, theoretically (and 
temporally) abstracted and isolated from the general 
commercium of flesh, blood, ideas, and sex. 
Cyber-bodies, like Sado-masochist bodies, stand out as 
exemplars of the postmodern venture of engaging in acti vi ties 
which threaten the integrity of the flesh in a number of 
ways. Unlike the anticipated pain of perpetually incomplete 
Enlightenment philosophical thinking, such pursuits do not 
mark out an initiatory step in the becoming-whole of the 
ethically integrated subject, but the becoming-amorphous of 
the central nervous system. For the ethical and politico-
aesthetic subject of Humanism, pain is the means by which one 
internalises the moral imperative, that is, it is vanguard 
for the institution of Law. For the cyber, transsexual, sado-
masochist body of post-humanism it is that by means of which 
the law itself becomes a mechanism for transformation, and 
immanent condition for becoming. 
The function of the cyborg, as exemplary body-in-becoming, is 
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not to be taken as an ideological creation after-language 
that simply reconstitutes a privileged state of being, re-
encapsulating desire, for it is in no sense concerned with a 
logic of counterdomination (formulated as perfect 
communication), or with the institution of alternative 
command and control structures. Its mode of operation is 
conducted through processes of hyper-differentiation in the 
form of interference, static and viral contagion. Viral 
inception into the categorical mainframe produces a form of 
monstrosi ty, contamination as a subspecies of information 
malfunction or communications pathology; it incurs a process 
of misrecognition leading to hybridization and breakdown of 
the boundaries of a strategic assemblage called Self. 
Opposition to the (be)coming configurations of the body using 
the cyborg as ontological launch-pad is mounted on the basis 
of war-mongering (man versus machine) . Beneath the 
obsessional science fiction and Hollywood Terminator models 
of which, lies an opposition between future man as carbon-
based, organic individual organism seated before a keyboard, 
bound to a body that eats, sleeps, defecates, bleeds and 
dies, and its silicon based surrogate; the electronic avatar 
which, decoupled from its physical other, is a superbody, a 
body that is 'virtually' immortal. The pattern follows the 
traditional binary of man-versus-nature on the basis of a 
survivalist opposition between man and his other. On such a 
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reading it is impossible for man to enter the cyborg 
condition so long as he can die from starvation, that is, so 
long as his basic alimentary nature is not done away with. If 
food and waste were, on the other hand to enter into the 
cyborg condition, the resulting entity would remain human. 9 
The human-become-cyborg is not a hybrid-human, a human 
prosthetic or implant freak, what its ontology suggests is 
rather a fusion of human body with electronic culture and 
biotechnology in what amounts to a logic of incorporation. 
Becoming-cyborg is not to do with either the loathing of the 
flesh or the redundancy of carnal desire. But nor is it an 
end in itself. The technology that will someday radically 
alter what we think of as our individual death is already 
complicating specifications (legal and moral) as to the 
nature and parameters of what counts as a life. It is perhaps 
in the field of reproductive biotechnology more so than in 
any other that the radicality of what it means to be post-
human has been made manifest. Here technology makes it 
possible to initiate the growth of a child from the 
genetically engineered contents of a test tube, a child whose 
so-called biological mother was a 28 week old foetus that 
never took a breath of air, and whose own progeny - utilizing 
the same batch of ovaries, gestated in a non-reproductive 
partners' amniotic sack - can be both her children and her 
aunts and uncles. 
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Reproductive biotechnology is perceived by the control 
collaborators--those who claim to speak for the moral 
majority--as posing the greatest threat to human society and 
community. Not surprisingly, given the paternalist and age-
ist orientation of our culture, much of this threat is 
focussed upon the ability of such technology to empower 
frigid, infertile or post-menopausal women, enabling them to 
take the responsibility for new life. The physical 
degeneration of flesh growing old and the cocooned security 
of conception and gestation within the womb - the two ends of 
the human life-span - the requisite parameters of what it 
means to be a human being, are no longer assured. Power 
structures cannot but be altered when non-passive, productive 
post-menopausal women become visible and articulate in a 
society whose last acknowledgement of them culminated in 
their being burnt at the stake. Once both the generational 
lineage and patriarchal basis of a body able to transform its 
racial, sexual and productive configurations have been made 
redundant, the power of the ethically determined subject 
begins to unravel of itself. 
Biotechnology moves us into the sphere of the post-human both 
in terms of its forcing a disengagement between the body and 
its traditional boundaries of birth and death (the Other and 
pain), and in its very real commercium with non-human 
sUbstances. It is only within this already well-established 
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(although still war-torn) arena of the post-human-condition 
made visible enlarge part by biotechnology, that the body of 
the cybernetic, virtual or becoming-post-human gets to make 
it beyond science fiction. 
The party thrown by postmodern techno-culture to celebrate 
the apocalypse at the end of humanities reign is a virtual-
shamanic-rave of frenetic activity and dizzying speed, but 
one that is ill-informed and risks burn-out. Its dystopian 
visions are matched in their sUblimity only by the excesses 
of its utopian boys-club camaraderie. Proclamations issued 
from the foaming mouths of philosophers since Nietzsche 
structure the lyrical terrain of the virtual technoscape. 
Hands clasped around the rope that sounds the death-knell of 
modernity are past blistering and bleeding. Wave upon wave, 
peeling out an audible landscape of devastation and 
jubilance: The death of God! The end of Metaphysics! The 
dissolution of Spirit! The demise of ethics and morality! The 
parting of Politics! The redundancy of ideologies of 
alterity! The vacuity of the transcendent! The final 
extinction of Man! Each proclamation, each wave a cascade of 
orgasmic sperm, wrung by the bell-toIlers hands that pull and 
pull and pull on the umbilical cord that will finally detach 
humanity from its Enlightenment project - the birth of the 
subject. And yet still they come, each in turn, having proven 
their worth, exhibiting their bloodied hands and naming 
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themselves last in line, the final Nazarene, (and their 
audience, still picking through the left-overs, the rotting 
remains of humanity for a trinket, a little nostalgic 
souvenir, continue to applaud). We cannot ask who the real 
party-goers are, but only who they were. History becomes an 
autopsy and a de-briefing that maps the war between control 
collaborators and cyborgs. 
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1. The importance for the formulation of the subject of a 
necessary opposition between Man and Nature and the reliance 
upon a feminization of Nature, enabling unlabelled sensation 
to be marked hysterical (as in too unmediated a relation with 
matter), will be explored at length in the next chapter. 
2. It is also challenged, as consciousness, by the idea of 
the unconscious, a point to which we will return in a later 
section. 
3. This, on the assumption that we cannot give any positive 
account of the Noumenal (wherein the empathetic relation 
would be transcendently assured), as Kant claims is the case. 
4. The coherence and compossibility of the fields of our 
various senses and the perceptual fields of others are known 
only in the continuous transitions by which each field opens 
upon the next. We recognize the coherence and consistency of 
the world whose fields evolve about us by virtue of style. 
Style designates a coherence and consistency we do not 
comprehend but take up and are caught up in. In this way it 
is the style of the visible by which we know that we are not 
dreaming, we doubt the reality of an appearance only by 
believing more in another perceptible configuration. 
5. Donna Haraway documents this new reality, in respect of 
the transformations in life sciences in the twentieth 
century, as follows: 
"Pre-Second World War 
Represented by R.M.Yerkes 
psychobiology 
human engineering 
organism 
physiology 
intelligence 
person 
109 
Post-Second World War 
Represented by 
E.o.Wilson 
sociobiology 
communication control 
cybernetic machine 
systems theory 
information 
gene 
personality services 
sex and mind 
instinct and engineering 
time-motion studies 
human relations management 
adaptivity 
eugenics for race hygiene 
nervous system for integration 
endocrine system for integration 
homeostasis 
population genetics 
and ecology 
genes and survival 
machines 
constraints and 
choice or redesign of 
trajectories 
ergonomics 
sociotechnical 
systems management 
optimization 
sexual investment 
strategies for 
genetic profit 
sensory channels and 
processing centres 
for environmental 
tracking 
c hem i c a I 
communication for 
environmental 
tracking 
feedback and other 
control 
mechanisms 
system 
superorganism population" 
[Simians. Cyborgs and Women p.44] 
6. Transcendence here is being used in the traditional 
Kantian sense as conditions for the possibility of ... 
7. Massumi's description of the larval self of the developing 
baby (in the previous section) is just one instance of this. 
8. This move does undoubtedly take place however and will be 
explored in Baudrillard's use of feminine seduction as a 
means of moving between zones that do not fall within the 
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same representational system (by means of utilizing the 
tradi tional concept of woman as transcendental caponi ere ), in 
a later section. 
9. This is obviously a gross simplification of the models 
produced by science and its fiction, but the basic point 
remains. It is a logical operation, moreover, familiar to 
those who oppose the intrusion of women, as women, into the 
male economy, and to those who claim that the feminization of 
the workplace, the aesthetic and political recognition of an 
unrepresentable basis of justice, and the emergence of a Care 
ethic in medical and other practices, is not a feature of 
women's entrance into the public arena, but a development of 
Man. 
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7. Cyborgs and Women. 
"Bodies have become cyborgs - cybernetic organisms 
- compounds of hybrid techno-organic embodiment 
and textuality. The cyborg is text, machine, body 
and metaphor all theorized and engaged in 
practice in terms of communications." [Haraway. 
Simians. p.212] 
Theories of the subject rejecting an originary multiplicity 
of the self-in-becoming in respect of the commercium of the 
sensual body, tend to fall back upon the idea of desire-as-
community, in the form of the full body of the socius 
(individualized in the reflective and re-iterative processes 
of the focus imaginarius). The myth of the full body, as we 
have seen, is at least partially the result of the 
instantiation of binary oppositional structures (man/woman, 
man/nature, man/animal, man/machine), whose collapse has 
brought about, on the one hand, the drive to free up a 
productive force of desire from its domestication under the 
allgemeine Stimme, and on the other, attempts to re-qualify 
the binding quality of communio. The scene of post-
modernism's mourning over the body-politic or social body, as 
an example of re-qualification through memorialization (of 
the founding ideal or lack), is symptomatically linked, in 
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our era, to the growth in theorizations of "panic" and 
"consumer" bodies; orphaned bodies whose response to the 
severing of the umbilical cord is to invent a pseudo-economy 
of representation, in the form of apocalypse or market-mall 
culture, as their newly adopted mode of being-in-common. The 
problem with these accounts is that whilst claiming a bodily 
orientation, they none-the-less tend towards the privileging 
of an account of the individual produced through feminization 
and simulation on the basis of a universal pre-existing male 
body-form. 
The cyber-feminist body1 is not simply transgressive (in 
respect of the dominant phallic ideal), for transgression 
always assumes in advance a surface of bodily unity upon 
which it can inscribe its patterns of displacement. 
Transgression is a game better left to the sons who would 
become-woman through emasculation of the father and the 
promulgation of parthenogenic practices (immaculations of the 
self). These re-birthings, moreover, rely upon an implicit 
inside/outside opposition in their denial of paternity; 
working through exclusive disjunctions, they continue to bind 
themselves to a history of desire cursed in triplicate 
through Lack, Alterity, and Zero (death). 
The cyber-feminist, unlike the neo-Nazarene, is an inclusive 
hybrid, she/it knows that there is no outside, no limit 
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defining lack, no great wall of absence. This is not to 
suggest however, that she/it fails to recognize the power of 
transgression where desire is its own worst enemy, for she/it 
is not blind to the fact that, as Lyotard remarks: 
"One must realize that representing desire, 
putting on stage, in a cage, in prison, into a 
factory, into a family, being boxed in are 
desired, that domination and exclusion are 
desired: that extreme intensities are instantiable 
in these assemblages too. " [Libidinal Economy 
p.12] 
Thinking desire through the cyborg (using the cyborg virus as 
a critical tool), allows us to pose the body in terms of 
multiplicity and becoming, and as cyberfeminist, to question 
what is at stake in strategies of becoming that privilege the 
notion of "becoming-woman" as their starting point. It is 
important, gi ven the exposi tion of the nature of 
transgression above, to examine both the basis and the 
consequences (for desiring bodies of all kinds) of following 
the kind of line espoused here by Deleuze and Guattari: 
" [B] ecoming-woman , more than any other becoming, 
possesses a special introductory power: it is not 
so much that women are witches, but that sorcery 
proceeds by way of this becoming-woman." [D&G. 
1000 Plateaus. p.248] 
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"Woman" has a long history of close association with 
processes of bodily becomings, her lack of bodily integrity 
endowing her with the dynamic potential for transmutation 
upon the boundary (in terms of both form and matter) of what 
it is to be human. The role of "Woman", as logical operator 
in transcendental systems of philosophy has however, excluded 
women from that productive space whose bridging of the abyss 
between the real and the ideal, has maintained Man in a 
position of mastery over all non-human (in)determinations of 
substance. 
The operation of "Woman" as the silent groundwork of male 
subjectivity and the condition of possibility for his history 
denies in principle that women, as women, be allowed access 
to the passage of the feminine. Access for women in general 
can be permitted only on condition of the assumption of a 
female subjectivity constructed (Adam and Eve fashion) out of 
the body of male subjectivity, thus relinquishing any claim 
to an originary relation to the symbolic function of 
"Woman".2 Rosi Braidotti remarks of female subjectivity: 
"The truth of the matter is: one cannot 
deconstruct a subjectivity one has never been 
fully granted; one cannot diffuse a sexuality 
which has historically been defined as dark and 
mysterious ..• The fragmentation of the self being 
woman's basic historical condition, •.• we are left 
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with the option of theorizing a general 'becoming-
woman' for both sexes, or else of flatly stating 
that women have been postmodern since the 
beginning of time." [Men in Feminism. p.237] 
The point is that women have little to do with the 
philosophical creation of "Woman", existing neither in the 
realm of the sacred (as fully fledged Goddesses) or the 
profane (as bestially carnassial witches). Partially-formed 
hybrids, women are always in the process of becoming. In 
becoming-woman however, they risk falling into a teleology of 
Man by making female subjectivity the new (differing but 
ultimately the same) universal starting point. There cannot 
be another molar subject-form named woman that is not created 
in reactive opposition to, and thus reliant upon, the biopic 
of Man; another son of god, another little man. Women, in 
entering into becoming-woman through the strategic assembly 
of subjectivity, must first become like-Man, and this they 
can never succeed "in, for women in relation to the Man-form 
are always monstrosities: 
"Women excel in fickleness, inconstancy, absence 
of thought and logic, and incapacity to reason. 
Without doubt there exist some distinguished 
women, very superior to the average man, but they 
are exceptional as the birth of any monstrosity, 
116 
as, for example, of a gorilla with two heads; 
consequently we may neglect them entirely." 
[Gustave Le Bon, in Gould's The Mismeasurement of Man 
p.104-5] 
"Deep meditation and a long-sustained reflection 
are noble but difficult, and do not well-befit a 
person in whom unconstrained charms should show 
nothing else than a beautiful nature. Laborious 
learning or painful pondering, even if a woman 
should greatly succeed in it, destroy the merits 
that are proper to her sex, ... A woman who has a 
head full of Greek, like Mme Dacier, or carries on 
fundamental controversies about mechanics, like 
the Marquise de Chatelet, might as well have 
beard; for perhaps that would express more 
obviously the mien of profundity for which she 
strives." [Kant. Observations on the Beautiful and 
Sublime p.78] 
Remarks of this nature are hardly less common in our day than 
they have been in ages gone by, and yet, as Donna Haraway 
points out: 
"Monsters have always defined the limits of 
community in western imaginations." [Simians. 
Cyborgs and Women p.180] 
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Woman produced unproblemmatically through a process of 
feminization of the male-form (the positing of the female 
subject) does not however take up the power offered by 
monstrosity. She will ultimately be cast in the 
representational form of a female Frankenstein with her Dad's 
features; a being that transgresses rather than transforming 
the Law under whose prescription she is constructed. 
Before moving on to address the possibility of re-configuring 
the becoming-woman of women through an ontology of becoming-
cyborg, we must however explore what is meant by "women" as 
a determinative category of being in general. 
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8. The Transcendental function of "Woman" and the 
Sex/Gender distinction. 
Criteria for determining what it is to be a woman abound: 
1. anatomical (genital) female; having vagina not penis. 
2. biological (reproductive) female; having womb not testes. 
3. scientific (chromosomal) female; having xx not xy 
chromosomes. 
4. medical (hormonal) female; producing oestrogen not 
testosterone. 
5. neurological female; having a particular brain 
organization. 3 
There is another set of criteria playing the same role as 
those in 1-5, but following a historical and sociological 
rather than biological account of the division of the sexes. 
The most definitive of these are: (i) Economic female; women 
as the part-time under-paid class. (ii) Social female; women 
as the mothers and carers whose place is in the home. 
6. feminine female (psychological or behavioral); 
manifesting traits that are passive not aggressive, 
maternal not paternal, caring not rational. 
None of these definitions is clearcut, nor can they, either 
alone or in combination, account for all those who claim to 
be or are designated women, furthermore, many who are denied 
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this designation fall into one or many of the female sides of 
the categories as listed. There is, of course, a missing 
category: 
7. transcendent (or symbolic) female (divine, imaginary, 
elemental, spiritual, mythical); Ideal not Real. 4 
It is to a large extent through this last, which entails the 
transcendental use, that is the abstraction and idealization, 
of the determinations in 6, that the idea of the female-ness 
finds its model. Such articulation is not straightforward 
however, as it involves a further relation to categories 1-5. 
That is to say, in the manifestation (or concretization) of 
the feminine female through adoption of the unrealizable 
ideal of the transcendent female, there is implied a relation 
between this feminine and its specular equivalent at 1-5; 
gender, transcendentally legitimated by the ideal of Woman, 
physically validated through scientific and medical exclusive 
disjunctions. 
The problemmatization of this equivalence has been made 
manifest particularly over the past forty years with the 
growing evidence of people with androgen insufficiency 
syndrome (re.1), female testosees (re.2 and 4), biological 
males with xx chromosomes (re.3), as well as an increase in 
the visibility of cross-dressing, and the availability of 
medical procedures for "sex-change" operations. On the social 
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side, there has been exponential growth in the participation 
of women in high paid work, a move in industry in favour of 
part-time and home-based workers (re. i ), and on the home 
front, a radical change in the traditional family structure 
(re.ii). In addition to these there has also been witnessed 
in literary and philosophical circles a renewed interest in 
the concept of intellectual feminization. The traditional 
move from the transcendental category (6) to application 
through the ideational parameters of the transcendent (7), to 
its specular equivalent (1-5), is challenged in many of these 
developments as in the practice of becoming-woman where one 
begins with an elision of the disjunctive determinations of 
1-5. 
On the basis of the above, we may assert that the feminized 
male who claims to enter into becoming-woman by means of a 
privileged access to its transcendental determination, is 
doing nothing more than re-asserting his power over the 
transcendental; his possession of the mark of the phallus 
whose ideational construct (7) enables him to appropriate the 
disjunction (6) as transcendental idea, which is, for him, a 
totality (a community) of his own making. 5 
The problem of the manner of the self re-positioning of 
feminized males in relation to becoming-woman furthermore, 
requires that we examine the implicit division assumed to 
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exist between sex and gender ( in the articulation of 6 
through the twin series at 1-5/i, ii). According to most 
gender theorists, the transcendental determinations (6) are 
made transcendent on the basis of either sex or gender. In 
the former case, the transcendental idea is materially 
consti tuti ve of its equivalent (at 1-5), whereas in the 
latter, the idea is manifested through fixed power relations 
(of the type i and ii). What this means is that where 
division in terms of sex is deemed originary, determinations 
at the biological level (1-5) will be held to reflect the 
transcendental idea of the feminine (6); where gender is the 
crucial factor however, biological determinations will 
function merely as adjuncts to a second series disjunctions 
(type i,ii) based upon historical, economic, familial and 
other power relations. 
The sex/gender distinction is further complicated by 
competing theories of essentialism and constructivism. 
Neither of these terms can be used unproblematically, and 
whilst, in general, their division remains based upon the 
privileging of either nature or nurture, their underlying 
evaluati ve cri teria (especially in terms of their 
universality and necessity) are still hotly contested. It is 
none-the-Iess possible to make the general observation that 
those theorists privileging sexual difference as fundamental, 
will hold some sort of essentialist position with regard to 
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the biological or developmental nature of the female, whereas 
those preferring an account of difference on the basis of 
gender will follow a historical and/or sociological 
constructi vist account. The interdependence of these two 
positions, in allowing for fixity on the one (essential) side 
and movement on the other (constructed and thereby 
inessential) side, (whichever criteria is held to be 
determinative), and the battles for supremacy between the 
two, tends to obscure the basic fact that so long as there is 
held to be some a priori factor in the division of sexual 
beings, the hierarchical legitimation through the relation of 
1-5/i,ii-6-7 will be left unexamined. One might even go so 
far as to assert that it is by way of the tensile connection 
between sex and gender that subsumption under a 
transcendental principle is preserved, 6 a principle that will 
then produce a construction of gender regardless of whether 
or not the link with sex is maintained. Hence the popularity 
of gender rather than sex-based studies in a cultural climate 
where a bodies sex is often indeterminate.? On this reading, 
it is only the continuation of the enforced link between the 
two constructions of sex and gender (and their independent 
reali ties), that allows for 7 to retain i ts position of 
mastery over bodies. 
The distinction between these two categories of sex and 
gender can, of course, be grossly misleading. The use of the 
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word "sex" in such contexts almost always implies an a priori 
category, medically verifiable, concretely experiencable, and 
exclusively maintained (either this or not this, A or not-A, 
penis or no penis), although the criteria for verifiability 
is kept ambiguous. There are no criteria for verifying the 
accurate categorization of an already sexed being, the 
doctors (and later the birth certificators) word is final, 
"its a boy! ". The insubstantiality of the criteria upon which 
the initial division between the sexes (the naming of an 
individual) is made is, however, camouflaged in the texts of 
many gender theorists, where "sex" is uncritically assumed as 
grounding all further divisions, and is underpinned by an 
undisclosed allegiance to heterosexuality; community of 
disjunctive sexes. 
Where the term "sex" has multiple and different meanings, and 
is ultimately reliant upon an undisclosed criteria, and in 
theories where sex is unspecified, the relation between sex 
and gender is at once both a motivated and arbitrary one. 
Hence we will move to differentiate sex- the act, from 
gender- the classification, on the basis of the qualifier 
being used for gender differentiation (this term now being 
used to account for 1-5,i,ii), which mayor may not indicate 
a dependency of one upon the other.8 
Despite the profusion of gender systems--gender by clothing, 
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gender by divine right, gender by lottery--it is the system 
of gender by biology (1-5) that Western civilization 
continues to bow down to. The extent to which our own 
culturally specific folk beliefs about biology saturate our 
view of gender, providing us with many potentially illusory 
truths we hold to be self evident is, however, rarely 
discussed. The acclaimed supremacy of biology, which accords 
biological gender superiority over other gender constructions 
by calling it "sex", is rarely made explicit in the texts of 
gender theory where, as has been suggested earlier, it is 
more likely to be couched in terms of "essence". In many such 
accounts the (theoretically) reversible roles of sex and 
gender become the coinage of a modernist diagramatics of 
signification. Here the initial sex-gender connection is what 
becomes manifest later in life, in and through socialization. 
This process is not, however, progressi ve in any 
straightforwardly linear sense, for entry into socialization 
occurs by way of a primary marking that becomes its own 
signified. Whether the initial 'sex' (biological gender 
naming)--gender system connection is maintained or 
disconnected is merely a matter of whether one chooses to 
follow an essentialist or constructivist position, it does 
not alter the mark/marking (the two are not distinct) itself. 
When a sexual being refuses their gender allocation, what 
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occurs is a sundering of the signifying relationship of sex 
and gender and a freeing up of the body as a stage for the 
creative forces of desire. Sex, as an act, preference and 
orientation, becomes differentiated from a governing gender 
system, thus cOllapsing the institutional sex/gender relation 
(whose mutually dependent structure assures its stability 
through referred signification) onto an arbitrary gender code 
with no access to its transcendent model through the 
transcendental idea of exclusive disjunction. The rejection 
of binary demarcations in becoming-woman that is a move into 
trans-gendering or poly-sexuality, defies the heterosexual 
telos of being for the human species. Rather than emptying 
sexuality of its difference and richness, as many feminist 
theorists claim, such disinvestment of the gender system 
allows desire to be reinvested on an intensive libidinal 
scale without measure or norm (rather than its being retained 
within the exclusivity and repeatability of a male economy of 
the mirrored Other). Instituting a break in the coding that 
binds sexuality to the system of enforced binary gender, 
moreover, allows a critical distance to be instantiated 
between the (indeterminate) female and the transcendental 
function of becoming-woMan ( as both history and process) 
opening up strategies for de- and re-codification of the 
body in becoming -woman -cyborg.s 
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9. Woman as Transcendent: a re-telling of the Myth. 
As illegitimate transcendental function of the female (that 
is, as transcendent), Woman is outside time and can have no 
history, only myths. Man, on the other hand, is well-
documented; his growth, his successes and failures, his 
promise, his enlightenment, the death of his god and of his 
ego. There is but one time and it is the time of Man. But as 
to how this time is constructed, as to the permanent 
unconditioned upon which transcendental determination makes 
possible its reproduction and continuation, this is a matter 
concerning Woman. Woman as matter and noumenon, Nature and 
Other, sacred and profane. Woman as that which enables 
reality to be divided in two, and which is the doubleness of 
nature; where Man = approaching 1, Woman = 0 and Woman = 2, 
that is, l<woman<l (woman is both less than and more than 
one) .9 
Woman is not human. For man, women are never Woman enough. He 
chases her through the structure built to try and contain her 
0-2-0-2-0 trying to make 1.10 Whereas men may work towards 
the destiny of Man, of whole number 1, (of being, in Kant's 
terms "more than man"), for those named women there is an 
unbreachable chasm between what they are as desiring beings 
and that which defines them in essence. Women's destiny is 
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not and cannot be Woman, for Woman is not a future predicate 
of any female (whatever the gender criteria used) and is not 
plottable upon a progressive scale towards enlightenment of 
the species .11 The species, the history of humanity, is 
teleonomic and it is male. 
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This is not to say that women have not been marked as human, 
on the contrary, it is precisely in the shortcomings that 
mark women's distance from her transcendent given 
(unrealisable) identity structuring her opposition to the 
male, wherein she has been confined. Each time she tries to 
escape the demands of the unrepresentable ideal her becoming 
is appropriated, given a telos and that telos domesticated in 
the name of order and control. And so it continues, each 
becoming re-plotted as a logical linear progression whose 
process may be reduced to a relation of totemic or symbolic 
correspondence. This is how women are made. He made her a 
bitch, chick, fox, pussycat for not becoming-animal; he made 
her a babe, a baby-doll, a virgin, for not becoming-child; he 
made her a breast and nipple, a whore, for not becoming-
machine. 
Such determination occurs on the basis of heterosexuality 
founded in homo-economicus, producing the defining conditions 
for domestication out of a missionary position. The ritual of 
a torn maidenhead; a discovery more of and through poetry--in 
the voices of genius, seed of the gods--than medical science, 
although there too. What occurs in the formation and eruption 
of the hymen is not the transition from one (kind of) space 
into another, nor is it simply the exposition of an 
unpresentable mark of the passage between silence and voice. 
It concerns rather, the inscription of a passage between two 
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laws; the carefully prescribed route that allows for a law to 
be passed from Father to Son without being broken as such 
(that is, without alteration of its juridical authority, its 
legislative power) .12 Immaculate conception makes possible 
the realization of the law of one domain through its 
manifestation in another. Through the ritual of defloration 
Woman is voided in transcendence, absence of the membrane 
(not its sundering) signifying an unrepresentable materiality 
that can be worshipped as passage, reappropriated and 
reversed in the form of the phallic mother. Cultural 
construction of the hymen in women locates their fundamental 
Lack. 
Woman as Divine is not a state but an onanistic abstraction--
"Mnemosyne"--mother of the muses, uturinal passage of 
poetizing. Genius orphans, products of immaculate conception, 
of a name (of all the names in history), become deflorators 
of the second order, shedding tear-shaped petals rather than 
spilling blood. Every mothers son, sons of bitches, sons 
become bitches; defloration returned to the first order 
through immaculate conception marking a deprival or theft of 
a material mark of purity, itself a fiction ensuring 
transcendental production. (A long line of french male 
intellectuals queuing up to become-woman.) Each new poet-
philosopher guaranteeing their position as last in the line, 
attempting to create new non-linear (non-reproductive) lines, 
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a production of Nazarene monsters suckled on sperm. 
"Mine is the century of Death. Mine is the century 
of male-birthed children, precocious with 
radiation." 
[Phyllis Chester. About Men] 
"[T]he history of philosophy as a kind of ass-
fuck, or, what amounts to the same thing, an 
immaculate conception. I imagined myself 
approaching an author from behind and giving him a 
child that would indeed be his but would 
nevertheless be monstrous." [Deleuze. "I have 
nothing to admit", p.12 Pourparlers.] 
The role of the immaculated son is to become-Woman in a 
practice for the fulfillment of (male) desire, 
"to knock down the thin walls, the clefts, the 
partitions in order to occupy all the places at 
once ... to swallow oneself, to touch oneself, to 
deliver oneself, to give birth to oneself and to 
give oneself ones own ... to fuck oneself by flowing 
out of oneself: je m'ec, je m'enc." [Genet. 
Thief's Journal] 
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To become phallic mother by cross-dressing in an economy of 
the same generates history by representing its own 
defloration, giving birth to itself in order to have itself 
in its own image. 
"Is there not a desire on the part of western man 
to be sodomised by Woman?" [Lyotard. Reader. 
p.115] 
Here is the myth and here too Hollywood's (re)productions 
that bind the body to genealogy and immaculate conception, 
not in the form of xenogenetics but through teleonomic 
morphology. 
Cyberfeminism is the name of the anti-myth (it does not deny 
myth but utilizes it in strategic resistance to--feeding it 
back upon--the history it creates), it is a practice of 
becoming-woman that is poly-sexual and trans-gendered (or 
post-gendered). Cyberfeminism instigates a hybrid revolution, 
a "genderfuck" that does not birth monsters compromising 
xenogenesis. The cyberfeminist hymen is a tactical insurgence 
in cyberflesh. It does not reverberate in empty space to the 
limit, the meeting point, of God and man (as the Lack/Law 
shared out between them) in the song of the hymenal, 
universal voice and attunement [allgemeine Stimme, Stimmung] 
of sensus communis. 13 It is a viscous screen--veil--spittle-
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-that sticks in the throat when men attempt to name God, 
their Father, preventing the throat from opening and the 
mouth from forming the vowel that would enunciate His 
name .1.4 Appropriation of a fiction, virtual hymen, cyborg 
tissue that seals (and steals from) the stoma/Stimme1.5 
preventing the expression (lactation) of any fixed meaning 
filtering through or seeping out of an unconditioned Mother. 
A device leaking toxins1.6 antithetical to the 
dream/nightmare of performing cunnilingus on the 
Goddess/Mother - milk of Aphrodite that loosens tongues by 
eating them and destroying their articulate citadels. 
The process of becoming-woman is obviated by a fiction, a 
tale that can maintain or redescribe boundary conditions 
depending on the power it is accorded as virtual fiction. 
Woman operates both as a threat to the law and its condition, 
its mediator, its styx. The bad boys (whose names are 
unimportant) invoke the name that constructs them, 
regurgitating hymens, in the hope of becoming Demon Nazarene. 
"Mysterious dame, That ne're art call'd but when 
the dragon woom [vomit] of Stygian darknes spets 
her thickest gloom" [Milton. Comus. p.134] 
The Stygian is indefinable, it lies in-between realms, it is 
the passage; liberating and deadly, poison and nectar, fluid 
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of that name "Woman", poem penned by mortal men (in the guise 
of demigods), impossible river poem of an impossible body 
(Immaculate conception). stygian = Nitrohydrochloric acid: A 
combination of Ni tro, the necessary constituent of every 
organized body, too much of which leads to delirium, rapture 
of the deep, laughter; of Hydro, water (especially the serous 
fluid which accumulates, engorging and making diseased the 
organized parts/organs); and Chloride, a colourless but 
smelly gas. It is mineral acid--the inbetween--product of the 
bowels of the earth, divined by the rod.~7 
The immaculated sons with their fleshy rods decapitate 
themselves and revel in their own sacrificial castration. But 
in their greediness for the whip and the knife they forget 
their prophylactics. There will always be seepage from the 
transcendent, even when it has no name. This excess is taken 
up by those who would utilize its logic in their own name-
sake. The virus encoded in the name of Woman is 
acti vated ... potential to become... by voiders, in those 
carriers named women. You can only subvert the law when you 
use the (un)safe word, when your lips are open to the styx. 
The cyber-feminist ontology goes beyond the myth it takes up, 
fracturing the real mirrors of male authority, control and 
juridical mastery, and the integrity of the body. The 
postmodern world is post-human, system becoming process. The 
134 
viral coding of Woman in 'women' is effected not 
independently of a history of becomings. Lines of flight 
mutate in the aftermath of becomings that have yet to happen 
as such. 
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10. Postmodernity and the problem of becoming-(woman). 
Processes of becoming pose the greatest threat to a status 
quo based upon the integrity of the body and anti-viral 
policing agents don't give up easily. As was the case with 
the Inquisition, protectionist panic programs have some 
success, in our era ironically transforming Stygian fluid 
into the missing matter of technological society, which 
becomes the emancipated rhetorical centre of the lost subject 
of desire after desire. It's logo is simple - loss, lack, 
crisis, panic, transforming into loss-gain, lack-excess, 
crisis-stasis, panic-coma - it's body is bulemic rather than 
anorexic, wanting everything and needing nothing. Its 
hustings announce, through a rhetoric of clean bodily fluids, 
a prophylactic covering to protect against the disappearance 
of the classical body into what the small print calls a 
detri tus of toxic bodies, fractal subjecti vi ty, cultural 
dyslexia, and the pharmakon. 
This reactive positioning of humanities 'other' in the 
productions of electronic media and/or scientific 
technological development, is generally developed in three 
ways (adopted independently or in combination): 1) The 
attempt to re-establish an enlightenment project through the 
extension of identity boundaries providing new categories for 
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human sUbjectivity. 2) The demand for a rejection of current 
trends and a return to a lost subjectivity. 3) The forcing of 
humanity into dissolution and nihilism. The first of these is 
demonstrated in much feminist political philosophy which 
would have us merely redraw the boundaries of subjectivity to 
include women but without altering their basic schemata. The 
second is most commonly associated with the mourning for a 
lost communio (communitarianism in a full-body) and the oft' 
heard call to an ethics of justice as a space for the re-
birth of humanity. The third is posed in the form of a 
celebration of apocalypse culture, its most common forms 
being those of "panic" and "consumer" philosophy. Illustrated 
here by the Krockers: 
"We have reached a fateful turning-point in 
contemporary culture when human sexuality is a 
killing-zone, when desire is fascinating only as a 
sign of its own negation, and when the pleasure of 
catastrophe is what drives ultramodern culture 
onwards in its free fall through a panic scene of 
loss, cancellation and exterminism." 
[Krockers. Body Invaders p.13] 
The first position tends to fixate upon the re-articulation 
of Enlightenment prescriptions for the progress of the 
species, using duplicates of the original diagrams of the 
subject and a magic marker (to scribble in "WO" every time it 
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finds "man"). The more adventurous even invent new names for 
their copies in the hope of miraculating a female community 
denied in the original form, with names like "sisterhood", 
"care" and "maternity". such names, however are the coinage 
of the dominant economy, and whilst their use at a local 
level may invest particular political projects, their 
universalization merely crafts ever more decorous cages in 
which (state) subjectivity can be produced. Demanding female 
subjectivity means engaging with the structures rather than 
relations of power, structures based upon the masculinist 
model of community in the full body of the socius. These 
concretizations of power, especially juridical models, do not 
simply represent subjects, but produce them. Once produced, 
moreover, the exclus_ionary practices employed to maintain 
the social bodies integrity are effectively hidden beneath 
its politics (and to some extent its aesthetics). Should this 
first position be allowed to work itself through, its destiny 
is assured in the birth and death of a female subjectivity 
that will always be masculinized and legitimate political 
policies based on "post-feminism"; ultimately mirroring the 
mourning over the father's body of community (this time the 
mother's) as was witnessed in section four. 
In examination of the third alternative, it quickly becomes 
clear that there cannot be sustained for long such frenetic 
jubilation in exorbitant nihilism, without an eventual 
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decline into either mysticism of a metaphoricity of 
simulation (a position between 2 and 3). This latter position 
is suggested in the writing of Jean Baudrillard: 
"We are looking for a reduction into partial 
objects and the fulfillment of desire in the 
technical sophistication of the body. In itself 
changed by sexual liberation, the body has been 
reduced to a division of surfaces, a proliferation 
of multiple objects wherein its finitude, its 
desirable representation, its seduction are lost. 
It is a metastatic body, a fractal body which can 
no longer hope for resurrection". [Baudrillard] 
What links these three postmodern positions is their seeming 
failure to take on board the creative aspect of desiring 
production. The body need not be either forced back onto a 
transcendent plane of a Kantian ideal of sensus communis 
(guaranteeing stability through an ethics of justice and 
reciprocal association), nor deconstructed and scattered 
across a politically, economically, culturally differentiated 
field. This last, as has been said, tending to revert to the 
former orientation around lack, or else reducing desire to 
appropriation of a bodily-becoming that is exchangeable at 
the level of appearance. 
We can chart the failure of these postmodern maps of desire 
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on the level of the body by plotting their trajectories as 
diagrams of becoming, becomings of the body that fail because 
they either repress and/or domesticate desire, accrediting a 
teleology to the creative process itself. For as Deleuze and 
Guattari point out: 
"What is real is the becoming itself, the block of 
becoming, not the supposedly fixed terms through 
which that which becomes passes •.. [becoming] 
exists only as taken up in another becoming of 
which it is the subject, and which coexists, forms 
a block, with the first." [1000 Plateaus. p.238] 
What is also required (as we recall from an earlier section), 
is to look at creative-productive processes of becoming and 
question whether or not the access to these is open, or is 
specific to the construction of a certain kind of 
subjectivity. What shape is the "block" that is formed such 
that it may be connected up to ... (and to what extent is its 
past a history of patterns)? Is becoming not to some extent 
always reactive in relation to a certain social production of 
identity issuing out of an oppositional positing of the non-
human? If this is so, we must then ask in what sense beings 
who are located in the virtual space of the non-human are 
themselves able to access a process of becoming without first 
entering into the territory of stable (domesticated) 
becomings. Such an enquiry is necessary if we are to 
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understand the specific way in which becoming has opened up 
the potential for creative evolution in our era through the 
privileging of the female/feminine. Whether in the field of 
anthropology, biology, market economics or philosophy, 
becoming-woman has become the launch pad for becomings of all 
kinds, an event which is not independent of an evolutionary 
past. We must begin again here from Deleuze and Guattari's 
claim that: 
"becoming-woman, more than any other becoming, 
possesses a special introductory power; it is not 
so much that women are witches, but that sorcery 
proceeds by way of this becoming-woman." [D&G. A 
Thousand Plateaus p.248] 
Institutional mechanisms set up to manage the failures of 
human bodily-becomings through transcendent imagery and 
domestication (particularly well-documented by Foucault) have 
proliferated to such an extent that in the 20th century we 
are confronted with a fractured subject spread across an 
increasingly frustrated field of normalizing 
terri torializations. The disintegration of the state has only 
added to the fear that the physical body has finally gone 
beyond all hope of unification under a single structural 
organic system capable of pursuing a particular configuration 
of progress in the name of human destiny. There are no new 
myths, no consolidated ideologies, no mountain peaks in the 
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postmodern landscape, only a mogul-field where the body-count 
is multiplied to infinity.18 
To assume that this so called "bad dream of infinity" occurs 
only at the level of the appearance of bodies in their 
insti tutional simulations is however, to re-mystify the 
conditions for their production; to ensure that becoming-
woman operates transcendentally as an introduction to 
sorcery; traditionally in the form of Mnemosyne, virgin/whore 
and phallic mother, now as seduction of the "feminine". This 
is Baudrillard's position when he claims that: 
"the passage toward the feminine is 
contemporaneous with the passage from 
determination to general indetermination. " 
[Seduction. p.S] 
This use of the feminine is no more than a return to a mode 
of thought where Woman is a code legitimating reproduction; 
the inscription of an impossible ideal in the teleonomic 
morphology of male production, where, 
"To produce is to materialize by force what 
belongs to another order, that of the secret and 
of seduction." [ibid. p.24] 
Thus, remarks Baudrillard, 
"they [women] do not understand that seduction 
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represents mastery over the symbolic universe." 
[ibid] 
The lineage here is not difficult to trace, we need but cast 
a glance back to the works of Jacques Lacan: 
"the fact that femininity finds its refuge in this 
mask, by virtue of the fact of the [repression] 
inherent in the phallic mark of desire, has the 
curious consequence of making virile display in 
the human being itself seem feminine." [~ 
Signification of the Phallus p.291] 
It seems clear that the most promising way to make Woman 
function as a device for becoming requires it [Woman] 
infiltrate the body that cannot realize (virilize, 
domesticate and/or repress) it, that is, the bodies of women, 
where it cannot function transcendentally but only as 
decoding mechanism. 19 In this sense then, it is not possible 
for becoming-woman to operate independently of the death of 
Woman. The task is to escape the pattern ° - 2+ - ° - 2+ - 0, 
by infecting the body (approaching singularity) with de-
coding sequences (producing bodies with n sexualities). The 
question facing women infected with this viral contagion is 
whether it is possible to kill that which operates 
potentially as a decoder of transcendental structures that 
have positioned her in opposition to human subjectivity, or 
whether it is necessary to allow the decoding to become 
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productive within that oppositional structure, that is, to 
create a female subjectivity (as equivalent to the fictional 
and failed One) precisely in order that it too be 
annihilated. It is proposed that this notion of bringing 
about a second and this time "female" Enlightenment is 
precisely to fail to use the potential of approaching the 
singularity of being out on the edge that is implicit in the 
problematic impossibility of becoming g woman. This is not 
however to suggest that we either ignore or attempt to cure 
women's bodies of viral contagion, on the contrary, the 
project at hand must be one of developing the potential of 
Woman as ?e-coding mechanism and feeding it into previously 
regulated spaces (non-places of female activity and 
commercium amongst women), freeing up becomings of all kinds. 
Judith Butler makes the important point that, 
"i t may be time to entertain a radical critique 
that seeks to free feminist theory from the 
necessity of having to construct a single or 
abiding ground which is invariably contested by 
these identity positions or anti-identity 
positions that it invariably excludes. Perhaps the 
problem is more serious. Is the construction of 
the category of women as a coherent and stable 
subject an unwitting regulation and reification of 
gender relations? And is it not such a reification 
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precisely contrary to feminist aims? To what 
extent does the category of women achieve 
stability and coherence only in the context of the 
heterosexual matrix?" [Gender Trouble p.5] 
Clearly there remains a feminist political project to be 
pursued, but, in taking up Butlers' point, to concentrate 
this project upon the birth of a female subjectivity, that 
is, to make heterosexual (homo-economic) representation the 
sole focus of the activity, would be to reconstitute the old, 
merely reformulated relations of domination and exclusion. 
Production is the immanent principle of desire. But desire 
effects not just a desiring-production, it is also the agent 
of social production that domesticates desire by way of 
repression and containment. Social production in the 
postmodern world however, fails to police the boundaries of 
becoming, for it has forgotten its own myths and relies upon 
the assumption of an ungendered nonproductive starting point. 
That is, the mode of collapse (re. anti-production), always 
assumed from the outset in the formation of an inner/outer 
distinction, cannot accommodate the viral contagion of woman 
which works against social production insofar as it embodies 
its (impossible) conditions for actualization in the flesh of 
the women it inhabits. 
Baudrillard's becoming-feminine is not simply a becoming 
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effected from a ungendered, sexless position reliant upon the 
construction of woman as other - where the ritual passage of 
stable domesticated (failed) becomings held erect by 
transcendental structures folds in upon itself, upon the 
neutral male body it was created to support -but might even 
be deemed sexist in its denial of the potential for the 
realization of woman in the bodies of women, and in its 
insistence upon their silence. Baudrillard's "femininity" is 
a masculinist ('male') disease, expressing the critical state 
of the postmodern condition. Not only does it have nothing to 
do with women and what they can become, it perpetuates the 
century-o~d mental habit which consists in assigning to the 
"feminine" disorders or insufficiencies pertaining to the 
male. 
Baudrillard's subject of desire is constituted around lack 
insofar as it stands in opposition to the loss of identity 
through confrontation with the sight of death (the abyss, 
meaninglessness, etc.), through which identity is formulated. 
It is not however the promise of death as such lurking behind 
the veil of appearances that allows the Baudrilladian subject 
to get a grip on itself, but the threatening shadow cast over 
the Mall of appearances that is both the mark of, and is 
itself, the abyss. The transcendental, death, woman, all are 
projected as commodities in the Mall (which is not, 
ultimately so different from the theatrical stage of 
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representation it claims to replace). The real and the 
virtual are the same, everything is appearance. You can buy 
anything, wear anything, become anything. Only Baudrillard 
leaves out the small print, you can only ever play at 
becoming, no matter what rules are set for the game in hand, 
and no matter that they can be altered as often and as 
radically as you like, the fact remains that they only 
operate when constrained wi thin an economy of play. The 
economy of play is constituted by a grid, a back projection 
upon the papered-over abyss between the real and the virtual. 
This is not the actualization of lines of flight, nothing so 
dangerous., The threat, the panic, the apocalyptic vision here 
is only an advert, a glossy packaging on a product that 
promises stability, identity and safety, by way of an 
acceptance of vulnerability. Such vulnerability is of course 
itself prescribed wi thin the mainframe of the game, the 
stakes, the risks you can take, and their street-cred value, 
all of which is already designated. Moreover, if you up the 
stakes, cut through the paper, uncover the abyss, set a dare, 
the masculine (that masculine that is feminized in seduction) 
disappears altogether; the masculine subject dissolves, not 
in symbiosis with a becoming-feminine, but into total 
redundancy. 
Baudrillard is the master of consumer philosophy, an expert 
shopper, accepting the equation of identity with negative 
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difference in his stride and confidently asserting that (in 
consequence), if identity has no posi ti vi ty , it does not 
exist, it is an empty category, thus everything is 
undifferentiated, including sign systems. One abstract 
category inexorably slides into the next, in a playing out of 
the specious conceptual reversibility inherent to 
oppositional difference. Naturally, at the point of viscous 
circulari ty, the only al ternati ve to cynicism ("everything is 
everything else, so nothing matters and I'll do what I 
please") is seduction: affirming the play of empty 
signifiers, surrendering oneself to the allure of the sign. 
Unfortuna~ely, in an information economy signs cost money. 
Baudrillardian seduction of the feminine becomes the 
kleptomaniac face of pathological consumerism: lost in the 
Mall and penniless into the bargain. 
Of Baudrillard's followers, the Krockers are at once the most 
promising and the most disappointing in their championing of 
the indeterminacy of the body, particularly as construed in 
the guise of cybernetic cyborg. For them, sexuality 
especially is distilled into the meaninglessness of 
transparency and surface where genitalia are no more than 
special effects and gender is less a metaphor than a saleable 
attitude. Their unsuccessful attempts to bring into being of 
the emerging body of the cyborg results in a trivializing of 
desire that places them back in the Mall, queuing up with the 
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pre-adolescents in Next and The Gap. The champions of techno-
jargon seem often to be the first in line on MacDonald's VR 
machines, but are rarely prepared to invent or even 
experiment with new programmes (that Wall street hasn't yet 
accorded street value). Their voices resound through the 
length and breadth of the Malls, proclaiming the coming of 
the cyborg in order to retain a notion of meat in relation 
(though not symbiosis) with the machine-mind. It is only in 
this way that they can hold onto an empirical subjectivity 
(necessary for justice and descent burials), the unity of 
which will be retained at the level of transcendent 
production. scott Bukatman, puts it thus: 
"The body must become cyborg to retain its 
presence in the world, resituated in technological 
space and refigured in technological terms. 
Whether this represents a continuation, a 
sacrifice, a transcendence, or a surrender of 'the 
subject' is not certain." [Bukatman Terminal 
Identity p.247] 
The marriage band of panic and consumer philosophies 
decorated with a certain nostalgic technoshamanist symbolism 
is worn upon the fingers of paranoid theorists and 
egotistical virtual reality gurus alike. Of the latter, 
Howard Rheingold is probably the most offensive (yet banal) 
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with his vision of a virtual reality future that is no more 
than a return to pre-C18th spatial forms of utopia-- spaces 
representing ideal and universal forms of human association 
and collectivity--alternative realities in a world gone 
wrong. As with his philosophical counterparts, Rheingold's 
error is to start out from what he sees as the damaged or 
decayed state of modern democratic and community life, an 
account based upon the assumption of an originary lack. It is 
in reaction to this scene of devastation that Rheingold 
posits cyberspace's potential as "one of the informal public 
places where people can rebuild the aspects of community that 
were lost, when the malt shop became the mall" [Virtual 
Communities. p.25-26] What is recreated, recaptured and 
redeemed is the mythic community of the social in-common and 
with it those values and ideals considered lost to the new 
techno- (un) social world. 20 
"We need computer networks to recapture the sense 
of cooperative spirit .... While we've been gaining 
new technologies, we've been loosing our sense of 
community." [Virtual Communities. p.110] 
For Rheingold, there is solidarity in cyberspace in the 
extension of the security of small-town Gemeinschaft to the 
transnational scale of the global village, which brings with 
it, of course, virtual anti-viral policing agencies. virtual 
ideology in such hands perpetuates the age old ideal of 
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communications utopia in the shared consciousness and mutual 
understanding of the consensual communitarian body, a 
neutralizing space reflecting the desire to control and to 
create security and order in the name of self-repression 
(another name for preservation of the subject). 
Omnipotence phantasies at the individual level and familial 
communitarianism at the group and collective level; 
regression and transcendence, redemption through totalization 
of childhood, cultural regeneration through regression: These 
are the functions of Rheingold's techno-communitarianism, the 
image of v,irtual Gemeinschaft, an electronic variant of the 
Rousseauesque dream of a transparent society in which the 
ideal of community expresses a longing for harmony among 
persons, for consensus and mutual understanding. It is a 
social vision that is grounded in a primal sense of enclosure 
and wholeness. In this electronic community, virtual reality 
functions as a neutralizing space for the domestication of 
desiring production, a domain of order, refuge and 
withdrawal. 
The glue, the sticky ethico-politicism that binds much 
postmodern and techno-VR culture and theory together is a 
belief in the mastery of the abstract schema in the 
resolution of commercium into a unit (or unity). What is 
overlooked however, is that the moment at which linkage or 
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coupling breaks down and the thought of lack takes hold is 
not the removal of a part of what constitutes the linkage, 
but the conceptualization that what is at stake is a 
connection (requiring no imposed schematization for its 
synthesis into the general commercium). 
Linkage or coupling occurs as inclusive synthesis, where a 
whole is broken down, disassembled and sensitized to the 
singularities of its parties, resonating with them, combining 
potentials and creating new ones rather than subtracting 
potentials already clamoring to express themselves. This 
process is, thwarted by virtue of the enforcement of overlayed 
social categories; a repressive mechanism of reinforcement 
and amplification of the body's whole attractors, expressed 
as authorized social categories to be in or conjoined with 
(man/woman, husband/wife, boss/employee, etc.). In this 
scenario of stability, coordinates are set and entropic 
equilibrium rules. 
Identity and identity-loss correspond to being in or slipping 
out of one's assigned category and the paths through the 
social field associated with it; they are the end effects not 
the foundation, of the process of indi viduation. What is 
founding is the body's nonidentical threshold states, its 
potential for becomings-. 
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Man/woman, as one of the interlocking sets of coordinates on 
the categorical grid defining the socialized human being, are 
usually taken as equivalent yet empty categories constituted 
solely out of opposition and designating two poles of the 
same exclusive disjunction. As has been shown, there is no 
real body that coincides completely with either category but 
only approaches it as a limit in terms of engenderment, that 
is, becoming more or less "feminine/female" or more of less 
"masculine/male" depending on the degree to which it conforms 
to the connections and trajectories laid out for it. Insofar 
as Man and Woman have a reality at all, it is as metaphors, 
symptoms 9f sickness, logical abstractions, artificially 
closed energetic systems revolving around subtypes of each 
gender category; abstractions of the attractors to which 
society expects bodies to gravitate (love, school, family, 
church, etc.). 
A body does not have a gender, it is gendered. Gender is done 
unto it by the socius. Sex, on the other hand is a potential 
for becoming certain kinds of desiring machines through 
commercium: Entities are not assigned a sexuality but are 
sexualized in accordance with the bodies they have (which are 
open to alteration) in their potential for interaction 
(association, coupling) with other bodies (human, animal, 
machine, etc,). There are as many sexualities (kinds of sex) 
as there are modes of association. Whereas gender is a form 
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of imprisonment, a social functional limitation of a bod~'s 
connective and trans formative capacity; sex is a bOd~'.s 
potential, its virtual state. 21 
Thinkers like Baudrillard attempt to have gender master sex 
in order to stabilize the bodies state and limit its 
potential to change, to move away from the state of 
equilibrium. Gendering is used to overlay sex as the process 
by which a body is socially determined to be determined by 
biology: social channelization cast as destiny by being 
pinned to a,natomical difference. Doubtless such procedures of 
tactical mastery have been largely successful in the past, 
but the categories that legitimate them are themselves in the 
process of transformation: from physiology to communications 
engineering, biological determination to evolutionary 
constraint, organic sex role specification to optimal genetic 
strategies, gender to irrelevance. 
The reason for initially privileging a Deleuzian reading of 
"becoming-woman" over a Baudrillardian "feminine seduction" 
should now be clear, for becoming-woman involves carrying the 
indeterminacy, movement, and paradox of the female stereotype 
past the point at which it is recouperable by the socius as 
it presently functions, over the limit beyond which lack of 
definition becomes the positive power to transform the 
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boundaries that constrain sex within a point attractor space. 
As the categorical grids22 become dysfunctional in terms of 
social production, the apparatus of identity is forced beyond 
the threshold of sameness, into singularity and intensity, a 
dystopia of hybrid carnal invention. Kate, a postmodern 
transsexual explains: 
"I went from being male to not-male, to female, 
and now to not-female." [Kate Bornstein. The Last 
Sex. p.llS] 
She contin~es: 
"What they do for a M-to-F sex change is cut the 
penis open, scrape out the inside and then turn it 
inside out so that the outside of my penis is now 
the walls of my vagina. The head of my penis is 
now my cervix. You [female audience] have more 
sensation in your clitoris than I do because mine 
is reconstituted from my perineum. It has lots of 
nerves and is fine, but yours is more sensitive. 
However, the walls of my vagina are more sensitive 
than the walls of your vagina." [ibid. p.120] 
Although still problematic, this is at least the becoming of 
a body that differs from itself in that it has no simple 
history and no linear development from past to future that 
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can be recounted within the boundaries of traditional 
category distinctions. It stands at an extreme; it is both a 
threat and a promise to the "standard Man-form" wherein 
bodies and desires are in near-total symbiosis. Its process 
involves the necessary suicide of both male and female, a 
suicide that may none-the-Iess have to be assisted. This does 
not however lead to undifferentiation, which is not outside 
but integral to the system of identification (operating from 
the point of view of a system of difference predicated on 
equivalence, yielding sameness), it is rather a process of 
hyperdifferentiation in an irreversibly open system. 23 
Baudrillard, like the Krockers and other purchasers of the 
"panic body" still operate within the framework of identity, 
that is within an oppositional framework; identity (negative 
difference) versus undifferentiation (confusion). They are 
thus presented with three choices: Becoming the person it is 
said to be - the slow death of stable equilibrium; opting out 
of that path, into its opposite - neurosis and eventual 
breakdown; or shopping-to-be - not exactly mental stability, 
but not quite breakdown either. The frenzy of the 
purchasable, potential experienced as infinite choice between 
having's rather than becomings. The escape route taken by 
Kate, amongst others, moves beyond this mall-mentality on an 
exorbital path away from identity and undifferentiation into 
an unstable equilibrium of continual experimentation and 
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invention. 
At the risk of becoming tedious in repeating the refusal to 
engage with theories espousing a female subject-position, we 
must return to the question of access/exit from the 
phallocratic molar order once more, for Kate, after all, 
began in becoming with "being male". The problem, as Rosi 
Braidotti puts it, is that; 
"[I]t is as if all becomings were equal, but some 
were more equal than others." [Braidotti. Nomadic 
Subjects p.115] 
Two movem~nts must be noted where the stake is to make 
"woman" the referent of the intensity of (an introduction to) 
all becomings. 
The first concerns the historical production and maintenance 
of "woman" as the basic stratum upon which the multilayered 
institution of phallogocentric subjectivity is erected; woman 
as silent presence installing the master in his monologic 
mode. The second concerns the potential of women, given their 
seeming indeterminacy in relation to identity-structures, and 
posi tioning on the periphery of societal productions of 
desire, to become. 
It is clear that the entry point to becoming is different for 
"men" and "women", at least as a point of exit from the 
phallocentric mode. For men, becoming-woman (when it is not 
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enveloped by becoming-feminine) is a process that, beginning 
with the deterritorialization of a male subjectivity, 
dissolves "woman" into the forces that construct her, that 
is, into the male process of becoming (other). Yet women have 
no stable identity from which to initiate a process of 
becoming fluid, they are already (implicated) in becoming. 
Some feminist philosophers (most notably Irigaray), would 
claim that women's historical condition is precisely that 
allusion to a "body without organs" that directs the 
processes of deterritorialization. This suggests that women 
cannot construct an other without first becoming subject, the 
question tben is whether becoming necessarily begins from a 
stable identity or whether it can be initiated from out of a 
multiplicity that is not posed reactively. 
If this latter is possible, then there is no need to posit a 
female subjectivity as a preparation for becoming, what is at 
stake is rather an insistence that the philosophical 
emergence of experimentation with female subjectivity not be 
divorced from the general trajectory of becoming-woman. Such 
experimentation is necessary insofar as it is the 
interaction of identity with subjectivity that spells out the 
categorical distinction between dimensions of experience that 
are marked by desire, and therefore the unconscious, and 
others that are rather subjected to wailful self-regulation. 
For women to enter into a process of becoming-woman, that is, 
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to exit from identities based upon human subjectivity and the 
phallus, implies the transformation of the very structures 
and images of thought, not just their propositional content. 
The becoming-woman of women thus offers a more radical 
challenge to the transformation of categorical structures of 
thought than the, primarily re-active, becoming-woman of the 
male, in that it is always in advance of its own sex, that 
is, it is a becoming post-gendered in process. 
Becoming post-gendered occurs not in an a-sexual or non-
sexualized space (as is claimed by those feminists who see 
the alternative to the myth of bi-polar gendered sexuality as 
androgyny24), but in a space of poly-sexuality. This 
becoming is precisely not a move into androgyny, it is only 
a move away from those prescribed norms of sexuality (modes 
of desire) that are dictated by the deterministic categories 
of male and female (and the appointed sexual preferences that 
go with them). Or rather, it is a move through the 
transcendental plane that prescribes these identities in an 
escape mode that results in the transformation of the 
categories themselves in a process of deterritorialization. 
There is no need whatsoever to envisage such movement as a 
collapse onto an androgenous, non-sexual zone, this becoming 
does not effect the creation of a molar state, there being no 
simple point attractor for it to gravitate towards (as there 
was none for Kate once the process of transsexuality had 
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fully taken hold). The process of becoming is not 
teleological in any sense2S • Deleuze and Guattari again: 
"What is real is the becoming itself, the block of 
becoming, not the supposedly fixed terms through 
which that which becomes passes." [D&G. 1000 
Plateaus. p.238] 
The post-human body-in-becoming striding, skipping and 
spinning into the millennium incorporates a newly elaborated 
diagrammatics of desire (desiring production). In the 
following sections we will map some of the cultural practices 
of bodily b~comings which move us in this direction, namely; 
transsexuali ty, as a problematic practice of post-genderment, 
and sadomasochism, as a practice in boundary manoeuvering and 
the becoming immanent of the law (in respect of bodies in 
their integrity). 
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11. Becoming transsexual as a post-gender practice. 
R.J. stoller, (a renowned psychological theorists on 
transsexuality), asserts that the transsexual condition is a 
"dysfunction" whose cause can be traced back by the mother. 
Stoller claims that, "the mother is responsible for her son's 
transsexual urges", and where the transsexual is deemed a 
"natural" female, that, "it is the mother who is initially 
responsible, because she was not a 'good mother' during the 
first few months of the girl's life". Thus, he writes, "the 
psychological mechanism is seen as the opposite of male 
transsexualism: male transsexuals are the product of 
'smo)Qther love', 
maternal neglect." 
female transsexuals are the product of 
[Stoller in Eskapa's Bizarre Sex. p.284] 
Thomas Sza~, a theorist writing against transsexual surgery, 
although exhibiting a certain degree of sexual prejudice and 
political paranoia in his attacks upon the transsexual 
culture, comes closer than Stoller in claiming that it is 
medical technology and the availability of new surgical 
techniques which is largely responsible for the "invention" 
of modern transsexuality. Where Harry Benjamin (the so-called 
father of transsexual theory) claims that surgery is life-
preserving, maintaining that transsexuals will invariably 
commit suicide without it, Szasz notes that "no one will die 
as a direct re'sul t of a disease invented by the transsexer 
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Harry Benjamin", suggesting that it is the (the promise or 
denial of) surgery itself that is often responsible for 
driving the individual to suicide, and that these procedures 
are never justified given that "surgical operations creating 
false males and females are not treatments". [ibid. p.286] 
In our account of transsexuality as a post-gendered practice, 
there is no such sUbstantial difference between concepts of 
"real" and "fake" sexed and gendered beings (although being 
able to "pass" in a particular role will become important in 
what follows). Transsexuali ty, in the post-human condition is 
one of the.starting points in free-ing up sexuality, where 
the body poses a threat to the metaphysics of subjectivity 
and identity politics on the basis of which the concepts of 
"real" or "natural" males and females are based. 
Sexual politics presents us with the opportunity to privilege 
differences between sexual beings on the basis of their 
upbringing, sexual orientation and lived experience in 
general. On the basis of asserting positive sexual 
difference, disparate groups are able to combine forces in 
disrupting or overturning the dominant macho heterosexuality 
of social, political and financial institutions. 
Unfortunately however, some theorists, especially in the 
feminist camp, in propounding a political agenda based upon 
principles either of integration and equality or separation 
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and equality, tend to revert to a notion of originary sex-
gendered difference. As a consequence of such calls to 
"true", "real" or "natural" binary sex-gender difference, 
adherents to these theories often refuse to include 
transsexuals wi thin their politics, and sometimes openly 
attack transsexuals' attempts to be a part of the anti-
masculinist movement. Feminist arguments against the 
inclusion of transsexuals tend to fall into one of two camps: 
1) Radical and/or lesbian separatism, where the aim is to 
promote so-called "feminine" (positive) values over 
"masculine". (negative) ones, sometimes to the extent of 
separating out the sexed-genders as two separate species with 
different ethical, economic, aesthetic, and political 
tendencies and requirements. Extreme versions of this 
posi tion can often seem to be combatting misogyny with 
androphobia. The objection to transsexuals is that such 
individuals can never be accredited the status of 
"womanhood". Why this is the case depends upon the criteria 
espoused (most commonly essentialist of constructivist). Mary 
Daly, who grounds womenhood in the mystic heritage of witches 
and crones, claims that the "feminist soul" is violated 
"horizontally" by the transsexual, whose purpose (conscious 
or not) is to "colonize female bodies" [Mary Daly. 
Gyn/Ecology]. Those with a psychoanalytic background, on the 
other hand, refer to "womb envy" as the focus of male-to-
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female transsexuality, which they then refer back to the 
masculine trait of acquisition and appropriation. Followers 
of Andrea Dworkin and other anti -pornography supporters, 
present a third alternative with their claim that male-to-
female transsexuals are nothing more than male abusers who 
have found a safe way of getting intimate with women by 
faking membership of the class thereof. 
2) Politically oriented liberal femin[in]ists, whose aim is 
to be accepted into male society on equal terms, extol a "no 
difference except binary sexual difference" position, and 
attack anything that might threaten the seeming normalcy of 
their idealized version of woman as man without penis. For 
followers of this cause there can be no middle term and no 
crossing between territories, for the regulations ensuring 
equality demands the fixed status of those who are to be 
judged equal to their opposite. 
The common factor in these feminist positions lies in the 
fact that in their attacks upon transsexual ism , all 
concentrate almost exclusively upon the male-to-female model. 
The views of feminist author Janice Raymond, who writes 
extensively on transsexuality, does not fit comfortably into 
any of the positions stated. In her book, The Transsexual 
Empire, it is female-to-male transsexuals who are accused of 
blurring the patriarchal bias of sexual difference. She 
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writes: 
"The female-to-male transsexual is the token that 
saves face for the male "transsexual empire". She 
is the buffer zone who can be used to promote the 
universalist argument that transsexual ism is 
supposed to be a "human" problem, not uniquely 
restricted to men. She is the living proof that 
some women want the same thing." [The Transsexual 
Empire p.27] 
What is meant here by the "same thing" is left un-articulated 
by Raymond, but the suggestion seems to be that individuals 
participating in female-to-male transsexual ism manifest the 
possession of, or desire for the male privilege of being able 
to be, or to appropriate, all things, including sexual 
difference. Such privilege, moreover, includes the assumed 
mastery over all bodies, to the extent that Raymond 
formulates the main tenet of her book in the assertion that 
"all transsexuals rape women's bodies." 
There is some force in the arguments behind Raymond's 
assertion, yet the accusation of appropriation of the female 
category would seem to be more accurately directed against 
male colonizers of the feminine, such as Derrida and 
Baudrillard. Insofar as men claim the right to becoming-woman 
through a process of feminization, we can see that the stakes 
are not only to retain the traditional sex/gender 
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distinction, but to appropriate femininity itself as a male 
trait. This is not possible for the male-to-female 
transsexual, who has to disclaim all male privilege--
including his own history--once surgery has been agreed upon. 
Robert Briffault claims that the notion of the feminine is an 
economically evolved term permitting qualities other than 
those attached to the bearers of power in a culture to be 
valued. In this way, he argues, those whose economic power 
had been usurped, for whatever reason, are kept from 
revolting against the dominant group.26 One might argue, in 
light of this, that writers like Baudrillard and Derrida are 
attempting to recover an 'other' economy which, whilst having 
been initially born out of the strategies of an unacceptable 
dominant ideology to protect itself, has developed a 
discourse and power of its own, a power, moreover capable of 
disrupting the now clearly bankrupt dominant discourse when 
fed back into it. In the same vein, it might also be argued, 
however, that these male theorists, in attempting a re-
couperation of the feminine as creation of a masculinist 
discourse, and in doing so from a position of male privilege 
(from a seat of intellectual authority), are merely re-
instantiating the power of the dominant discourse in its 
right and in its ability to access and claim otherness as its 
own. This is to suggest that such male theory considers 
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itself the real force behind the discovery of the hidden 
power of the feminine; that the powers of seduction encysted 
in the concept of Woman are there for His experimentation and 
His transformation; that He is the rightful heir to the task 
of becoming-woman by means of gaining full knowledge of 
Himself, uncovering His own femininity. 
What is bad for feminism is male privilege, and it is 
probably true to say that occasionally a male-to-female 
transsexual will carry more than a small degree of that over 
into their newly-gendered life, but what this demonstrates is 
the necessity for transsexuals to be allowed the space within 
a society of enforced mono-gendered life stories to be able 
to tell of a multi-gendered past and future. The problematic 
of male-feminization as a political manoeuvre for gaining or 
regaining power (over women) ceases to have any significance 
once it is made clear that what is at stake in 
transsexualism, as a practice of post- or trans-gendering, is 
not simply a jump from one side of a binary oppositional 
gender system to another, and the denial or repression of 
that jump and what went before it, once undertaken. On the 
contrary, it is in the transsexual body (as body, as surface 
of desire and as text) that we may find the potential to map 
the refigured body and current of gender discourse so as to 
disrupt that binary; to take advantage of the dissonances 
created by the juxtaposition of the multiplicity of body-
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gender potentials, to fragment and reconstitute gender in new 
and novel geometries. 
It is, of course, true that insofar as transsexual dialogue 
within gender "identity" and "dysphoria" clinics is 
concerned, transsexuals, at least pre-operative ones, are as 
guilty as anyone of confusing the performative character of 
gender with the physical fact of sexuality, referring to 
their perceptions of their situation as being in the "wrong 
body" . By adopting such terminology (which is still a 
prerequisite if one is to be judged suitable for surgery), 
transsexuals seemingly become complicit with the patriarchal 
exclusive definition of gender, and help to reinforce the 
oppositional mode of gender identification. Judith Shapiro 
points out: 
"To those ... who might be inclined to diagnose the 
transsexual's focus on the genitals as obsessive 
or fetishistic, the response is that they are, in 
fact, simply conforming to their culture's 
criteria for gender assignment." [Body Guards 
p.261] 
Not only is the language of being in the "wrong body" the 
only quasi-acceptable alternative in our society to according 
with ones prescribed gender/sex assignment, but the focus of 
this artificially oppositional belief is directed 
specifically at the genitalia, viewed as the focus of sexual 
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desire. It is thus from within the heterosexual economy of 
(repressed) desire that institutionalized transsexuality is 
defined. 
At the moment of neocolporraphy, the institutionally 
constructed transsexual is instantaneously transformed from 
unambiguous (albeit unhappy) man, to unambiguous woman. The 
bizarre, manufactured, literature of early transsexual ism , 
concocted by the medical profession and academia, sets the 
tone for such mystical transformations: 
"I'm not a muchacho ••• I'm a muchacha now ..• a 
girl [sic]." [Conn Canary. The story of a 
Transsexual p.271] 
"In the instant that I awoke from the anaesthetic, 
I realized that I had finally become a woman." 
[Hedy Jo star. in Gender Outlaw p.46] 
And unbelievably, from the second-hand text of Lili Elbe 
[Andreas Sparre], who, immediately upon waking from surgery 
writes a note: 
"He gazed at the card [he had just written] and 
failed to recognize the writing. It was a woman's 
script." 
[Which the nurse then carries in to the doctor] 
"What do you think of this , Doctor. No man could 
have written it?" 
[The doctor concurs, and remarks that the same 
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thing has happened to Elbe's voice.] 
"the strange thing was that your voice had 
completely changed ... You have a splendid soprano 
voice! Simply astounding!" [Lili Elbe p.198] 
For decades after the opening of the first "gender dysphoria" 
clinics, the seminal text for the assessment of an 
individuals "genuine" transsexual ism was Harry Benjamin's The 
transsexual Phenomenon. This, largely fictional and badly 
researched little manual, was used by the medical profession 
and academics as standard reference for assessing an 
individuals' suitability for surgery and was accordingly 
passed around the enclaves of pre-operative transsexuals as 
a guide to what to say and how to behave in order to be 
accredited "gender reassignment" status within the medical 
and psychiatric institution. This situation has changed 
relatively little, being in the "wrong body" is still the 
central point of reference in the citing of the diagnostic 
category of transsexualism, except that, since 1980, it has 
been considered necessary, by the body police (the medical 
establishment) that, in moving into the "right body" one must 
adopt a clinically "good" history to go with it. 
Not only must the intervening space in the continuum of 
sexuali ty be invisible - nobody 
wringing of the turkeys neck 
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ever mentions the ritual 
prior to the mystical 
transformation27 
experience must 
transformation. 
but the previous state of lived 
be silenced forever at the moment of 
Sandy Stone argues against 
institutionalized requirement: 
"Passing means to live successfully in the gender 
of choice, to be accepted as a "natural" member of 
that gender. Passing means the denial of mixture. 
One and the same with passing is the effacement of 
the prior gender role, or the constitution of a 
prior history. Considering that most transsexuals 
choose· reassignment in their third or fourth 
decade, this means erasing a considerable portion 
of their personal experience. It is my contention 
that this process, in which both the transsexual 
and the medical/psychological establishment are 
complicit, forecloses the possibility of a life 
grounded in the intertexual possibilities of the 
transsexual body." 
[Body Guards. p.297] 
this 
The art of "passing" requires that the transsexual co-operate 
and participate in the creation of totalised, monistic 
identities, forgoing physical and subjective intertexuality 
and foreclosing the possibility of open relationships. Under 
the principle of passing, the destabilizing power of being 
"read" is denied and life experience is grounded upon a anti-
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productive fiction (a female or male childhood that the 
individual never had). This story is not unfamiliar to the 
person of colour whose skin is light enough to pass for 
white, to those who can afford facial surgery and melamine 
operations and to the closet lesbian or gay, indeed to anyone 
who has chosen invisibility as an imperfect solution to 
individual dissonance and irony in the face of social 
prescriptivism. 
The post-human transsexual is celebrated in many subcultures 
as some sort of shaman, and their knowledge of the denied 
"other side" is held to be invaluable for inventing tactics 
of patriarchal subversion; for they know the enemy (male 
privilege and the ego that goes with it) .28 But like all 
shaman, they are forced to communicate/perform the truth of 
the other side in such a way that the culture can hear it, 
that is, they are forced to advertise themselves as symbols 
standing outside and in opposition to the norms and values of 
ordinary (mainstream) society. Such a demand then entails 
that the individuals concerned give up any ability to blend 
within their cultural, social, family background. This 
glorification of the transsexuals' status stands in direct 
opposition to the place they are allotted by the medical 
community that judges them. Kate notes: 
"we're taught that we are literally sick, that we 
have an illness that can be diagnosed any maybe 
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cured. As a result of the medicalization of our 
condi tion, transsexuals must see therapists in 
order to recei ve the medical seal of approval 
required to proceed with any gender reassignment 
surgery. Now, once we get to the doctor, we're 
told we'll be cured if we become members of one 
gender or another. We're told not to divulge our 
transsexual status, except in select cases 
requiring intimacy. Isn't that amazing? 
Transsexuals presenting themselves for therapy in 
this culture are channeled through a system which 
labels ,them as having a disease (transsexuality) 
for which the therapy is to lie, hide, or 
otherwise remain silent." [Gender Outlaw p.62] 
In the same vein, sandy stone proclaims in her "post-
transsexual manifesto": 
"transsexuals must take responsibility for all of 
their history, to begin to rearticulate their 
lives not as a series of erasures in the service 
of a species of feminism conceived from within a 
traditional frame, but as a political action begun 
by reappropriating difference and reclaiming the 
power of the refigured and reinscribed body." 
[Body Guards p.298-90] 
If the essence of transsexualism is the art of passing, then 
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perhaps stone's post-transsexual ism is more appropriate for 
our purposes. As she puts it: "Perhaps it's time to begin 
laying the groundwork for the next transformation." [ibid 
p.298] 
It is precisely this kind of "freeing-up" of gender identity 
that is feared by the likes of Janice Raymond, who are unable 
to separate the task of pursuing a feminist anti-masculinist 
politics from the acceptance and adoption of patriarchally 
assigned gender specific subjectivity. This is not to deny 
the reality of operational gender systems, but rather to 
assert that one does not have to be a victim or to accept the 
status of underdog to be able to oppose the aggressor. 
The tradition of oppositional gender identity is the bedrock 
of patriarchy, and inasmuch as it is impossible to break free 
of this state without understanding it, cross-dressing and 
passing can be taken as positive activities. Moreover, once 
an individual has begun moving towards a trans-gendered or 
post-transsexual position, the adoption of a gender identity 
(whichever one it be) will never be the same again. It should 
also be pointed out that, wi thin white male supremacist 
western society, bodily survival alone sometimes demands the 
ability to pass and, as Kate points out, living at the edge 
can get a bit tiring when you're in a minority of one: 
"I love the idea of being without an identity, it 
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gives me a lot of room to play around; but it 
makes me dizzy, having nowhere to hang my hat. 
When I get too tired of not having an identity, I 
take one on: it doesn't really matter what 
identity I take on, as long as its recognizable." 
[Gender Outlaw p.39] 
Gender is real, it is the real effect of our cultural 
practices, but it is not an a priori given and it cannot be 
productive or creative when defined within a binary 
oppositional structure. Nor is the so-called "genderfuck" of 
transsexualism (and other trans-gender activities) an 
activity that makes gender roles ambiguous -- and it most 
certainly does not lead to asexuality, which, as has been 
argued, comes from the false equation of sexual orientation 
and activity with biological gender specification -- what it 
does, is to make gender a fluid continuum. Gender becomes 
that through which one is able to move freely (although not 
without effort and a certain dizziness) and that which one is 
able to transform by making it (its construction and 
operation) immanent to the body that is identified by means 
of it. Gender too can be evolutionary. 
Citing Kate again: 
"Instead of imagining gender as opposite poles of 
a two-dimensional line, it would be interesting to 
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twirl that line in space, and then to spin it 
through several more dimensions. In this way many 
more possibilities of gender may be explored." 
[Gender Outlaw p.117] 
And Sandy sounds the warning that must accompany it: 
"Here on the gender borders at the close of the 
twentieth century, with the faltering of 
phallocratic hegemony and the bumptious appearance 
of heteroglossic origin accounts, we find the 
epistemologies of white male medical practice, the 
rage of radical feminist theories and the chaos of 
lived gender experience meeting on the battlefield 
of the transsexual body: a hotly contested site of 
cuI tural inscription, a meaning machine for the 
production of ideal type." [Body Guards. p.294] 
In classical male-supremacist society, cuI ture does not 
simply create roles for gendered people, it is itself the 
creator of gender. Gender attribution, like gender 
assignment, is phallocentric, and one is male unless 
perceived otherwise. As we should all be aware: 
"i t would take four female cues to outweigh one 
male cue: one is assumed male until proven 
otherwise. That's one reason why many women today 
get "sirred" whereas very few men get called 
"ma'am"." [Gender Outlaw p.26] 
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Not only do we confuse sex and gender but we isolated them 
whilst making them dependent upon one another, such that the 
only choices we're given to determine the focus of our sexual 
desire are firmly circumscribed wi thin the binary gender 
system, desire is domesticated and forced into specific 
models of sexual manifestation: The heterosexual model- in 
which a culturally defined male is in a relationship with a 
culturally-defined female; The gay male model- two 
cuI turally-defined men involved with each other; Lesbian 
model- Two culturally defined females involved with one 
another; The bisexual model- culturally defined men and women 
who could be'involved with either culturally defined men or 
women. 
Many leading psychological and medical theorists refuse to 
accept bisexuality as a real category, claiming that it is 
merely a guise for homosexuality. This denial can be seen as 
a defensive manoeuvre against opening up a mul tiplici ty of 
sexual difference--even if it is based upon a binary 
structuring of gender--by confining sexual preference to )( an 
ei ther\or ground rule. Even where this denial of sexual 
plurality is not in operation however, it is still the case 
that all four models depend upon the gender of the partner, 
minimizing, if not completely dismissing other dynamic models 
of a relationship which could be more important than gender 
and are often more telling with respect to the real nature of 
an individual's desire. These other models, by virtue of the 
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threat they pose to the overall binary system are 
traditionally repressed, criminalised or otherwise 
stigmatized, for example, butch/fem models, top/bottom (sado-
masochist) models, triad models, human/animal models, 
adul t/child models, multiple partner models, differently-
abled body models, reproductive models, monogamous models, 
owner/slave models, to name but a selection. 29 
The point here is that there is more to sex (the act) than 
gender (the category). Sexual preference could be based upon 
genital preference (which is not necessarily preference for 
a particular. gender), but it could also be based upon the 
acts one prefers. Elaborate systems for just this kind of 
preferential distinction are already existent in many so-
called "deviant" cultures. For example, the handkerchief code 
from the Samois Collective. This code is used for displaying 
preference in sexual behavior. Colours mean active if worn on 
the left side, passive if worn on the right. 
"Left side 
Fist fucker 
Anal sex, top 
Oral sex, top 
Light S/M, top 
Foot fetish, top 
Anything goes, top 
colour 
Red 
Dark blue 
Light blue 
Robin's egg blue 
Mustard 
Orange 
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Right side 
Fist fuckee 
Same, bottom 
Same, bottom 
Same, bottom 
Same, bottom 
Same, bottom 
Gives golden showers 
Hustler, selling 
Uniforms/military 
top 
Chickenhawk 
victorian scenes 
top 
Does bondage 
Shit scenes, top 
Heavy S/M and 
whipping top 
Piercer 
Likes menstruation 
Yellow 
Green 
Olive drab 
White 
White lace 
Grey 
Brown 
Black 
Purple 
Maroon 
Group sex, top Lavender 
Breast fondler Pink 
[SAMOIS coming to Power. Interlude I] 
Wants same 
Hustler, buying 
Same, bottom 
Novice 
Same, bottom 
Wants bondage 
Same, bottom 
Same, bottom 
Piercee 
Is menstruating 
Same, bottom 
Breast fondlee" 
Include within this list spots, stripes and checkers and the 
possibilities are limited only by the bodies willing to 
participate in them. 
There is a new generation of transsexuals entering the scene, 
post-transsexuals who assess their journey not as either/or 
(then/now) but rather as an integration, an on-going 
trans formative process with a past and a future. These new 
transsexuals are the post-humans perhaps most properly 
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qualified to invent the new post-modern culture, not as 
shamans, but as living, desiring multiplicities of self: 
"One answer to the question 'Who is transsexual?' 
might well be 'Anyone who admits it'. A more 
political answer might be, 'Anyone whose 
performance of gender calls into question the 
construct of gender itself." [Gender Outlaw p.121] 
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12. Becoming sadomasochistic as a poly-sexual practice. 
"I have someone stretched underneath me. Her hands 
are tied. I have cut her back, and I suppose I 
could pretend that I don't intend to put my mouth 
on the wound I've just made. But this is not an 
ornamental cut - an orchid, a whip, a snake. It is 
utilitarian, two short lines that cross each other 
at right angles. It delays the clotting of blood, 
which wells up thick as tar, a bead of perfect 
scarlet. Any second now, it will break and 
run ......... . 
I'm going to come soon, and I put my face down to 
her back and bite the skin around the cut so the 
blood spurts into my mouth. 
The sight of blood makes most people sick. It 
means there's an injury, pain, maybe even the 
possibility of death. But I can smell a woman who 
is bleeding across a crowded room. I bleed myself 
every month. I'm not afraid of it. The sight of 
someone else's blood, my own blood, makes me shake 
with excitement. It is life. Shedding it and 
sharing it is the ultimate violation and intimacy 
for me ....... . 
I appreciate my own pain, enjoy the adrenaline it 
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takes to slice my own skin, but my own blood has 
no taste. So I have to take this need to someone 
else. But I will just smear it on my skin, my 
face, where I can smell it, but it isn't in my 
mouth. If I have to drink it, I'll take it out 
with a syringe and squirt it into brandy to kill 
the virus. 
But this is tonight; this is urgent. It's been too 
long. This is something I have to have. I drink 
with the intensity of a newborn child." 
[Pat Califia. Melting Point p.221-2] 
Sadomasochism [SM] is not a form of sexual assault, it is a 
consensual acti vi ty that involves polarized roles and intense 
sensations. An SM scene is always preceded by a negotiation 
in which the top and bottom decide whether or not they will 
play, what activities are likely to occur, what activities 
will not occur and about how long the scene will last. The 
bottom is usually given a safe word or code action she can 
use to stop the scene. This safe word allows the bottom to 
fantasize that the scene is not consensual and to protest 
verbally or resist physically without halting stimulation. 
The key to understanding SM lies in the unravelling and 
acting out of some of the most complex desires within the 
multiplicity that is the self. The roles, dialogue, fetish 
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costumes, and sexual activity are part of a drama or ritual 
of self construction, analysis and destruction. The 
participants are enhancing their sexual pleasure, not 
damaging or imprisoning one another. A sadomasochist is well 
aware that a role adopted during a scene is not appropriate 
during other interactions and that a fantasy role is not the 
sum total of her being. 
In 1990, in this country, 16 men received prison sentences of 
up to four and a half years, or were fined, for engaging in 
consensual SM. These convictions were upheld by both the 
Court of Appeal and the Law Lords, despite protestations from 
within and without the juridical system as to the underhand 
manner in which the convictions were arrived at. In 1995, the 
European Court overturned the rulings on all counts. During 
the five years between the arrests of operation Spanner and 
the European Court decision, SM and fetish culture have 
become some of the fastest growing cult practices in the UK, 
with activities such as tattooing and body piercing becoming 
almost common place, fetish shops and SM clubs springing up 
in all the major cities, and kinky conferences disseminating 
across the Net. The Juridical system has been made an ass of, 
and continues to make an ass of itself. 
As the human body integrates evermore rapidly with evolved 
and evolving viruses, as prosthetic and genetic technology 
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enter into a hybrid relation with flesh, and as the human 
'self' is transmuted and transformed through virtual 
technology and the Net, the antiquated mechanism of the 
juridical, subject-based law is not simply challenged but 
infected and itself transformed in relation to that which is 
no longer within its jurisdiction, namely, the post-human 
body. 
Since the 'free-love' days of the 60's, representatives of 
the molar orders of Church, State and Family have pursued a 
moral crusade against the growing public face of polymorphous 
perversity in a permissive society that (supposedly) 
encourages sexual pluralism. For years their moralizing 
rhetoric was largely ignored until, in the early 80's, a most 
unlikely yet mutually empowering alliance was formed between 
a large number of Christian fundamentalists and a group 
highly politicized radical feminist separatists. 30 The 
dri ving force behind the latter association was a 
sanctimonious political lesbianism that had experienced a 
rapid rise in the separatist movement in the States and now 
claimed to be setting the agenda for the feminist movement as 
a whole. The puritanism they aspired to was, of course, just 
what the pious seminary militia were searching for, and the 
two formed an uneasy and largely unexplored coalition against 
the "perverted" enemy. 
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From its earliest proselytizing--directed mainly at the sex 
industry and its distributors--this puritanical feminism did 
not go unchallenged. Pitted against the popular WAP (Women 
Against Pornography) campaign and the 'Coalition of Women for 
a Feminist Sexuality and Against Sadomasochism' (both of 
which tended to equate pornography and abortion as violence 
against women), were lesbian SM groups like SAMOIS who argued 
against the separatists, that women must be left to choose 
and define their own sexuality, and who pointed out that 
anti-porn campaigns were effectively a means to impose sexual 
correctness upon women as well as men. 
In 1982 at 'the Barnard Conference on Sexuality, the split 
between these groups came to a head. The WAP claimed that the 
conference-- which aimed at representing all areas of female 
sexuality--was itself an obscenity, ignoring the needs of 
'real' women in favor of celebrating the perverse 
inclinations of academics in "debating the niceties of 
leather and shit". In the media coverage that followed the 
conference many so-called liberals found themselves siding 
with the seemingly concrete feminism of the WAP against what 
was regularly characterized as the perverse rantings of a 
sexually obsessed theory-bound minority. 
In an attempt to circumvent the 'free speech' protection that 
sexually explicit material enjoys in the US, separatist 
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ideologist Andrea Dworkin and lawyer Catherine MacKinnon 
attempted to buy off the Christian moral majority already 
sympathetic to WAP claims with a 'feminist' solution to 'the 
pornography problem'. Denying that this amounted to 
capitulation to the patriarchal state, the separatists 
promoted a legal Ordinance that stated that pornography de 
facto caused social harm, and sought a city that would adopt 
it. 31 The Ordinance gave women the right to sue producers of 
sex magazines and videos for the harm their products caused 
women as a class. Amongst other things, pornography, it was 
asserted, was a manifestation of, 
"dehumanization, sexual exploitation, forced sex, 
forced prostitution, physical injury, social and 
sexual terrorism, and inferiority presented as 
entertainment" 
[Ordinance] 
A wholly misinformed and distorted vision of SM sex was made 
a focal point of the crusade, characterized as 
"graphic sexually explicit subordination of women 
presented as dehumanized sexual objects who enjoy 
pain or humiliation; or who experience sexual 
pleasure in being raped, tied up or cut up or 
mutilated or bruised or physically hurt, presented 
in postures of sexual submission, servility or 
display." [ibid] 
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Had the Ordinance been made law, any woman would have been 
able to file a civil suit against the sale, exhibition, or 
distribution of sexually oriented material. This right would 
not have restricted to models or sexual assault victims; 
anyone might attempt to secure damages for themselves on the 
model or victim's behalf, with or without their consent. The 
model's consent, complicity, or contract was declared 
unacceptable as proof that they had not been coerced into 
posing or performing. The immediate effect of an Ordinance in 
practice would have been to drive all sexual representation 
and non-mainstream activity underground. 
The necessity for feminist proponents of the Ordinance to 
ally themselves with their previous adversaries - the moral 
majority - further split the feminist movement, especially 
when it was made public that McKinnon's employer was the 
conservative Republican anti-feminist Coughenour who had led 
a successful campaign to stop the equal rights amendment in 
Indiana. Thanks in large part to the work of groups like 
SAMOIS and other locally organized feminist collectives with 
an investment in keeping the sex in sexual politics, the 
Ordinances were eventually declared unconstitutional. 32 
The most prominent and popular anti-porn group in the UK at 
the same time, was the WAVAW (Women Against Violence Against 
Women), an organization that had been attempting to stipulate 
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the parameters of politically correct sex in this country for 
a decade or more. Carried along on the wave of moralizing 
inspired by the Barnard Conference and the formulation of the 
Ordinances in the States, WAVAW attempted to censor the 
imported American feminist magazine Heresies' "Sex Issue", 
which carried an open debate on anti-pornography arguments 
and an article in support of lesbian role-model play. 
Censorship, confiscation of material and even physical 
assaults on Dyke supporters increased in frequency directly 
following this attempt. It was not however, until the WAVAW 
attempted to have Dykes banned from the London Gay Centre 
that the battle came out into the open, forcing British 
feminists to seriously examine the separatists' dominance of 
sexual discourse within the movement as a whole. 
Again SM sex was the main target of the feminist purists, 
being mis-described, vilified and portrayed as the backbone 
of Patriarchy: 
"The white woman, the civilized woman, whose 
transcendent femininity is realized through 
submission, requires force. Force to exist as such 
requires violence. Violence inevitably means the 
infliction of pain. The norm of femininity as it 
manifests in normal women is masochism. Force 
actualizes femininity. Violence is sex. Pain is 
pleasure for the woman. The pornographic conceit 
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is that the normal female demands the force, the 
violence, the pain." [ And rea D w 0 r kin. 
Pornography. p.165] 
A violence reinforced in its monstrosity in virtue of its 
genealogical heritage; 
"expressions of male violence current amongst 
sado-masochists include symbols and activities 
that are directly fascist and racist. Sado-
masochism does not exist in a cultural vacuum; as 
the name suggests, it comes f'o~ a male, violent 
view of sexuality that goes back centuries. There 
are clear links between sado-masochism in Berlin 
in the 1930's and the rise of fascism; the same 
events are beginning in Britain today." 
[Sheila Jeffries Anti-climax Introduction.] 
This vision of the powerless humiliated female victim was 
abhorrent to many feminists, it was however the ideal symbol 
the Christian CARE trust had been searching for. In a second 
bizarre alliance, the increasingly isolated separatists and 
CARE joined forces in the late 80'S in the attempt to outlaw 
news agents top shelf material. 
The alliance did not however prove successful. The growing 
communications network (most notably satellite television 
viewing) and increased awareness and availability of sex 
material in London and across the Channel, thwarted the 
189 
zealous crusaders at every turn. And so, in desperation, they 
introduced into the debate a new gambit, the ruthless 
exploitation of the issue of child sex assault. There was 
thus launched an all-out war on kinky and perverted sex with 
accusations about satanic ritual abuse and soft-core 
'violence' spewed into every media outlet that would take it. 
The fictive causal chain leading from porn to SM to satanism 
and child abuse was highly saleable. What followed was the 
redefini tion of numerous, previously neutral sexual practices 
as dangerous, and, for a period, a frightening return to the 
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days when masturbation, being deemed 'self abuse' , was enough i, 
to put a child in care. 
Whilst the Christian zealots filled the tabloids, their 
feminist counterparts were gi ven ever more copy in the 
quali ty press, promoting incredible assertions about 
international satanic sado-masochistic sex rings which serial 
murdered aborted babies before the eyes of drugged preschool 
children, who then had to eat the remains of the sacrifice 
before participating in sado-masochistic orgies and Kiddy 
porn movies. The lack of any evidence for this obscenity 
dreamed up by the pure-in-heart, rather than illuminating its 
idiocy, gained a further ally in the OPS (Obscene 
Publications Squad) who, despite the four-fold increase in 
their operational costs during this period, were seeing 
convictions down 75 per cent due to jury acquittals. 
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with the creative storytelling of the pure at heart behind 
them and given their homophobic history, by 1990, the OPS had 
largely succeeded in promoting a necessary connection between 
SM, gay child killers and snuff movies. "Peds under the beds" 
became the rallying cry of the early 90's moral crusaders 
who, led by the likes of John Patten, forcibly removed 
children from their parents and coerced them into "disclosure 
therapy" to live out social workers satanic sex fantasies, 
whilst at the same time targeting for harassment homosexuals, 
horne-movie-makers and SM devotees. 33 
Given this context, the uncovering of horne-made homosexual 
group SM movies was bound give the OPS a hard-on. They even 
went so far as to dig up the back garden of one of the 16 men 
accused in operation Spanner, in the hope of finding half-
eaten babies. At the horne of another, finding a snakes and 
ladders game, the police asked "So you bring kids here, then, 
and torture them?" Finally the police had some evidence that 
perverts did at least exist, and they were not about to have 
their jubilance deflated by something as mundane as a factual 
investigation of the activities and persons accused, instead 
they wasted 500,000 pounds of taxpayers money on a show trial 
whose duplicity and hypocrisy has hardly been matched to this 
day. 
The judiciary in the case, being equally enmired in the 
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satanic abuse hysteria, quickly amended the initial charge of . 
"conspiracy to corrupt public morals" with prosecution under 
sections 20 and 47 of the 1861 Offenses Against the Person 
Act. The prosecution was far from safe however, as the act 
permits those who strike a blow against another the right to 
a defense of consent up to an ill-defined ceiling, and until 
recently, the act committed had to be likely to cause a 
breach of the peace. On Council's advice the defendants had 
pleaded "not guilty" to assault believing, reasonably and 
correctly had the precedent been followed, that the 
prosecution would have to prove that there had been a hostile 
act or intent and a lack of consent. Judge Rant, being only 
too aware of this fact, made a rUling that consent was no 
defence against assault, which effectively prevented the 
defence from presenting their case, which included evidence 
of the consent of all individuals accused to all acts 
involved, and further, to the expert testimony that SM had 
nothing to do with acts of coercive, vindictive or permanent 
bodily damage. 
It became clear to the defense council that Judge Rant was 
not about to let the accused off with cautions. Nor was he 
prepared to risk a not-guilty verdict by citing the 1967 
Sexual Offenses act which forbids gay men having sex if a 
third party is present. with no defense to mount, the Council 
was obliged to recommend the defendants change their pleas to 
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guilty. On the 19th December 1990 the formal convictions were 
made and the Judges position was clarified. The role of the 
judge and jury, Rant informed the court, is to draw a line 
between what is and what is not acceptable in civilized 
society, and that sadomasochism is "degrading and vicious" 
and thus, by definition, on the wrong side of the law. Rant's 
decision was upheld 18 months later by the Court of Appeal 
and confirmed by a split 3:2 decision by Law Lords in March 
1992. 
It is manifestly clear from the remarks of all the judges 
concerned in the Spanner case, that a definition of SM sex 
had been formulated in advance of and despite any relevant 
information on the subject, a definition moreover that was 
indebted to the original rantings of the anti-porn radical 
feminist separatists. From this careless disregard for the 
facts three moves followed: 1. The assertion that the essence 
of sado-masochistic activity is the infliction and reception 
of pain. 2. That inflicting such pain amounts to assault in 
English law. 3. That no 'victim' of an assault can consent to 
being assaulted. It is this third point that led to the 
Spanner convictions, a point which is dependent upon the 
first two for its validity. Yet the first justification is 
erroneous and the second only became a legal 'fact' by virtue 
of the Spanner judgements (and could easily have been decided 
otherwise) • 
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Part of the problem in placing SM acti vi ties under the 
heading of assault is that most contemporary exceptions to 
the assault law have never been explicitly listed either in 
Case Law or in statute, and that mutually gratifying SM sex 
was neither an exception nor an assault before the Spanner 
Judgement. By declaring that consensual SM sex was not an 
exception, the judges were, for the first time in history, 
making a distinction between the right to use various forms 
of force in the name of sport and those to create sexual 
pleasure. By ignoring the precedent of letting the jury 
decide on borderline assault cases, by refusing to clarify 
what was meant by "good reason" to classify something as an 
exception, and by refusing to supply any guidelines as to the 
definition in borderline cases, the judiciary effectively 
used their power to place sex acts in a criminal category, 
without defining the boundaries of that category.34 
The embarrassment for the law is that in order to justify 
prohibiting acts by claiming that they are not in the public 
interest requires a judge to decide that there is "no good 
reason" for the act. As many of the existing violent 
exceptions to the assault law relied upon the anachronistic 
justification that they helped prepare the realms subjects 
for war, and most contact sports would fail that test, most 
so-called exceptions have no more 'good reason' that SM. This 
became obvious when the Law Lords claimed that they did not 
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have to provide good reasons for their own whims and fancies. 
Behind the nonsense made of the assault law, however, is the 
simple fact that the Law Lords knew that if they left the 
decisions to the defendants' peers on juries, their own power 
would be reduced, and the Law would not be manipulable for 
poli tical reasons. 35 
It is in virtue of the relation of the body to the law that 
SM (like transsexualism) is of vital interest to a 
cyberfeminist position, for how can we learn to become-cyborg 
when we are still paranoid about being meat; of what confines 
us within and motivates our pursuing a separation between our 
desires and our flesh. Testing the limits of the body is a 
crucial element of exploring the multiplicity of the self, 
which seeks to move beyond the constraints of biologically 
and sociologically programmed desire. SM is one of the most 
successful decoders of the law of the ethically and socially 
unified subject-citizen , effectively dismantling both its 
conditions and its consequences. The basic dynamic of SM is 
not pain but power-play and the exploration of sexual desire 
without the familiar constraints of economic control, 
proscribed role-behavior or forced reproduction. 
Our political system cannot digest the concept of power 
unconnected to privilege. SM recognizes the erotic 
underpinnings of our social system and seeks to reclaim them. 
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There is an enormous swelling beneath the priest's robe, the 
cop's uniform, the president's business suit, the soldier's 
khakis. But that phallus is powerful only so long as it is 
concealed, elevated to the level of a symbol, never exposed 
or used in literal sex. A cop with an erection sticking out 
can be punished, rejected, blown or enjoyed, but he is no 
longer a demigod. In an SM context, the uniforms and roles 
and dialogue become a parody of authority, a challenge to it, 
a recognition of its secret sexual nature. 
Although one can understand how feminist anti-SM comes about 
from the fact that the women's movement has always fought 
against the 
against the 
idea of women as fundamentally masochistic, 
belief that they create, or are at least 
responsible for there own second-class status, and have to 
accept their positioning as the natural victims of 
biologically constructed domination, a sexual sadomasochist 
has no more wish to be raped than anyone else, nor does she 
wish to be battered, discriminated against at work or kept 
down by the system. Her desire to act out specific sexual 
fantasies is very different from the pseudopsychiatric dictum 
that a women's world is bound by housework, intercourse and 
childbirth. Furthermore, women and gays who are hostile to 
other sexual minorities are siding with fascism: They don't 
want the uniforms to degenerate into drag--they want uniforms 
of their own. 
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"S/M is scary. 
significance. We 
disgusting or 
That's at least half of its 
select the most frightening, 
unacceptable activities and 
transmute them into pleasure. We make use of all 
the forbidden symbols and all the disowned 
emotions. S/M is deliberate, premeditated, erotic 
blasphemy. It is a form of sexual extremism and 
sexual dissent ..... 
[Califia. Public Sex p.158] 
SM practitioners hang out in the gay community because that's 
where the sexual fringe starts to unravel. They are limited 
only by their own imagination, cruelty and compassion, and by 
the greed and stamina of their partners body. 
"No matter how poetic I am, some people will never 
be able to see anything beautiful about the 
authori tarian set of a women's broad shoulders 
inside a leather jacket that is well broken in, or 
the curve of a submissive's back when she dares to 
kneel and arch her shoulders for the lash. The 
prospect of a human body being rendered helpless, 
put under slowly increasing stress, so that the 
maximum amount of sensation can be run through 
skin, nerves and muscles, will always seem 
horrifying to some readers, not a fascinating 
attempt to bring out the body's stamina and grace. 
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Do these people hate me? do they want 
sadomasochists to cease to exist, because of a 
different notion about what constitutes the good 
and the beautiful?" [Pat Califia. Macho Sluts. 
p.25] 
Classically, the law justified itself by two movements, 
regressively through abstraction to the Good as absolutely 
necessary principle and condition (of society, exchange, 
association, desire); and progressively through reduction to 
the relative best outcome, that is, the consequences of 
action. For law to remain between these two poles, it must 
subject all beings to its authority and for this it must 
create subjects and a force external to them which can be 
turned upon their presumed autonomy, as that which defines 
them as subjects (as that which keeps them safe from the 
chaos and turmoil of experiencing their multiple desires). 
It is the law that tyrannizes where power is ultimately 
dependent upon the complicity of masters and slaves. As we 
recall from section eight, it is in the nature of human 
beings, in Enlightenment terms, to internalize the law that 
enslaves one to an unbiddable, unapproachable master, 
becoming more-than-man in the image of God the lawgiver. It 
is the notion of consent in the experimental sphere of 
sexuality that the law and its adherents find so abhorrent, 
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the notion of setting ones own constantly revisable limits. 
Here we are witness to the double-bind of the subject in our 
era; at once seeking protection from the law and yet 
despising the false repressive subjectivity it is set up to 
enshrine. Man has found himself incapable of occupying the 
role of mirrored god (semi-divinity) and thus despairs of 
himself; even more so as he recognizes the law (the divine 
sanction) as the displacement of his own desires for unity 
and mastery. 
The would-be-tyrant speaks the language of the law and lives 
in its shadow. SM is not complicit with this usurpation, it 
is neither the language of the Nazi concentration camp guard, 
nor that of the abused victimized female body under 
patriarchy. SM does not transgress the law but transcends and 
transforms it by placing it en scene. If anything, SM is more 
a parody of the hidden sexual nature of fascism than it is a 
worship of or obsequience to it. Its eroticism focusses on 
forbidden feelings or actions and searches for a way to 
obtain pleasure from them. For SM practitioners the most 
significant reward for being a top or bottom is sexual 
pleasure. If they don't like being a top or bottom they 
simply switch keys. 
"If you don't believe we choose to do S/M, you 
aren't using the term 'consent' in any meaningful 
way, but rather as a synonym for 'mature', 
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'socially acceptable' and 'politically correct'." 
[Califia. Macho Sluts. p.27] 
In SM the law is scrupulously applied such that its absurdity 
is demonstrated and the very disorder it is intended to 
prevent is provoked. The law is reduced to its furthest 
consequences, forced to manifest itself in consequences. In 
an SM scene you won't ever get sent to a shrink, a judge or 
a parent, unless they're wearing rubber hosiery and carrying 
a whip. The point of sadomasochism is that the very law which 
forbids satisfaction of a desire under threat of subsequent 
punishment is converted into one which demands the punishment 
first ordering the satisfaction of the desire to follow 
alongside or upon it. Pain is not the cause of the pleasure 
received so much as the necessary precondition for achieving 
it. The sadomasochist bottom knows that the law increases the 
guilt of the person who submits to it, thus she finds new 
ways of descending from the law to its consequences (just as 
the sadomasochist top ascends to its conditions); she stands 
guilt on its head by making punishment into a condition that 
makes possible the forbidden pleasure. 
The law is just the name of the scene being enacted, its 
power is concentrated within the safe word, the 
trans formative word that sets up, reverses or collapses the 
relations en scene. The "safe word" is a bifurcation event, 
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no such events are possible where coercion is involved. It is 
the play of necessity where accident is itself an outcome and 
precondition of that necessity. 
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13. Post-human bodies in becoming. 
Becoming is not historical but topological: It is not a 
matter of progression or regression but viral involution. The 
law that attempts to master bodies through the prescription 
of acceptable gender roles and sexual practices is not simply 
transgressed in bodily practices of transsexuality and 
sadomasochism (as processes of becoming), but is transformed 
with the body in play, such that both law and body enter into 
a new relationship and one that is permanently open to re-
negotiation and re-evaluation through the commercium of 
association. Becoming is not intentional but directional: It 
is a movement' (a line of flight) away from the domain of 
exclusive disjunction that demands desire be actualized 
either as this or that (male or female); it is a 
counteractualization perpetrated by way of an alteration of 
the perception of constraint (the boundaries of attraction). 
The body-in-becoming associates with its constraints by 
becoming (over) sensitive towards them, thus converting them 
into opportunities, potentialities. 
When becoming-same holds sway (as is the case with the 
becoming-normalized the liberal feminism; becoming 
oppositional yet equal in terms of power, of lesbian 
separatism; becoming female-God of the Oalyesque mystic 
fringe, desire turns against itself and society begins to 
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attack its parts. In the name of humanist inspired 
transcendence there can be but two attitudes towards bodies -
incorporate or annihilate, and as every body has within it 
the ability to be duplicitous (to pass as one body-category 
while continuing to incarnate another) every body is a 
potential enemy. 
strategies of passing become invaluable in coordinating the 
ini tial move away from one or other of the oppositional 
extremes of molar attraction (male or female). In trans-
gendered passing moreover, there is no stable or underlying 
identity. It is not the male-that-was who is left behind in 
passing, but the definitional category of male, that is, the 
bipolar gender system itself, that is made immanent, singular 
and fluid. The past does not take on the shape of a well-
ordered and integrated, unified structural history, a story 
of the self-conscious subject, but rather becomes a zone of 
transcendence in which (and through which) one must be able 
to pass in order to reach escape velocity on the plane of 
consistency ( immanence). Passing is thus the practice of 
xenogenetic morphology, an inventive, imaginative experiment, 
with risks. The simulation of gender undertaken in passing, 
as an introduction to becoming-trans-gendered of the poly-
sexual being, is a practice which fails to respect the 
boundaries between identity sites and the rituals for moving 
between them as givens. This passing does not involve a 
203 
comparison or movement between bodies considered separately 
as entities unto themselves, but is rather a matter of 
diagramming differences in potential associated with bodily, 
machinic and other parts as such. In this sense then, the 
trans-gendered, poly-sexual, xenogenetic cyberfeminist is 
non-human (having no human sex or gender), a desiring 
production that is not one or even two, but n- sexes. 
The becoming-trans-gendered of the poly-sexual being moves 
the body out of its ricochetting between point attractors of 
male and female and into the phase space of the strange 
attractor, inducing turbulent behavior and the creation of 
incredibly complex boundaries separating basins of 
attraction. As control parameter (identity-category) shifts 
occur and energy is dissipated, bifurcation events are made 
possible. Desiring-production engages any tools available to 
catalyze, to push systems toward the border of their basin of 
attraction where small fluctuations can force them into the 
domain of a different, (more exciting) attractor, setting up 
an array of potential futures for the possibility of 
experimentation. 
To enter into becoming, to take up the practice of 
immanentization, is to become post-human, where post-human 
means nothing more than to have ventured in becoming beyond 
the qualifying categories that define the states of being 
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human, that is, morally culpable personhood, sexual and 
gendered citizenship, educated mainstream (or genius) 
rationality, etc. Movement through the binary oppositions of 
man/woman, child/adult, goody/baddy, that lead one out of the 
human condition can begin in a number of ways, transsexuality 
and sadomasochism are just two potential bodily strategies 
thereof. For those who insist on retaining the name of "man" 
it remains unclear as to whether their attempts to undermine, 
transgress or reverse the process of schematization (that 
binds them to a Man-form beyond the empirical and 
transcendental realm) can hope for anything beyond, on the 
one hand, creating an elaborate burial ceremony for the dead 
father (Baudrillard), with or without the accompanying 
mourning over his loss (Nancy) or hollering in the woods for 
his blessing (Iron John style); and on the other, (a la 
Schopenhauer-Sade-Bataille-Genet), becoming the (Kantian) 
bastard genius son, unable to subvert the immaculating 
process beyond the repetitive onanistic practice of re-
producing hymens, or (which amounts to the same thing) naming 
themselves last of the line (Nietzsche and Lyotard). 
These practices, moreover, run the risk of either maintaining 
or re-vitalizing the psychically integrated rational subject 
whose fictitious existence continues to reinscribe an ideal 
and patriarchally designed body upon which all exchange, we 
are told, is to be conducted. Such nostalgia is not a feature 
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of becoming that takes woman as its introduction, for here, 
insofar as the subject exists at all, it does so in the 
ironic local space between contradictory signs. Here, the 
enabling trans formative movement of becoming occurs when 
contradictory associations rather than being resolved one way 
or the other within the enforced binary social code, are held 
together in conjunction, transforming the evaluative term 
(previously held in stasis by the either jor structure), 
opening it up to re-evaluation on the basis of other 
associations and linkages, previously unthinkable. 
Many self-dubbed post-modern writers, claim that the 
previously necessary fiction of the subject has, in our era, 
come to an end, that it has lost its expediency, and can now 
be seen fractured, shattered and spattered across the new 
poli tical, economic and culturally global landscape. What has 
been lost in the breaking asunder of this great I, they tell 
us, is the governing principle that held it together as 
unitary entity, a principle we have already seen expressed as 
sensus communis, and which elsewhere hides behind the masks 
of "justice" "fraternity" and "care ethics". The values of 
the defunct system of subjectivity--discourse on the truth of 
being, humanist dialectics and moral reasoning--estranged 
from their central control mechanism, are none-the-less kept 
alive by many such thinkers in the concept of the community 
made small (and the subculture made high culture and made 
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safe). This is not post-humanism but a poor attempt to re-
harness spirit in the face of the threatening instability 
promised in the machinations of post-human desire. So long as 
the multiple associations occurring at a local, national or 
global level are re-glued with the sticky moralizing of 
humanist enlightenment promise, unregulated commercium will 
remain merely transgressi ve. The attempt to codify 
association with the values of a defunct humanity is no more 
than a redescribed and renewed venture on the golden pathway 
towards the goal of psychic unity and equilibrium, Kantian 
harmonization, the stultifying cud-chewing existence of 
being. 
Marike Finlay De Monchy, illustrates this attempt to re-
capture a subject control centre: 
"if the psyche-soma is permanently rent asunder 
there is annihilation of the subject or self once 
and for all. The correct sadist turns back before 
annihilating the partner in the game, and this 
moment of turning back is the moment of 
'jouissance'. It is the held paradox of de-
subjectification and re-subjectification, of the 
not-me and me of my body." [Body & Society p.28] 
"On the verge of death, the sadist turns back and 
the libido rushes in to replace death by the 
orgasm: the elation of self-affirmation." [ibid. 
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p.36] 
This description of a process of near-loss and regaining of 
the self is rooted in a call to survival of the "sane" 
organism, in the belief that the body must, at times, be 
subjectified if the subject is to survive psychically. "I 
would rather speak of a dialectic between subjectification 
and de-subjectification which allows for psychic survival." 
[ibid. p.37] On such an account the practice of sadomasochism 
is akin to pinching one's skin to be awakened to the 
consciousness of having a bodily boundary. Following the same 
logic as the old favorite "Have you stopped beating your 
children ye't?", De Monchy ends up asking: "Does self-
mutilation heighten or diminish de-personalization, i.e. does 
it promote the dispersion of the subject or is it in some 
manner a hedge against it?" [ibid] 
There is a second move often made to avoid the negative 
aspect of seeming to posit the existence of a psychically 
integrated, intentional and interested subject by those none 
the less needing to maintain a logic of communio, whereby the 
subject is replaced with the subject or author as mere 
function of textuality or linguistics in general. In this 
way, by replacing a seemingly animate with a seemingly 
inanimate subject, meaning is produced and yet the structure 
of the discursive practice itself is left intact. Such a 
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position replaces the de-anthropomorphization of the subject 
of post-humanity with an ambiguous anthropomorphization of 
the instances of language, text and discourse. This "crisis 
of the subject" as we can see, is a million miles away from 
the practices of the self elaborated by post-transsexual 
practi tioners of "gender-bending", like Kate, who, as we 
recall, speaks of a return (at moments of exhaustion) not to 
a stable pre-existing subject-position, but into a proscribed 
subject category (identity) in which one may be able to 
"pass" for a while. 
The post-modern subject, as a subject freed from the 
umbilical cord of Enlightenment thinking, is characterized by 
many philosophers as psychotically disintegrated through 
having been split, fractured or dispersed, an action causing 
a reversal of the Kantian schematism and undermining of the 
ontological status of the subject as integrated psyche-soma. 
According to this interpretation the post-modern condition is 
profoundly pathological. Against this view, it is more 
frui tful to consider the organism (for want of a better 
word), as in a constant state of becoming, in a position of 
being marked and marking a rite of passage between one state 
(one subject/object/subject relation) and another. The 
subject occurs as phenomenal effect when this association, 
this commercium of becoming, fails and a full object seems to 
have been produced, that is, when communion and confirmation 
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are achieved; where the ritual is completed; where subject 
and object are identified and differentiated from one 
another; where desire is commuted and committed to community 
(communal recognition of a permanent change in status). It is 
from wi thin such nefarious existence of the psychically 
integrated being that the auto-mutilation of sadomasochism is 
cast, by analysts like De Monchy, as strategy and relief, 
functioning either by transference or being replaced by 
abjection - both of which are byways and means for the 
continued production or maintenance of a fictional unified 
subjectivity. Moves of this type, may at first glance seem 
appealing due to their apparent engagement with the real 
process of de-subjectivization as the experience of a near, 
or a little- death. It is the very process by which this is 
effected however, that should clue us into the reason for its 
inadequacy in falling back into humanist enlightenment 
rhetoric. De Monchy, like Rheingold, the Krockers and 
Baudrillard relies upon a primary categorization and 
separation of organism and environment, followed by their 
immediate synthesis through de- and re-subjectification to 
establish the radicality of their positions in regard to more 
mainstream ethicists. 
The obsession with death functions as a stepping stone for 
the next generation, the reproduced, as a mark of progress. 
The unitary, unified, harmonious body is the dead body, 
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static and stable, that can only produce new life through the 
process of its own corruption. It is the fixation with life 
that is being unravelled now, with the new technologies of 
longevity36 and cyborgesque existence which force us to re-
assess the ethics of mortality's golden rule - the sanctity 
of (human) life - which is defunct in an age where life is no 
longer synonymous with either sentience or mortal (let alone 
moral) being. 
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1. This is a body which is post-human yet retains a political 
orientation in respect of the power relations within which it 
exists. 
2. It is easy to understand why, in this context, it is 
often the figure of the male-to-female transsexual who, in 
our culture, stands as exemplary physical model of the 
postmodern body. 
3. The physical evidence upon which this division is made is 
the least clearcut of those listed and many neuro-biologists 
reject the assertion as wholly fictional. 
4. This function of "Woman" will be explored in greater 
length in the next section. 
5. We can see this move at work as far back as in the text of 
Plato's Symposium, where the love that separates and joins 
the sexes is articulated, at its highest level, through the 
voice of the Goddess who is male. 
6. This argument is clearly more relevant to English speaking 
cuI tures than those whose language permi ts of no 
straightforward sex/gender separation, although I would argue 
that feminist writing in Europe in general (and especially in 
France) indicates a similar antagonistic interdependence of 
the two themes. 
7. Yet, it makes no sense to define gender as the cultural 
interpretation of sex, if sex itself is a gendered category 
(no matter how difficult to divine). Gender ought not to be 
conceived merely as cultural inscription of meaning on a pre-
given sex (as medico-juridical conception); gender must also 
designate the very apparatus of production whereby the sexes 
themselves are established. As a result, gender is not to 
culture as sex is to nature. Furthermore, if gender is held 
to be the culturally constructed interpretation of sex, we 
212 
must ask if it could not be constructed differently or if 
there is some notion of social determinism involved, 
foreclosing the possibility of transformation; whether 
constructivism suggests that certain laws generate gender 
differences along universal axes of sexual difference; of how 
and where the construction of gender takes place, etc. It is 
also worth noting in this context that one cannot 
automatically assumed that an essentialist position is also 
thereby a materialist position, as the anti-essentialist 
materialist writing of Monique Wittig shows. 
8. Such a move does not however entail the abandonment of a 
feminist politics, for asJudith Butler points out, in respect 
of the problematic relation of Queer studies to gender 
theory: 
"Only by a reduction of feminism to "gender", then 
implicitly conflating gender with sex, i.e. 
"female or male", and then explicitly declaring 
"sex" to be one of its two proper objects, can 
lesbian and gay studies establish itself as the 
proper successor to feminism. This place is 
however established in part through assimilating 
sexual difference to sex in such a way that sexual 
difference itself is refused through the 
trajectory of sUblation. Sexual difference, 
irreducible to "gender" or to the putative 
biological disjunction of "female or male", is 
rhetorically refused through the sUbstitution by 
which a unitary "sex" is installed as the proper 
object of inquiry." [Differences. p.3-4] 
9 . The higher unity, the unity beyond and grounding the 
reproductive determination of man's linear history, is not 
the grinding analyticity of time-production and 
determination, but the conditions of that production in the 
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existence of two series in schematization. It is only on the 
presupposition of this higher inclusive level of synthesis 
that the initial marking of sex-gender as assignment to one 
or other side of the line can occur. 
But let us be clear that insofar as woman is named in this 
process it is as transcendental production of sex (that is, 
as transcendent), it is man's determinations of the 
transcendental in empirical employment that consolidate 
gender and push through the act of signification. 
10. As if woman, as transcendent or matter (permanent 
substance) were able to get us to the abstract figure of the 
One whole subject. (This process, from invention to 
abstraction, is called history.) But woman does not embody 
the abstract. The consequent failures - watching the string 
and glue unity of the One collapse back into the multiplicity 
(2+), or into death (zero), just makes them still more 
def iant and determined - everything or nothing, god or 
castration. 
11. There is no female equivalent to male molarity. Feminist 
humanist discourses that proclaim the liberation of woman are 
not ultimately separable from the politics of identity and 
sUbstantive unity. 
12. The diagram of inheritance and manifestation of the law 
can be mapped directly onto Kant's description of the 
manifestation of the laws of nature from God through the 
works of the genius. The startling similarity of these two 
patterns is, moreover no coincidence. Unfortunately there is 
insufficient space in this writing to follow through this 
relation. 
13. The word 'hymen' has its origin in the Greek Hymenaios, 
a hymn sung at marriage ceremonies. Accounts as to the origin 
of the Hymenaios itself are varied: ( 1 ) Hymn expressing 
regret and longing for Hymenaeus, son of Terpsichore, who was 
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said to have disappeared on his wedding day. ( 2) Hymn 
honoring Hymenaeus of Athens, said to have chased some 
thieves and rescued the Attic maidens they had abducted. (3) 
Hymn exclaiming and heralding a happy life, joining together 
the people in prayers for the newly weds that they may find 
companionship and affection in their marriage [Photius]. (4) 
Hymn of mourning to Hymenaeus who died before consummating 
his marriage. [Pindar]. (4a) From (4) , Hymenaeus was 
believed to abide in the hymen (membrane virginalis) and to 
be the victim of the wedding night. Although it is already 
the case that in Pindar, wedding and funeral meet in the 
singing of the hymenaios (in the legally sanctioned communal 
rites of passage out of one family and into another), the 
association of the hymen with a virginal membrane (as in 4a)-
-and the consequent mourning/celebration of a torn veil--is 
not of Ancient Greek origin. 
14. "Our digestion is performed by a Menstruum which is 
chiefly saliva." [Cheselden. Anat. III.iv p.165. 1726. In 
OED. ] 
15. stoma, for the Greeks, was both the mouth through which 
air and food passes and the mouth of the uterus (not the 
vulva aidoion or vagina). The female stoma has always been 
the subject of heavy and explicit legislation (even as early 
as Plato. Laws. VI.). It is an old belief that if a woman 
shares a table with a man, it can be automatically assumed 
that she also shares his bed, eating practices, even in Greek 
times, were cited as evidence of sexual behavior. Although 
the connection is also made in the male, the symmetry of 
mouth-genitals is not at all matched: 
"That is why Anacharsis, who had dined with Solon 
and was resting after dinner, was seen with his 
left hand on his virility [meros] and his right 
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hand on his mouth: he believed that the tongue 
required a more powerful restraint, and he was 
right, for it would not be easy to count as many 
men lost through incontinence in amorous pleasures 
as cities and empires ruined through revelation of 
a secret." [Plutarch. On Garrulousness. 7. Mor. 
505A. ] 
16. "Upon the mixture of these two liquors there also 
obtrudes itself upon the Sense a very strong and offensive 
smell .. which perhaps occasioned some Chymists to call a 
Menstruum (wherein that nitrous spirit and smell is 
predominant) the stygian water." 
[Boyle. Cert. Physiol. Ess. iv. p140 1669.] 
Menstruum: (me'nstruum). Pl. menstrua (me'nstrua). 
Also 7 erron. menstrum. [L., neut. of menstruus 
adj., monthly f,. mens-, mensis month. Cf. F. 
menstrue'sing., menstruum, solvent, menstrues pl., 
monthly courses. (also OF. menstre) , Pro menstruas 
pl., Sp., It. menstruo. 
In classical Latin the sb occurs only in the pl. 
menstrua (=sense 1). The development ( in med. 
Latin) of sense 2 is to be explained by the fact 
that in alchemy the base metal undergoing 
transmutation into gold was compared to the seed 
within the womb, undergoing development by the 
agency of the menstrual blood. 
17. Stygian water, liquor [tr. mod.L. aqua stygia]: in Old 
Chemistry, a name for nitrohydrochloric acid and other strong 
mineral acids. Also applied to virulent poisons. stygian 
liquor (jocularly): a black nauseous drink. Obs. 
Nitrohydrochloric acid, also known as aqua-regia, N02 • 
Nitrogen: N. Gaseous element forming nearly four-fifths of 
common air, a necessary constituent of every organized body. 
nitrogen narcosis intoxicating and anaesthetic 
effect of too much nitrogen in the brain, 
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experienced by divers at considerable depths--also 
called rapture of the deep, depth and (slang) the 
narks. 
[Gr. nitron, sodium carbonate (but taken as if meaning 
nitre), and the root of gennaein, to generate.] 
Delirious (narcotic) baptism, and the (re)productive act of 
generation. 
Nitrohydrochloric: a. Chem. [NITRO-a.] N. acid, a mixture 
of nitric and hydrochloric acids, forming a powerful solvent, 
also called nitromuriatic acid and aqua regia. 
Nitrous oxide: a colourless gas (nitrogen 
protoxide, N20) with a faint odour and sweetish 
taste, which when inhaled produces exhilaration 
(hence called laughing gas) or anasthesia. 
Hydro- Combining form of water, employed in many compounds 
formed or adopted from Greek. 
a. Misc' having the sense of water. 
b. In medical and pathological terminology, hydro- is 
extensively used to form the names of diseases, 
being prefixed (i) to names of parts of the body 
to denote that such part is dropsical or affected 
wi th an accumulation of serous fluid, (ii) to 
names of diseases or diseased formations, meaning 
as the former. 
Serous: pertaining to serum. 
Serum: a watery liquid, especially that 
which separates from coagulating blood: 
blood serum containing antibodies, taken 
from an animal that has been inoculated 
with bacteria or their toxins, used to 
immunise persons or animals: watery part 
of a plant fluid. 
(Hydrocele: A tumor with a 
collection of serous fluid; 
spec. a tumour of this kind in 
the cavity of the tunica 
vaginalis of the testis.) 
Hydrochloric: Chemical combination of hydrogen and chlorine. 
Also called hydrogen chloride, a colourless gas with strongly 
acid taste and pungent irritating odour extremely soluble in 
217 
water. (Earlier names; muriatic acid, spirit of salt, 
chlorhydric acid). 
Mineral acids. 
Mineral: 1. Any substance obtained by mining; a 
product of the bowels of the earth. In early and 
modern technical use the ore (of a metal). Can be 
divined by use of a mineral rod. 
neither 
sUbstance 
kingdom' . 
4. A material substance that is 
animal nor 
belonging to 
vegetable; a 
the 'mineral 
b. In Alchemy, one of the three 
varieties of the philosophers stone (the 
others being lapis animalis and lapis 
vegetabilis). 
18. 2-bodies: Douglas; physical and social. 
Foucault; physical and political. 
3-bodies: Scheper-Hughes; phenomenal (individual) , socio-
cultural, political. 
Christian; physical, spiritual, mystical. 
4-bodies: Turner; body-over-time, body-over-space, body 
of physical desire, body as represented. 
Frank; disciplined body, mirroring body, 
dominating body, communicative body. 
5-bodies: O'Neill; world, social, political, consumer, 
medical. 
19. A Code is not the same as a language. Its substance of 
expression is of the same nature as its contents, unlike 
language whose form of expression is alienable from its 
substance and which can alienate the forms of its contents 
from their substances and translate them into its own 
sUbstance (meaning), and/or retranslate them into other 
sUbstances. 
"Codes are always power mechanisms associated with 
molar organization. They are never neutral or 
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objective. Any science of codes is a science of 
domination, however subtly masked." [Massumi 
p.1SS] 
20. This attempt to reintroduce the in-common of a lost 
social body, is also the revitalization of a public/private 
distinction (though this time as a more specifically spacial 
difference.) Rheingold says that we now have "access to a 
tool that could bring conviviality and understanding into our 
lives and might help revitalize the public sphere." [Virtual 
Communities. p.14] 
21. The body is now, less than ever a given. it can be 
molded, shaped, scooped out and filled in with all manner of 
extras. The temple of the holy spirit has become an amusement 
arcade of the future. Cardiac pace-makers, valves, titanium 
hips, polymer ,blood vessels, electronic eye and ear implants, 
collagen fibre and rubber skins, polyurethane hearts. Man is 
no longer simply plugged into a factory, but is plugged in 
and wired up to the incubator, scanning machine, heart 
moni tor, ultra-sound, dialysis machine, iron lung, respirator 
and life-support machine. 
The body itself is the stuff of commercium with its 
interchangeable parts, hearts, livers, pancreas, kidneys, 
corneas, bone marrow, even foetuses, are transplanted alone 
or in combination. Xenografts - transplants between different 
species - are routine. Babies are bred as biological re-
supply vehicles for bodies in need of repair. The body is 
engineered in advance of its birth through gene therapy. 
Babies can be chosen by using sperm banks and ovum 
catalogues, and utilizing the reproductive technologies of 
invi tro fertilization, artificial insemination, surrogate 
motherhood, embryo freezing, research into artificial wombs, 
and embryo implantation. (Children may now have 5 parents: a 
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sperm donor, an ovum donor, a surrogate mother (rented womb), 
and two social parents, quite apart from additional parents 
acquired by fostering, adoptions and re-marriages.) And 
cloning is well on its way to becoming a reality. 
22. Every molar organization produces an image of 
transcendent agency which procures moral containment. These 
images form an identity grid through the formulation of codes 
(empty, inert categories) that are made immanent within the 
social field of their application. These codes, as actualized 
by disciplinary institutions, are successful to the extent 
that they are alienated in their content, operating on levels 
of reality other than their own. Thus it is the disciplinary 
institutions that do the dirty work of transcendence. 
23. Becoming-transsexual (as an introduction to becoming-
hyper-sexual) begins with the differentiation of the 
molecular body from two (exclusive) molar categories, in 
escape mode the body slides into a cascade of 
differentiations, a volatile patterning of bodies moving in 
all directions in maneuvers of capture and escape that only 
increase the chances of collision and mutation. What occurs 
is a hyperdifferentiation that exponentially multiplies the 
potential bodily states and identity territories that can be 
traversed and enveloped, for even the singular body is a 
collective in its conditions of emergence as well as in its 
future tendency. 
24. Theorists of androgyny tend to base their claims upon 
definitions of the nature and operation of a 
masculine/feminine difference (it is not usually based upon 
. notions either of a-sexuality or hermaphrodism). Masculinity 
and femininity are characterized in one of the following 
ways: 
i. Where classifications of masculinity/femininity are used 
in the normative sense as applied to psychological traits 
meaning more natural or desirable in one sex rather than the 
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other. 
ii. Where masculine/feminine is used in a descriptive sense 
meaning characteristic of and peculiar to one or other of the 
sexes. 
iii. Where masculine/feminine means having 
traditionally assigned to one or other of the sexes. 
been 
The problem is that for i and ii, what's being advocated is 
that males/females should have traits which are now more 
desirable in one sex that another (i), or which are now 
characteristic of and peculiar to one sex (ii). But this is 
simply to perpetuate the myth that masculine/feminine traits 
are desirable only in one or another sex or are 
characteristic and peculiar to one or the other. Such a 
position is ultimately reducible to an articulation of 
ethical prescriptivism and commits androgyny to maintaining 
the sex-gender link through masculinization/feminization. 
This goes for both mono and poly-androgynism. Monoandrogyism, 
where everyone has both the (morally acceptable) masculine 
and feminine traits. Polyandrogynism, where everyone has a 
choice between: (a) Some combination of (morally acceptable) 
masculine and feminine traits. (b) Only (morally acceptable) 
feminine traits. (c) Only (morally acceptable) masculine 
traits. Furthermore, this same distinction works for 
behavioral androgynism, simply by just replacing "traits" 
with "roles". 
25. Nor should the process of becoming be delimited in terms 
of the nature of the connection between one state and the 
next, for a correspondence of relations does not add up to a 
becoming. 
26. Briffault asserts that: "The 'feminine' attributed in 
women develops only when males acquire superior economic 
power ... No longer having economic importance, women must 
cuI ti vate other qualities if they are to survive in society." 
[Mothers p.16] 
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27. "Wringing the turkeys neck" is the name given to the 
ritual of penile masturbation just before surgery; a most 
secret of secret rites. To acknowledge so "natural" a desire 
would be to risk "crash landing", that is, to be seen to 
exhibiting "role inappropriateness" leading to 
disqualification from surgery (and (pre-) transsexual status) . 
28. A male-to-female transsexual friend once remarked "People 
who have and exert male privilege just don't want to give it 
up, after all, its the glue that holds the system together, 
its assuming one has the right to occupy any space or person 
by whatever means, with or without permission. It's a sense 
of entitlement that's unique to those who have been raised 
male in most cultures - it's notably absent in most girls and 
women." 
29. For example, the lesbian butch and femme model should not 
be thought of simply as an assimilation of lesbianism back 
into the terms of heterosexuality. What is at work is rather 
the concept of "cultural intelligibility" [Judith Butler], 
which suggests that the contextualised and resignified 
"masculinity" of the butch, seen against a culturally 
intelligible "female" body, invokes a dissonance that both 
creates a sexual tension and constitutes the object of 
desire. 
30. This group was made up of two main contingents: on the 
one hand, feminists who saw the so-called sexual revolution 
(especially freely available contraception and abortion) as 
forcing women to distinguish their sexuality from its 
reproductive capacity, which, they believed, was necessarily 
to virilize them, by focussing sex around the male libido; on 
the other, women who located themselves (for a variety of 
reasons) as victims of a patriarchal system based on male 
violence. 
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31. MacKinnon bases her feminism on a heterosexual model of 
female victimization, offering an a analysis of sexual 
relations as structured by relations of coerced sexual 
subordination, arguing that acts of sexual domination 
constitute the social meaning of being a "man", as the 
condition of coerced subordination constitutes the social 
meaning of being a "woman". MacKinnon's view is extreme, yet 
typical of those feminisms who make free use of the copula in 
which causal relations are elliptically asserted through the 
postulation of equivalences, i.e. within the structures of 
male dominance, conceived exclusively as heterosexual, sex is 
gender is sexual positionality. 
32. The lower court judge Frank Easterbrook even went so far 
as to denounce the proposed version of the Ordinance for 
Indianapolis as "thought control". He added that the document 
"establishes an 'approved' view of women, of how 
they may react to sexual encounters, of how the 
sexes may relate to each other. Those who espouse 
the approved view may use sexual images, those who 
do not may not." 
[Quoted in Bill Thompson's Assault on Reason p.90] 
33. Media coverage of old child murder cases (especially 
Operations Orchid and stranger) were re-cycled through the 
press seemingly daily during this period. There was also a 
proliferation of scare-mongering documentaries, including The 
Cook Reoort which took great relish in parading a convicted 
child molester, John Peter Bullough, before the public 
revelling in his assertion that Portsmouth was the world 
centre of 20 Pedophile sex rings and kiddy-porn producers. 
Similar claims, elaborated in Tim Tate's Child Pornograohy 
and Children tor the Devil kept the ball rolling, and by the 
middle of 91, Bullough was claiming that Portsmouth was now 
the five-factory 'snuff' movie capital of the world. 
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34. Bill Thompson, a criminologist at Reading, writes: 
"As the only real difference between SM and many 
legal acts is the sexual intent involved, it is 
difficult to conclude other than that the Spanner 
Judgements amounted to legalizing prejudice 
against and moral beliefs against various forms of 
sexual pleasure. Once one places the alleged 
'violence' that occurs during SM sex in context -
you commit a battery simply by bumping into 
someone in the street, but the law happily allows 
you to kill another person as long as the 'sport' 
is regulated - the Spanner decision is dubious. 
When one adds the manipulation of legal precedent, 
it should be considered a scandal." ["Assault on 
Reason" p.92] 
35. Apart fro~ the obvious determination of the legal 
establishment to impose their standards upon the rest of us, 
there was the little matter of needing to enshrine in law a 
previous judgement by Lord Lane about actual bodily harm. 
This case occurred in 1980 and concerned two men who had 
sought to resolve their differences by agreeing to fight it 
out. As no one else was present there was no way their 
actions could amount to a Breach of the Peace. So in order to 
impose the law where it did not apply, Lord Lane argued that 
the concept of 'the public interest' should take precedent 
over a Breach of the Peace when refusing a consent of 
defence. 
There should be added to this the fact that despite their 
assertions that they were not interested in the fact that the 
Spanner defendants were homosexual, the Law Lords spent a 
vast amount of time in their rulings venting their dislike of 
gay law reform, and expressed pleasure that one participant 
had now settled into a heterosexual relationship. Likewise, 
they drew an analogy between SM and homosexuality by 
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insisting that neither was "conducive to the enhancement or 
enjoyment of family life, or conducive to the welfare of 
Society" and that any relaxation of prohibitions would be 
"giving the activity an imprimatur." 
36. "A team from Geron Corporation in Menlo Park, California, 
and the Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory in New York have just 
announced that they have cloned a component of telomerase, 
and identified a way of disabling the enzyme. Since it is 
telomerase that enables cancer cells to go on multiplying ad 
infinitum, this could prove a way of stopping them. Turned 
around, it could also provide ways of conferring immortality 
cells and make Rip Van Winkles of us all." [The Times. Monday 
September 4th, 1995. p.16] 
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14. The problem with the human being. 
If we are to pursue the path of desire in the post-human 
condition, accepting the redundancy of subjectivity and the 
ethical program that accompanies humanism, we must consider 
wherein the stakes of commercium reside, stakes including 
those appropriate to entities of a primarily human 
configuration. Here there remain two issues in need of 
resolution: 
1. The facticity and efficacity of the demise of subjectivity 
as starting point for association (commercium). The 
undermining of the traditional modernist enlightenment ground 
of politics, ethics and religion has occurred in two ways: 
Firstly, as we have seen, there is the recognition that the 
subject (as a constructed historically specific concept) is 
itself nothing more than a phenomenal effect of desiring 
production. Secondly, it has become manifest that human life 
has no special status at any physical and material level, and 
in addition, that the special title of homo sapien is itself 
a misnoma. The first of these points has already been dealt 
with at length in previous sections, as has the second, in 
respect of the concept "human being" having been shown to be 
no more than a call to paranoid humanist supremacy 
(substantiated largely through the workings of traditional 
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metaphysics). There is however, a further element to this 
latter point, which concerns the inaccurate categorization of 
the kind of beings 'we' are as homo sapiens. 
In order not to offend the church and his own religious 
sensibilities, the Swedish biologist, Carl Linnaeus, who in 
the C18th devised our modern system of classifying plants and 
animals into species, genus, family, order, phylum and 
kingdom, intentionally misapplied his criteria in order to 
separate man from the apes. In 1788 Linnaeus wrote to a 
friend: 
"I demand of you, and of the whole world, that you 
show me a generic character ... by which to 
distinguish between Man and Ape. I myself most 
assuredly know of none. I wish somebody would 
indicate one to me. But, if I had called man an 
ape, or vice versa, I would have fallen under the 
ban of all ecclesiasts. It may be that as a 
naturalist I ought to 
Linnaeus to J .G. Gmelin, 
Ancestors p.274] 
Although, as we can see 
have done so." [from 
Shadows of Forgotten 
from the above, Linaeus' 
miscategorization was something he was both aware of and 
unhappy about, his error has been perpetuated to this day, 
with homo sapiens being seen not only as a separate species, 
but as a separate genus and even a separate family, 
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Hominidae. In accordance with Linnaeus' fiction, our nearest 
relative, the chimpanzee, is given not as Homo but as Pan 
(there are two species, Pan troglodytes and Pan paniscus) 
while the gorilla is a separate genus, Gorilla gorilla, with 
the apes as a whole belonging to the family Pongidae. Recent 
developments in biogenetics over the past two decades have, 
however proved (on the basis of genetic comparisons), that 
the degree of genetic separation between man and chimpanzee 
is minuscule (less than 2%). Indeed, man is closer to the 
chimpanzee than two species of gibbon that belong to the same 
genus are to each other. We may be a separate species, but as 
human beings we belong to the same family and the same genus 
as chimpanzees and gorillas.J. 
Given this biogenetic evidence it seems clear that we are no 
longer scientifically justified in asserting the uniqueness 
of human life and thence the supremacy of the human race over 
all others. Moreover, with the collapse of religious moral 
prescriptivism (in the death of God and of the subject), we 
are no longer able to legitimate ethical and legal practices 
that are grounded upon the sanctity of human life. The 
popular aversion to this conclusion (primarily by the church, 
the medical profession and bioethicists of different 
persuasions) and the consequences of its acceptance are 
considered in the next section. 
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2. Following the discussion of the comparative value of human 
and other life forms in an ethical and medico-juridical 
context (in section 15), section 16 will assess the way in 
which we understand the difference between beings in general 
and their environment, especially given the breakdown of 
traditional oppositions of man and nature, the mixing of 
artificial life/environment distinctions in virtual reality, 
and the theories that abound in the currently popular 
environmental and Gaia philosophies and evolutionary geology 
and astronomy. 
The conclusions drawn from the enquiries of these two 
sections will be drawn together under section 17 which will 
explore the possibility and uses of evaluative criteria for 
establishing life as valuable, in the light of the 
philosophical development of thought and consciousness. 
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15. Bioethics and the rights of the "person". 
"This I say then, Walk in the Spirit, and ye shall 
not fulfil the lust of the flesh. For the flesh 
lusteth against the Spirit, and the Spirit against 
the flesh: and these are contrary to one another: 
so that ye cannot do the things ye would." 
[Galations. 5.16] 
Control over the body has, throughout history been the 
favoured method for the mastery and domestication of desire. 
Ethics2 , as an institutional discipline and practice, 
conceived and manufactured under various teleologies 
(Aristotelian "Good Life", Paulian "Asceticism", Hegelian 
"life of the Spirit", etc), themselves having little to do 
with the body (aside from its castigation), has, for 
centuries, shaped the law dictating what can and cannot be 
done with bodies. The concept of the life of the body has 
been of relatively little interest in itself, "life" in its 
true or pure sense being given over to that 'other' realm 
that one accedes to after or alongside the demise or 
rejection of the desiring body. But this transcendentalism of 
'life' is collapsing under the weight of the realities of 
twentieth century living. With the growth in secular culture 
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and failing belief in any sort of afterlife, alongside the 
increase in technological capabilities to assist and replace 
bodily processes, life has become a terrestrial phenomenon 
whose boundaries are as yet unspecified. 
Life is no longer a principle emanating from a Noumenal 
sphere of freewill, a mind or spirit-dictated realm above and 
beyond the reality of the flesh. But nor can life be defined 
simply as an empirical event mapped upon a linear causal 
diagram, an event readable as a unique state of affairs with 
a specific beginning and end. Medical science has enabled us 
to fix particular points in the material development of an 
animal organism (conception, quickening, parturition, etc.,) 
yet we still argue as to when "life" begins. Furthermore, we 
can say at what moment, for a particular body, the heart 
stopped beating, the lungs failed, certain upper hemisphere 
brain processes ceased functioning, but we are not able to 
agree upon when "death" took place. 
Death, as a mark of the end of life, is not something that 
can be pinpointed as a specific event in or of the human 
body/being. As a non-legalistic concept, it is a process that 
the body is engaged in throughout its existence as a 
particular, bounded, configuration, wherein numerous 
processes cease, irreversibly, to function. As such it is 
something that we take for granted and are not usually 
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required to confront in respect of determining its point of 
arrival to a particular body. As a juridico-medical 
definition, a term accredited a body by the medical 
profession, death is a sum, a conclusion, arrived at as a 
result of certain tests and (negative) criteria. In this 
context, the definition of death may change according to what 
it is being used for. Conflict arises when the concept of 
death is thought of as a state ( of being or non-being), 
rather than as an arbitrary point in a process of material 
transformation, chosen in order to license certain types of 
action. As a definition, death is constantly having to be 
revised and redefined in order to meet the requirements of 
its differing uses (e.g. organ removal for transplant, burial 
of the body, praying for the soul departed, etc.) and the 
comparative body-value attached to each. These definitions 
are not however interchangeable, for example, most people 
would feel very uncomfortable about burying a body that has 
been defined "dead" for the purposes of organ transplantation 
given that it's heart may still be beating and pumping blood 
around its soft, warm, pink flesh. As a definition chosen to 
fit a specific need, "death" can no longer be held to 
designate the moment of attaining an absolute state (being 
dead) as such. "Death" like "Life" when held to transcend the 
material conditions of the state of a particular organism, 
does nothing more than accord status to a particular class of 
beings in respect of abstract laws concerning their worth in 
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ideal teleological terms. 
The traditional Christian assertion, that death marks the 
moment of the separation of soul (personality or personal 
identity) from the merely physical body, is no more 
meaningful in defining a state of the living system, than the 
assertion that death is some divine moment at which the life-
energy of a person gets channelled back into the great think-
tank of being, or as when the essential energy of a person 
takes on a new animal or human configuration. Reverting to 
the myth and superstition of old, be it of Christian, 
Buddhist or other transcendent faith systems, fail to 
appreciate the 'basic point that the lived body, from a human 
perspective, is that to which the concept of a person has to 
be attached in order to make sense of the organisms 
existence, whatever form that body takes (real, abstract, 
virtual, etc.), and the fact that we cannot trace, or refuse 
to think about "life" in the commercium of that matter once 
its current configuration has transformed, indicates nothing 
more than a lack of imagination (driven by humanist bias) on 
our part. 
The classical definition of the end of life focuses upon the 
permanent cessation of the flow of vital bodily fluids. This 
definition, although used for many decades, is circular in 
its use of the term "vital": You only know whether a bodily 
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fluid is a 'vital' one by seeing if the being dies when it 
permanently stops flowing, but you only know that the being 
has died by seeing if its vital fluids have stopped flowing, 
etc. The point, as has been said, is that death understood 
pragmatically, is a process we take as occurring to a 
particular entity in its specific material configuration, the 
moment at which a specified crucially irreversible point is 
passed. Such a point is not something to be discovered, by 
medical science or any other discipline, but is chosen (in 
accordance with the reasons for requiring its be proclaimed) . 
Nowadays, brain processes rather than the flow of unspecified 
vital fluids are the focus of life and death decisions. The 
brain is not separable from the body as such, it is not 
something other than body, it comprises real processes 
occurring within a real material organization of cells. 
Nevertheless, although one might correctly observe that its 
failure to function (or perhaps even to function adequately) 
results in a lack of the experiential communicative activity 
wherein we understand the quality of life to reside, we 
cannot claim that it thereby exhibits its own death, for the 
pronouncement of death is not an observation but a decision 
concerning what to do with it next. 
The modern medical definition of death (dating from about 
1981), is that of 'brain death', where the upper cerebellum 
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and brain stem are deemed irreversibly non-operational. The 
motivation behind reappraising the classical definition of 
from a medical and economic viewpoint is obvious when we look 
at the original document produced by the Harvard Brain Death 
committee whose report formed the backbone of the consequent 
legislation in this area: 
"Our primary purpose is to define irreversible 
coma as a new criterion for death. There are two 
reasons why there is a need for a definition: (1) 
Improvements in resuscitative and supportive 
measures have led to increased efforts to save 
those who are desperately injured. sometimes these 
efforts have only a partial success so that the 
result is an individual whose heart continues to 
beat but whose brain is irreversibly damaged. The 
burden is great on patients who suffer permanent 
loss of intellect, on their families, on the 
hospitals, and on those in need of hospital beds 
already occupied by these comatose patients. (2) 
Obsolete criteria for the definition of death can 
lead to controversy in obtaining organs for 
transplantation." 
[Journal of the American Medical Association. 
August 1968.] 
Although it is the non-functioning of the "whole brain" that 
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became the legally adopted criteria for the pronouncement of 
death, most medical professionals concur with the assertion 
that "death is the irreversible loss of the capacity for 
consciousness", that is, that non-operation of the upper 
cerebellum alone is sufficient for it to be announced that 
the patient is dead. What we have as a result of this, is a 
situation where, on the one hand, patients deemed to be in a 
"persistent vegeti ve state", that is, persons whose upper 
cerebellum is dead but whose brain stem retains some 
function, in not being definitively "brain dead", are (in 
principle) legally protected from being disconnected from a 
respirator, from having their organs used for transplants, 
and in the mecHcal staffs terms, from being "allowed to 
die".3 Whilst on the other hand, patients are classified 
"brain dead" on the basis of tests showing some, but not all 
lower brain activities to be non-operational (it being too 
expensive and time consuming to test for all activity).4 In 
practice it is largely left up to the medical profession in 
consultation with the patients family as to whether or not to 
continue respiratory assistance and/or nutritive feeding to 
those with intact brain stems but no upper brain activity, 
for it is to these people that the decision as to what to do 
with the body next falls. 
This is not always the case however, for the legal situation 
demands that the judiciary intervene where the law is 
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publically seen to be being flaunted. Pragmatic decisions as 
to what to do with a particular body next are undermined 
where the law, with its call to a transcendent concept of 
life (which in our era cannot be divorced from the body) 
intervenes. It is this scenario that lead to one of the most 
momentous ethico-judicial decisions this century, a decision 
that effectively swept the ground out from under the most 
fundamental ethical principle of the medical profession, 
namely, the principle of the sanctity of life, which asserts 
that all human life is intrinsically valuable and to be 
preserved at all costs. 5 
"Traditional medical ethics ... never asks whether 
the patient's life is worthwhile, for the notion 
of a worthless life is an alien to the Hippocratic 
tradition as it is to English criminal law, both 
of which subscribe to the principle of the 
sanctity of human life which holds that, because 
all lives are intrinsically valuable, it is always 
wrong intentionally to kill an innocent human 
being." [John Keown "Courting Euthanasia? 
Tony Bland and the Law Lords" Ethics and Medicine. 
p.3] 
In 1989, Tony Bland, a healthy 17 year-old, was crushed so 
severely in a football crowd that his lungs could not 
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function and his brain was deprived of oxygen, destroying his 
cortex and leaving only the brain stem operational. His state 
was described as follows: 
"[He is in a] persistent vegetive state .... fed 
liquid food by a pump through a tube passing 
through his nose and down the back of his throat 
into the stomach. His bladder is emptied through a 
catheter inserted through his penis, which from 
time to time has caused infections requiring 
dressing and antibiotic treatment. His stiffened 
joints have caused his limbs to be rigidly 
contracted so that his arms are tightly flexed 
across his chest and his legs unnaturally 
contorted. Reflex movements in the throat cause 
him to vomit and dribble. Of all this, and the 
presence of the members of his family who take 
turns to visit him, Anthony Bland has no 
consciousness at all. The parts of his brain which 
provided him with consciousness have turned to 
fluid." 
[Airdale N.H.S. Trust v. Bland (C. A), p.350] 
Despite the pitiful condition of his body, it was possible to 
keep Tony Bland in the same physical state (at great economic 
cost) for an indefinite number of years. The health 
professionals and his family, seeing no benefit for anyone in 
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prolonging Bland's "life" for decades, wished to disconnect 
his food supply which would cause him to "die" within a week 
or two. In normal circumstances such action would not be 
unusual, but in this case, the accident causing Bland's 
condition was under official enquiry, requiring Bland's 
doctor inform the coroner as to his intended action; the 
coroner, in turn was obliged to warn the doctor that such 
action could lead to criminal charges. The hospital 
administrator, however, agreed to back the doctor and family 
and applied to the Family Division of the High Court for 
declaration that the hospital might lawfully discontinue all 
life-sustaining treatment, including ventilation and the 
provision of food and water by artificial means, and 
discontinue all medical treatment to Bland "except for the 
sole purpose of enabling Anthony Bland to end his life and to 
die peacefully with the greatest dignity and the least 
distress" [ibid]. Despite the charge made by Bland's 
appointed official solici tor--that the hospital's request 
amounted to asking permission to coromi t murder--the Court 
found in the hospital's favour. The Court of Appeal upheld 
the Family Courts decision, as did the House of Lords - the 
highest court in the British judicial system - where there 
was made manifest the transformation of the governing ethical 
principle being applied. 
"The consideration as to the quality Qf life of Mr 
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Bland now and in the future in his extreme 
situation are in my opinion rightly to be placed 
on the other side of the critical equation from 
the general principle of the sanctity and 
inviolability of life. In this appeal those 
factors which include the reality of Mr Bland's 
existence outweigh the abstract requirement to 
preserve his life." 
[ibid. my emphasis] 
One cannot help but wonder if such a remark would have been 
made by the Law Lord had the situation been different in 
respect of the burden Bland's continued existence placed upon 
the financial and staffing resources of an N.H.S. hospital. 
Yet, whilst it is certainly the case that economic and class-
based considerations cannot be excluded, it is nevertheless 
clear that the motivating force behind the judicial decision 
was an ethical one. 
The result of Bland's case, whilst not leading directly to a 
reform in the "brain death" criteria, has made it blatantly 
clear that the acceptable face of determining the value of 
human life in the twentieth century lies in examination of 
the operation of the upper cerebellum, that is, in the 
consciousness of the individual being. Death, in the economy 
of ethical representation thus finds its focus in the mental 
240 
operations of the subject, in an idealized being whose birth 
occurred as long ago as the 16/17th century. 
"But actually we feel this destruction [of the 
body] only in the evils of illness or of old age; 
on the other hand, for the subject death itself 
consists merely in the moment when consciousness 
vanishes, since the activity of the brain ceases. 
The extension of the stoppage to all the other 
parts of the organism which follows this is really 
already an event after death. Therefore, in a 
subjecti ve respect, death concerns only 
consciousness." [Schopenhauer. The World as Will 
and Representation bk 4. section 54] 
On the one (ideal) hand, death concerns the end of 
subjectivity, and on the other (real, pragmatic), it concerns 
the decision as to what is to happen to the body next. 
On the headstone of Nancy Cruzan who had been kept "alive" in 
a persistent vegetative state for eight years before 
permission was granted to remove her feeding tube, her family 
had engraved the following: 
NANCY BETH CRUZAN 
MOST LOVED 
DAUGHTER-SISTER-AUNT 
BORN JULY 20, 1957 
DEPARTED JAN 11, 1983 
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AT PEACE DEC 26, 1990 
Demanding that we refrain from referring to a patient whose 
upper brain has ceased functioning as "dead" is not, on the 
whole, so much a disinclination to have the body used for 
transplant, burned or buried, but the inability of the 
onlookers to accept that the "person" that was, is no more; 
that the citizen with his/her concomitant rights is no longer 
around to demand those rights (or have someone else demand 
them on their behalf); that the essential spark of 
individuality, the essence of that singular being, that was 
produced through the operation of an interactive 
consciousness irt numerous processes has suffered irreversible 
cessation; that the subjective construction of subjectivity 
for the individual has died with him/her, and that the 
constructions attributed to that person by others, whilst 
being open to reinterpretation and reappraisal, will never 
more be enriched with material issuing from the body of that 
individual. The problem with this, of course, is that the 
idealized form of subjectivity that consciousness is presumed 
to make possible, is indeed ideal, it is not something 
possessed but accredited to a being (and often 
problemmatically so in the case of certain classes of human 
beings such as the severely brain damaged and the unborn). 
Where consciousness is elevated to the status of a 
242 
transcendental condition, subjectivity (and the human telos) 
becomes the transcendent arbiter of moral worth in and over 
life. The further away we move from accepting subjectivity as 
the grounds for our ethical decision making (or as 
justification for our emotional reactions), the more forceful 
the demand that we confront our own prejudices and fears, 
especially the fear (real or pretended) of eugenics. There 
has, over the last couple of decades, at a collective 
cuI tural level been a sea change in attitudes towards ethical 
values, away from absolute laws - like the sanctity of life -
and towards guiding principles, in this case, as to the 
quality of life. Alongside this change there has also arisen 
the need to question the assumption made as to the supremacy 
of human life over all other life forms. The more we discover 
about the genetic and behavioral makeup of other creatures, 
the closer we discover that we are to them; the less we posit 
consciousness as something above and beyond the operation of 
the brain, the more we are able to take seriously a non-
species specific discussion of experience and thought as 
appropriate criteria for ethical decisions concerning beings 
in the 21st century. 
We are moving both away from a concept of man as semi-divine, 
(made in the image of god), and towards a being whose 
evolutionary progress has, on the one hand, not moved him so 
very far away from some other creatures, and on the other, is 
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in the process of transforming him into a cyborg, literally, 
a biological machine. The blurring of the species boundaries 
(and eventually the parameters of the natural and artificial 
so far as life is concerned), when put alongside ethical 
judgements as to the quality of life of an individual, can 
have some alarming consequences, especially for those 
bioethicists for whom the illegitimate supremacy of the human 
condition has not yet hit home. 
In Genesis 1: 24-28, we are told, 
"So God created man in his own image, in the image 
of God created he him; male and female created he 
them. 
And God blessed them and God said unto them, be 
frui tful and multiply, and replenish the earth, 
and subdue it; and have dominion over the fish of 
the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over 
every living thing that moveth upon the earth." 
Although such extreme prescriptions are not taken too 
seriously in our animal-friendly, environmentally-aware age, 
the underlying assumption concerning the supremacy of human 
life, of any human life over that of even the most 
sophisticated animal from another species, is still largely 
taken for granted. The church, and other hypocritical 
institutions, are only too willing to go on the attack 
against women who abort embryos and foetuses, many so 
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unformed as to not yet have brain activity of any kind, and 
against the doctors who allow severely disabled and/or brain 
damaged infants and accident victims to be helped towards a 
speedy end (although they are usually more vociferous in 
their attacks against the former due to the so-called 
"innocence" of the unborn and infants). Yet these same 
people, and many who are less bigoted and better informed, 
rarely even think to protest when the liver is taken out of 
the body of a healthy baby baboon - causing its death - and 
transplanted into the body of a middle-aged man dying of 
heart disease. 6 Arguments as to the innocence of the baby 
baboon, the comparative life-expectancy of the two creatures, 
the pain they each will suffer, the suffering of their family 
and friends, etc; and all the other considerations normally 
brought into a quality of life debate are left unspoken, for 
what is at stake is not a comparison of equals at any level 
or in any real, material respect. 
If we are to continue to claim that the decisions we make 
about which bodies we will use for what purpose; about who 
will be allowed to survive, in what state and at the expense 
of what other being, and at what financial cost; we must see 
the illogicality of our speciesism. If subjectivity, as the 
condition for ethical being, is no longer a feasible ground 
for action due to its fundamentally arbitrary bias in favour 
of the white, male, human, middle-class, educated Westerner, 
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then we must question what to do with an ethical system based 
upon it. We claim to accredit value to lives largely in 
accordance with their having or their having the potential to 
develop a certain kind of consciousness that enables us to 
deem the being concerned a person, that is, a rational and 
self-aware being (although, in effect, belonging to a species 
that, in general, are of this type, and living in a 
dependency culture, is shown to be sufficient in the case of 
many mentally deficient human adults). To be a "person" is to 
be accredited with a certain moral standing, or, to put it 
another way, a "person" is a being justified in defending, or 
having defended on their behalf, certain basic rights in a 
society of interacting persons. There is no reason to assume 
that all persons are human, or even that all humans are 
persons, (indeed, one of the original uses of the word was to 
allow for the spiritual contemplation of a divine being as 
one substance and three persons). 7 John Locke, in the 
seventeenth-century, proposed a definition of the person that 
remains relatively uncontested to this day: 
"A thinking intelligent being that has reason and 
reflection and can consider itself as itself, the 
same thinking thing, in different times and 
places." [John Locke Essay on Human Understanding. 
bk.II, ch.9, par.29.] 
On this criteria, there are many non-humans who should fall 
into the category of personhood, 8 and some humans who may 
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well fallout of it. Moreover, as the capabilities of 
artificial intelligence increase, there will doubtless come 
a time in the near future when we have to include under the 
heading of "person" (or whatever other title is chosen to 
refer to the criteria noted), beings who are either non-
biological or whose biological element has been engineered by 
man. It is not consequences such as these that make the 
adoption of a criteria for personhood, rather than (human) 
subjectivity, under the ethic of quality of life, an 
unsatisfactory, inoperable and regressive move for the post-
human community. Personhood still privileges a form of 
consciousness that is more than the nature (let alone the 
sum) of the processes it is deemed to account for, and this 
more involves the notion of a human telos. Ethics, as we have 
used the term here, is inseparable from morality. It is only 
when these two are divorced however, that it is possible to 
postulate guidelines for living that are appropriate and 
immanent to the systems to which they apply. In this sense, 
morality can be seen as a system of judgement, of rules for 
action based on laws always having transcendent value. 
Ethics, when freed from internalization of moral law, can be 
taken as a typology of immanent modes of existence. 
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16. The Redundancy of Ethics? 
Ultimately, if we follow the line of thinking, referred to by 
bioethicists (following Peter Singer's lead) as the 
"community of equals", we must consider what real advance has 
been made in replacing the values and criteria of 
subjectivity with those of personhood. On the positive side, 
it is surely the case that by adopting the criteria of 
personhood as the basis of ethical decision making, we would 
be obliged to consider more honestly and empathetically the 
fate of those human beings at the lower end of the economic, 
welfare, intellectual and/or disability spectrum, (and those 
suffering persecution under extreme political regimes). 
Adoption of the new criteria might also lead to our learning 
much more about the animals with whom we share the planet, 
especially those 'higher' animals (the great apes and 
dolphins), who seem to have complex communications systems 
that we have not yet fathomed. On the negative side, a so-
called "slippery-slope" argument warns against our moving 
into a position of anthropomorphising all living things and 
attributing to them the concomitant rights and duties. 
Whatever criteria are adopted as entrance requirement into 
the "community of equals", if they let in dysfunctional human 
beings without reference to the human society of which they 
are a part ( i • e. the protection often afforded dependent 
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humans by their families and the belief in--if not the 
practice of--a caring society with an operational welfare 
program), it will undoubtedly lead to the logical inclusion 
of all "higher" animals. Criteria such as self-consciousness, 
communication skills and rational behavior, however, will 
have to be qualified when applied to the animal kingdom (not 
changed as such, but considered to manifest themselves in 
non-human ways, requiring new methods of investigation), in 
such a manner that it may become necessary to accept animals 
such as dogs and pigs who, from anthropological observation 
of their behavior, clearly exhibi t some of these 
characteristics. with the re-qualification of criteria, it is 
argued that inclusion within the "community of equals" will 
then be extended down the animal chain and even into the 
plant kingdom. 
Such a claim is clearly dubious, nevertheless, it illustrates 
the point that adopting a criteria of "personhood" entails 
promoting a heavily paternalist state, needful for bringing 
about a dependency culture for all animals in order to accord 
them rights without the concomitant responsibilities, as is 
the case with dysfunctional human beings. It would also, 
arguably, lead to a moral imperative that we all become 
vegans or even fructeans (leaving carnivorous animals 
accepted into the "community of equals" in a condemned 
posi tion); that we cease any and all experimentation on 
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animals, that we forgo the domestication of pets, etc. The 
ludicrous conclusions of this position seem unavoidable if 
the basis of according the status of "personhood" to any 
creature is merely to afford them the rights and 
responsibilities which, up until now, have been the exclusive 
domain of humanity (although not all human beings have been 
counted as eligible thereto). 
Rights and responsibilities (duties) are, of course, the 
basis of any moral code of behavior, but they are founded 
upon a fundamentally human, and largely humanist, ethical 
ideal. This ideal is, moreover, produced out of a very 
specific history, one which, in the West at least, cannot be 
separated from its Judeo-Christian origins. To apply the 
codes of behavior based upon such an ethic to non-human 
animals, indeed, to force it upon humans who have not 
previously been accorded it, would seem both pointless and 
unjustified. Ethical codes were brought into existence to 
protect the "haves" from the "have nots", they are a symptom 
of pri vilege, and as such, deserve to perish with those 
outmoded beings who claimed them. 
What it is important to give consideration to in the 
postmodern post-humanist world in which we all live, is not 
any sanctity or quality of life ethic that begins by 
instituting a hierarchy of value accorded to different forms 
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of life on the basis of their matching up to an ancient, 
ideological and defunct morality, but the orientation of 
enti ties in the commercium between different and similar 
forms of life across a broad spectrum. The concern with such 
an approach, based on the singularity of each instance of 
commercium (although not excluding considerations of past 
commercium and the example of those following a similar 
pattern), is that such unregulated exchange would lead, 
ultimately to the dominance of the powerful over the 
powerless; to the exploitation of the manipulative over the 
nai ve; of the power-hungry dictators over the weak (a 
situation totally unfamiliar in today's world!). Such 
mistakenly pessimistic belief has two sources: Firstly, the 
misinterpretation of previous historical events where 
deregulation has seemingly lead to crisis, but where, in 
fact, crisis only emerges because the deregulated element of 
society, has to fit in with the remainder which is still 
operating under a strictly regulated code. Secondly, the fear 
of a massive growth in eugenic programs arising out of an 
anarchy of ethics. It is this latter concern that will be 
explored in the next section. 
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17. Eugenics and the Ideology of science. 
The accusation that failing to abide by an ethical code will 
lead our civilization into a program of eugenics (where 
eugenics is meant to operate as a dirty word akin to fascism 
and Naziism9 ), particularly in the field of genetic 
engineering, is a popular, although misplaced, concern of our 
era. w It is certainly the case that genetic research 
emerged out of an interest in eugenic principles, as Daniel 
Kevles remarks: 
"Human genetics as a program of research 
originated with the eugenic idea that the 
physical, mental and behavioral qualities of the 
human race could be improved by sui table 
management and manipulation of its hereditary 
essence." [Kevles. In the Name of Eugenics 
Preface.] 
It is also the case that, over the past decade, the genes for 
many diseases have been identified (including those for 
Huntington's chorea, cystic fibrosis, Duchenne muscular 
dystrophy and hypercholostrolemia, as well as many blood 
disorders, immune deficiencies and some cancers). Yet whilst 
the geneticists may be able to predict the presence of such 
genes, they offer little promise of a cure to the sufferers 
thereof. 
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The growing fear of action being taken against groups or 
indi viduals on the basis of information provided by gene 
therapy, embryo selection and the engineering of sperm, in an 
ethically unregulated community is indeed grounded. But to 
assert that such action will be part of a package of human 
genetic manipulation programs designed for the purposes of 
removing from society all non-standard beings, (be these 
groups or individuals) based on an assessment of their 
quality of life judged from the standard of an idealized 
norm, is a situation that could only arise in a 
traditionalist ethically governed program. 11 In a coming 
society where difference rather than the standard man-form of 
subject-based philosophy dominates our value system, what 
will be at stake in making decisions about life and death, 
genetic and other treatment, will not be idealist principles 
of the Good Life, the sanctity of human life or any other 
irrelevant principles, but the value of interaction through 
difference and evolution. Needless to say, considerations as 
to the pain and suffering of individuals will playa part in 
these decisions so long as human beings are empathetic and 
have nervous systems, as indeed will financial considerations 
so long as we remain a basically capitalist society. 
Discrimination on the basis of genetics is already well 
underway. Employers have sought to deny jobs to applicants 
with genetic susceptibility to disease or illness arising 
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from conditions of the workplace. Life and medical insurance 
companies in the USA have tried to exclude from coverage 
people with high risk genetic profiles. And doubtless this 
trend will continue in other areas, but the point here is 
that such discrimination is not being carried out in the name 
of eugenics but of cold hard cash. A far more applicable 
concern for the anti-eugenicist should be the increasing 
occurrence of individual families deciding what kinds of 
children they want to have. 
Temar Cur lender brought her case, based on the claim of 
"wrongful life", to the California State Court as long ago as 
1980. Both she and her husband had been genetically tested 
for the genes leading to Tay Sachs disease prior to the 
conception of their daughter Shauna, and were told that they 
were in a no-risk category. In 1978 however, Shauna was 
diagnosed as suffering from Tay Sachs. Their suit sought and 
was granted punitive damages, compensation for the pain and 
suffering to be endured during Shauna's expected four-year 
life span. In explaining its ruling, the court reported 
"The reality of the 'wrongful life' concept is 
that such a plaintiff both exists and suffers, due 
to the negligence of others. It is neither 
necessary nor just to retreat into meditation on 
the mysteries of life ••• The certainty of genetic 
impairment is no longer a mystery." 
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[Los Angeles Times. June 12, 1980. p.3] 
And this from a judicial system which only a few years 
earlier (1978) in the New York state Court of Appeals, had 
judged on a not dissimilar case12 based on the claim of 
"wrongful causation of life", reporting that, 
"whether it is better not to have been born at all 
than to have been born with gross deficiencies is 
a mystery more properly to be left to the 
philosophers and the theologians." 
[New York Times. Dec. 28, 1978. p.1] 
An odd statement when one considers that for centuries the 
termination before and after birth of unwanted babies has 
been almost the sole concern of mothers and midwives. 
Human improvement, wi th respect to mental and physical 
proficiency, is a fact of life issuing, in our era, from the 
growing demand for high-tech' medicine and i ts delivery 
through market economy, that is, from consumer demand and not 
from eugenicist policies. The principles, policies and 
practice of eugenics as a means of controlling or 
exterminating minority groups, on the other hand, can only 
operate in a society where the privileged few are able to 
create and act upon a hierarchy of life-evaluation of the 
kind featured in the religious and secular ethical ideologies 
of humanism.13 
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Genetic research inspires eugenicist fears not because of 
what it is doing but simply because of its belonging to a 
mystical body of science. Like everything else however, 
science uses coromodi ties and is part of the process of 
commodity production, it uses money and people earn their 
living by it. As a consequence it is the dominant social and 
economic forces in society determine to a large extent what 
science does and how it does it. For a long time science has 
been elevated, in the West, to the heights of Ideology. It 
has explained the world by legitimating its own account of 
it, seemingly having transcended the human social struggles 
of economic and political forces, receiving its command from 
a supra-human objectivity. From such activity there are then 
derived equally transcendent truths beyond human compromise 
or error. Moreover, the absolute nature of its truths have 
been guaranteed by the mystery and veiled operations of its 
insti tutions speaking in their esoteric language. It is 
because of these features that science has been so successful 
in replacing religion as the dominant ideology of the West. 
Yet despite its claims to be above society, science, like the 
Church before it, is supremely a social institution, 
reflecting and enforcing the dominant values and views of 
society at each historical epoch. 
Prior to Kantian critique, it was not commonly held that 
individuals should be viewed as the causes of social 
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arrangements but that they were rather their outcome. People 
were bound to each other through the community by virtue of 
obligation. Just as society was viewed as a unified complete 
body, so the developing science of the 15th and 16th 
centuries characterized nature as a kind of indissoluble 
whole. The practice of the alchemists in constantly adding 
more and more materials to a single experiment in order to 
transform one substance to another (dead to living and visa 
versa) is a clear example of this belief. 
As society moved into the industrial age and people, as 
individuals, became able to move from place to place, from 
role to role, the situation reversed and society came to be 
seen as the consequence of the activity of individuals. The 
same process occurred in science, where it came to be 
believed that the whole could only be understood by its being 
dissected into its constituent parts. Hence, with the era of 
Descartes, came the view that the world, both living and 
dead, was a large and complicated system of gears and levers. 
Alongside this reductionist view of nature, which broke the 
world down into independent autonomous domains, came a 
concentration on mutually exclusive internal or external 
causation as the basis for explaining its workings. 
In respect of our biological inheritance, this has given us 
a double-aspect picture of the world; On the one hand living 
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beings are seen as being determined by internal factors, our 
genes and the DNA molecules that make them up, whilst the 
world outside us is something that we experience as objects. 
If our genes are of the successful kind we will survive (i.e. 
propagate) and if not we will perish. Ideological biological 
determinists believe that we differ in fundamental abilities 
because of innate differences, biologically inherited, which 
form human nature and guarantee the formation of a 
hierarchical society. It is their advocacy of such an 
absolutist position that fires the eugenics-paranoia leading 
to a demand for new and ever more restrictive moral 
guidelines for the experimentation with and research into 
genetics, especially where sperm, eggs and embryos are 
involved. 
The fault with biological determinist's absolutism is, of 
course, the fact that we are not so much determined by our 
genes as influenced by them. Development depends not only on 
the material we have inherited from our parents (the genes 
and other materials in the sperm and egg), but also on the 
particular temperature, humidity, nutrition, sight, smells, 
and sounds (educational as well as environmental) that 
impinge upon the developing organism. Moreover, there is 
within the evolution of each organism a certain amount of 
random variation in growth and division of cells during 
development: developmental noise. Thus it is a fundamental 
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principle of developmental genetics that every organism is an 
outcome of a singular interaction between genes and 
environmental sequences modulated by the random chances of 
cell growth and division. 
It should not be assumed from this that the contrast between 
the genetic and environmental factors, nature and nurture, is 
a contrast between the fixed and the changeable. It is a 
fallacy of biological determinism to assert that if 
differences are in the genes then no change can occur, as has 
been shown many times over by biological evidence alone. 
Equally erroneous is the belief in some basic, unaided, naked 
or natural ability grounding difference. As Lewontin notes, 
"There are some people who can remember long 
col umns of figures and others who are good at 
adding and multiplying large numbers in their 
heads. So why do we give written I.Q. tests, 
which, after all, are simply giving the crutch of 
pencil and paper to people who do not have the 
"unaided" ability to do mental arithmetic? Indeed, 
why do we allow people taking mental tests to wear 
eyeglasses, if we are interested in culturally 
unmodified "naked" abilities? The answer is that 
we have no interest in arbitrarily defined 
abilities, but are concerned with difficulties in 
the ability to carry out socially constructed 
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tasks that are relevant to the structure of our 
actual social lives." [Lewontin. The Doctrine of 
DNA p.31] 
The current popularity of the genome project leads to a 
tendency to cast genes in the role of actors responsible, as 
agents, for the causal process of developing organism and 
eventually societal formations. It is often said in the 
popular scientific press that genes make proteins and that 
genes are self-replicating. But genes can make nothing. A 
protein is made by a complex system of chemical production 
involving other proteins, using the particular sequence of 
nucleotides in a gene to determine the exact formula for the 
protein being manufactured. Nor is it helpful to think of the 
gene as providing a blueprint for the production process, 
which merely replicates the traditional attitude of locating 
a control centre in the source of information rather than the 
manufacturing process itself. Privileging, and even 
separating off the information from the process is just 
another misleading ideological commitment when it ends in the 
positing of the gene as the master molecule superior to the 
process of production. Nor are genes self-replicating - a 
term imbued with the kind of mysterious power that make 
possessors of it seem autonomous - if anything is self-
replicating it is the entire organism as a complex system. 
Genes themselves are made by a complex machinery of proteins 
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that uses the genes as models for more genes. 
A living organism at any moment of its life is a singular 
consequence of a developmental history that results from the 
interaction of and determination by internal and external 
forces (including developmental noise). The so-called 
external forces, which we commonly refer to as the 
environment, are themselves partly a consequence of the 
activities of the organism itself as it produces and consumes 
the conditions of its own existence. Organisms do not find 
the world in which they develop, they make it in and through 
commercium. Reciprocally, internal forces (if using such 
language can still be made appropriate), are not autonomous, 
but act in response to external ones. In genetic terms, part 
of the internal chemical machinery of a cell is only 
manufactured when external conditions demand it. 
Ultimately, biological determinism is the heir of a history 
of scientific ideology and like all ideologies it has a 
poli tical agenda, which seeks to maintain the "Culture of 
Contentment" [Galbraith] for those holding the economic 
reigns. The structures of society are held simply to reflect 
individual predispositions (the properties of its individual 
members), and insofar as these traits are universal, they are 
held to be genetic, thus fixed and inevitable. 
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It is in sociobiology, more so than in any other field, that 
the role of science as an institution devoted to the 
manipulation of the physical world and as a function in the 
formation of consciousness about the political and social 
world is made evident. The individualistic basis of the 
sociobiological view of the world is however, simply a 
reflection of the ideologies of the bourgeois revolutions of 
the eighteenth century that placed the individual at the 
centre of everything. This science has also perpetuated the 
external/internal division myth by characterizing organisms 
as the battlegrounds between outside and inside forces, with 
organisms as the passive consequences of external and 
internal activities beyond their control. There is of course, 
no straight forward internal/external divide; no 
nature/nurture separation; no genetic/environmental isolation 
in any independent and abstract sense. Just as there is no 
organism without an environment, there is no environment 
without an organism. An organism's genes, to the extent that 
they influence what that organism does in its behavior, 
psychology and morphology, are at the same time helping to 
construct an environment. So if genes change in evolution, 
the environment of the organism will change too. Indeed, the 
environment of organisms is being constantly remade during 
the life of those living beings. And a consequence of the 
universality of environmental change induced by the life 
activity of organisms is that every organism is both 
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producing and destroying the conditions of its existence. The 
environment (qua Heideggarian World) has never existed and 
there has never been balance or harmony.14 
In section 16, we asserted that the traditional ethical 
posi tion is no longer tenable in the 20th century, being 
reliant, as it is, upon an anthropomorphization of beings 
under a moral law, created to favour a privileged class of 
human beings. The system of moral law, where ethical 
principles become concretized, takes as its formula the ideal 
of a human te10s. It is the insistence upon such a te10s that 
grounds ideological positions and makes possible the 
separation and opposition of Nature---Man (society), that has 
so long held sway in philosophy and science. This opposition 
has over the last century been substantially eroded, to the 
point where its only advancab1e formulation is in terms of 
the separation of Living Systems---Environment. 
The developments that have lead to the above reconfiguration 
have been expounded at length in previous sections. Here, a 
brief revisitation and overview of their nature will suffice. 
1. The increasing secularization of society in the west: 
With the death of God, man has had to come to terms with the 
loss of his divinely sanctioned mastery over the planet. 
Moreover, there has been eroded, if not eliminated entirely, 
that image in which he considered himself created, and 
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consequently the disappearance of a human telos found in 
epistemological and/or spiritual progression toward the 
divine. 
2. The growth in feminism, anti-racism and gay awareness 
movements, opening out untold histories of "others" (women, 
blacks and sexual deviants), of those not accredited full 
human status and consequently denied its rights and 
privileges, whilst none-the-Iess being subject to its laws 
(especially the negative ones). 
3. The growing science of genetics having afforded us a means 
of identifying our biological proximity to other species, 
substantiated and textured by research into animal and human 
behavior. A development forcing the abandonment of speciesist 
categorizations of the animal kingdom as formulated by 
Linneaus in the C18th, which located the human animal in a 
separate species, genus and even family (Hominidae) from the 
apes. 
4. The introduction into biogenetic computing of Artificial 
Life environments and their inhabitants, and equally, ongoing 
research into neural nets and advances in Artificial 
Intelligence and robotics. All of which, although still in 
their infancy, have already inspired our imagination and the 
righteous indignation and terror of the easily impressed, 
spawning a multitude of Hollywood morality tales warning us 
of the coming revolution of the all-too-human machine 
(Terminator et al). Also, in this context though remaining 
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unexplored here, the increasing possibility of the future 
production of smart matter. 
5. The growth and expansion of the environmental movement and 
gaia philosophies. Demanding that we respect the planet and 
all the life forms upon it, as co-existing in a mutually 
dependent and a unitary system. 
These developments illuminate the ways in which the 
opposition between Man and Nature has been eroded across a 
broad spectrum of disciplines: 
-1. In philosophy and religion, the loss of an image of Man 
as created by and in the image of God has deprived humanity 
of its telos, where human beings were positioned above all 
terrestrial creatures by virtue of their privileged access to 
logon ekon. with the collapse of the human-divine telos there 
is no longer any a priori legitimating criteria for the abyss 
in the Great Chain of Being which separates man from beasts 
on the grounds that he speaks and thinks in the language of 
the divine. 
-2. In gender, race and cultural studies, the knowledge that 
the human condition is historically a domain of elitist 
privilege, and that many humans have been firmly placed on 
the side of nature and the beasts ( on the grounds of 
religious, sexual or cultural discrimination), has bankrupted 
the acclaimed ethical supremacy of the great white western 
male. 
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-3. In molecular biology and evolutionary theory, genetic 
evidence substantiating our biological proximity to higher 
beasts has forced us to rethink the physical grounds upon 
which we make evaluative teleological distinctions between 
species. 
These first three developments transform the Man/Nature 
opposition in a threefold manner; by vanquishing the 
transcendent grounds for asserting a radical difference 
between man and animals; by pushing the criteria for what 
counts as Man into the animal sphere (where women and blacks 
have been denied equal human status); and, in the opposite 
direction, by placing some beasts alongside humans in terms 
of their actual and potential genetic, brain and behavioral 
functions. What was once asserted as a rigid distinction 
between man (on the side of the, divine) and beast (on the 
side of nature) thus becomes a continuum. But the 
transformation does not end here. 
-4. With the increasingly diverse production of new forms of 
intelligent self-organizing life, both wet and dry, we are 
confronted with a domain of artificial life, for which the 
tradi tional ethical prescripti ves issuing from the man/nature 
opposi tion provide us with no guidelines with which to 
regulate our interactions. 
-5. At both a microscopic and macroscopic level discoveries 
266 
concerning the nature of the basic elements of the universe 
have forced us to abandon the distinction between active life 
and passive matter. On the side of man, the domain of 
activity and production, we must account for artificially 
produced life, and on the side of nature, as passive and 
produced, for matter which turns out to be both active and 
productive. 
In combining these five manifestations of the collapse of the 
man/nature opposition, we are able to locate its underlying 
thematics. As erroneous structural and functional 
distinctions are eradicated and the illegitimate mythological 
and religious bias' of human supremacy is undermined, we find 
ourselves confronted with the naked ideologies of lifg and 
teleology. It is on the basis of defining the nature and 
limits of these two themes interdependently that evaluative 
distinctions have been manufactured and institutionally 
maintained. These evaluative distinctions prescribe the 
sphere of subjecti vi ty that is the domain of the ethical 
community, a community thought of as communio, a unity bound 
together by the uni versalizable principles and demands of 
human life grounded in a human telos. 
When proponents of animal rights and radical environmentalism 
demand that we extend the ethical domain to include other 
beings, the call is not to follow the opening up of our 
267 
conception of life to allow for richer more productive 
interactions with others, but rather to reverse the movement 
of the post-human condition by re-anthropomorphising Nature. 
Here the umbilical cord of Enlightenment ideology remains 
intact. It is nevertheless the case that anti- or post-
Enlightenment thinking has made some of its most radical 
advances as a result of extending and reconfiguring, rather 
than abandoning, the creative force of the concept of life. 
268 
18. Away from Ideology, towards Difference. 
In their attempts to retain or recover some notion of the 
integrity of thought, philosophers who claim to critique the 
metaphysics of the subject rarely do more then merely re-
configure and re-articulate (usually in a poorer form) a 
version of the Kantian subjective realm of transcendence. In 
seeking to go beyond the subject (in the sense in which a 
defunct concept is dropped), we speak of the "post-human", 
this is not however to be equated with Lyotard's "inhuman", 
or Heidegger's "nonsubject", both of which are merely 
attempts to re-conceptualize in other vocabulary the 'true' 
thinking subject of the cartesian cog ito - the impersonal, 
unidentifiable, unlocatable, ineffable subject at the heart 
of Kantian thinking. On the other hand, under the name of the 
subject, "philosophies of consciousness" (of which the 
cartesian ego is but a paradigm case), persist in seeking a 
being whose ontological traits are those of the body, a being 
endowed with temporal continuity comparable to the physical 
continuity of a material thing, and with an identity 
analogous to personal identity. A move which, rather than 
collapsing the transcendental subject onto its immanent 
materiality (which may include consciousness), projects upon 
that idealized transcendental being a transcendent 
anthropomorphic telos. 
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Those in the former camp are, on the whole, submerged so deep 
in an idealized space of re-iterative Being, where thought 
thinks itself to the exclusion of materiality, that their 
dream of Dasein will ever remain just that. Those following 
the latter line (which has been much simplified for our 
purposes here) have a more real (material), abstract 
(material) and virtual orientation. The problem with the 
critique of the subject, as they see it, is that by ridding 
us of the ideal of free subjectivity, we are accordingly 
depri ving ourselves of the legitimacy for posing ethical 
questions, for to be a subject is understood as the very 
definition of the moral ideal. To work to become always more 
(of) a subject, such is the principle of moral life. 
Moral philosophers consequently tend to defend the philosophy 
of the subject, asserting the necessity of pursuing its 
theoretical entanglements, given the validity of its 
practical aspect. 
"If we no longer had the possibility or the right 
to consider ourselves, even if only partially, as 
subjects, we could no longer pose ethical 
questions. We could no longer differentiate 
between an oppressive political regime and a 
regime of liberty; if we were not at least a 
little right in believing ourselves to be 
subjects, the only thing we could see would be a 
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different distribution of existing forces. We 
could no longer differentiate between a tyrant and 
a man who resists this tyrant; these are only 
different 'points of view'. The concept of the 
subject should therefore be maintained and 
justification found in its (surely unrealisable) 
function as'regulating ideal." [Descombes. p.122] 
It has been shown in the previous sections that such a belief 
is naive as it fails to take into account the fact that it is 
in the very nature of the ideology of the subject to restrict 
our ability to recognize, appreciate and operate within 
difference. The idea that if one takes away the moral code we 
would all go around enslaving, stealing from and murdering 
one another, (a claim coercively trotted out by the police 
state every time it senses its own hegemony is under threat), 
is itself an ideological expression of a paranoid fear of 
others (of difference) and is wholly unsubstantiated by fact. 
Indeed, if history shows us anything, it is that the contrary 
is the case. The worst atrocities committed by humans against 
other humans are invariably carried out in the name of 
religious fundamentalist ideals or political ideologies. 
Let us then consider, at greater length, the positive force 
of re-configuring the concept of life beyond the traditional 
ethical and political boundaries (in terms of points 4 and 5 
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exposited in the previous section). For if we are to accept 
the death of the subject, its criteria, its dreams and its 
values, we must assess the possibility this leaves us with 
when confronted with new and novel (as well as already 
existing) associations and interactions for which we no 
longer have ethical guidelines. Indeed, we must discover 
what, if any, role is to be given to ethics in a postmodern 
post-human era. 
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19. Living with Rocks and Cellular Automata. 
At the cutting edge of molecular and evolutionary biology, 
new definitions of life are being constantly proposed, in the 
attempt to facilitate a better understanding of the 
interaction of living systems with their environments (rather 
than re-iterating their opposition). The most widely accepted 
of these is composed of the following elements: that the 
thing be cellular; that it be based on carbon-based chemistry 
taking place in aqueous solution; and that there be complex 
molecules (DNA) that provide the program governing cell 
processes and carrying a genetic code inherited by the 
offspring. Such criteria, for all there seeming 
expansiveness, are still too restrictive for some bio-
scientists however, as they are based exclusively, upon 
examples that are limited to discovered forms of earth-bound 
'wet' life (where, for example, out of tens of thousands of 
possible amino acids, we find only twenty in use in the forms 
of life so far discovered). 
A more general attempt of establishing a wide ranging 
cri teria comes from the joint fields of cybernetics and 
genetics, where life is defined as information, for although 
resulting from the discovery of the DNA double helix, these 
formulations need not necessarily be limited to the simple 
linear genetic code and its capability for being copied. What 
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we are presented with in these cases is a description rather 
than a definition of the crucial and fundamental basis of all 
carbon-based wet life on the planet which allows for an 
extension of the concept of life beyond both the metaphysical 
humanist and speciesist bias to rocks, stars, radioactivity, 
artificial life and aliens, as well as to plants and animals. 
criteria for the analysis of life, based upon this 
descriptions of information systems and processes seem 
abstract in comparison with their forebears. Where previously 
biology looked to growth, reproduction, self maintenance and 
self-regulation, it now turns around the elaborations of life 
as the capacity to evolve; as information that governs form 
and function and that can be replicated and passed on; and as 
that which exhibits some general law of self-organization in 
its processes. So long as it is accepted that information is 
not the sole prerogative of DNA (and that its process is as 
important as its possession), we are able to conceive of life 
as a semi-open system where there is both an inflow and an 
outflow of energy and matter. 
As a definition of life, or living systems, this can be 
functionally useful in allowing us to describe living systems 
as those which must always be doing something; which at any 
moment of their existence must maintain a particular 
organization of their components in the face of potentially 
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disruptive forces (heat, cold, energy flows, etc.). A living 
system must have its structure organized in a manner that 
performs particular functions that attain the end-state of 
continuing the organisms existence. At any moment of its life 
a living organism is a singular consequence of a 
developmental history that results from the interaction of 
and determination by internal and external forces (including 
developmental noise). As we have already noted, the so-called 
external forces which we commonly refer to as the 
environment, are themselves partly a consequence of the 
acti vi ties of the organism itself as it produces and 
consumes the conditions of its own existence. Organisms do 
not find the world in which they develop, they make it, in 
and through interactive commercium. 
In moving away from the traditional exclusive disjunction of 
Man-versus-Nature, philosophy and science are able to enter 
into new discourses based around such novel concepts of 
life. It is still possible however, that the new criteria 
will be abused by those who insist upon founding principles, 
effecting an anthropomorphization of living systems according 
to transcendently empowered ethical dictates; what occurs in 
such accounts is a teleologization of life. 
There are three kinds of acti vi ty potentially at work in 
living systems: Teleomatic or end-resulting activity, where 
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end-states are attained by living systems because of the 
operation of processes whose existence depends upon the 
properties of the constituent matter alone (not on its being 
purposefully designed). Teleonomic or end-directed activity, 
where end-states are determined by the operation of internal 
controlling factors, in living systems, the inherited genetic 
or epigenetic ,factors (which set the context for further 
emergent properties) . Teleological or goal-directed acti vi ty, 
where outcomes occur as a result of purposeful behavior, 
events being deliberately brought about so as to produce 
them. 
All physical entities exhibit some sort of teleomatic 
activity, a subset shows teleonomic activity (primarily 
biological systems), and a subset of these also shows 
teleological systems (primarily cognitive biological 
systems). It is when philosophers and scientists try to give 
a historical teleomatic or historical teleonomic account of 
a living processes that there is a tendency for the 
explanation to become teleological by incorporating the 
attainment of the future end-state into the causal 
explanation for the activity coming to exist. Such 
explanations, moreover, in relying upon a fundamentally human 
telos, result in an anthropomorphization of the living 
process of the system considered, eradicating any inherent 
differences therein. 
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In terms of the origin of life, we see life emerging from 
through processes of self organization. Teleomatic activity 
gi ving rise to teleonomic history. With respect to the 
transformation of one teleonomic system into another -the 
evolution of species - this means that evolution is caused by 
teleomatic changes in inherited teleonomic properties during 
reproduction and ontogeny. The teleomatic processes 
responsible for the end-state which, although stable for 
generations of intraspecific reproduction, evolves into the 
end-state of a descendent species, do so because of the 
natural properties of the physical entities involved. They do 
not do so for the sake of the organism in which they happen 
to occur. The teleomatic activity of biological function does 
not occur for anything. 
The transpecific process of evolution is not analogous to the 
intraspecific process of ontogeny, for only the la~er is 
directed toward an end-state. Ontogeny, a teleonomic 
activity, operates with an internal representation of the 
end-state(s) to be attained. Evolution has no similar 
controlling representation of what is to be. It is in drawing 
the false analogy that there have resulted the erroneous 
teleological interpretations of evolutionary change. Here the 
principle of an elan vital functions to maintain Man in a 
position of ethical superiority over other beings (including 
future ones), whether this be by excluding and alienating 
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them as 'other', or making them the same by including them 
within the confines of the human telos. In elaborating the 
above distinctions for a new concept of life we must also 
consider the theoretical consequences relating to our 
descriptions of even the most "base matter". 
Traditionally science has viewed such substances as rock as 
inert or dead matter. The change in conceptual approach that 
we see occurring today is not simply the result of closer 
observation of rocks themselves, but is the consequence of a 
reassessment of the general approach to geological and other 
sciences, where past methodologies have been found to be 
misguided. 15 It is in two specific areas of consideration, 
that of the environment (involving the inner/outer 
distinction), and of interaction, that the most radical 
revisions have occurred. It is also these two features that 
have been the central pivot of our considerations of life 
(its definition and its boundaries) in the previous sections. 
Tim Harper (a geologist and engineer), points out the 
importance of understanding the new approach to geology from 
a perspective of immanent interactionism: 
"This new concept pictures rock as a system of 
vast numbers of interacting elements. It is the 
interaction of these elements that governs the 
systems behavior, not the substance of the 
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particles, nor, from some points of view, the 
details of the rules governing the interaction of 
the individual sand grains. Rock responds in a 
similar manner in response to many different forms 
of disturbance--it evolves to a state in which it 
is remarkably sensitive, ready to facilitate the 
next flux of energy or matter through the 
system .... It is critical that the multiplicity of 
interactions occur not just internally but also 
externally, with the environment outside the 
boundaries of the system." 
[Bicycling to Utopia. p.43] 
In the past, geologists insisted upon a closed-system 
approach to observation, an isolationist methodology which 
designated and separated off an object (of study) from its 
environment and the interactions therein. It is this approach 
that led scientists to adopt the Newtonian concept of matter 
as inert. In opposition to this, the new conceptualization 
takes geological processes as characteristically open-
systems; open system processes in the presence of a flux of 
energy and matter. This flux driving the feedback reactions 
which are typical of geological processes, leads geological 
systems away from equilibrium. 
It is only by working within open systems, reports Harper, 
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that the scientist is able to record the behavior of matter 
under the kind of conditions that it is ordinarily 
constrained by.16 In an open system the sample substance is 
free to experience the transfer of energy and/or matter to or 
from its environment. Where what is at stake is the mapping 
of the typical behavior of a material under certain 
conditions, yet still within its ordinary context (not 
isolated from its environment), observation wi thin open 
systems proves to be most representative of natural 
geological processes. 
Re-describing of rocks as active matter [prigogene] moreover, 
enables us to tell an evolutionary story of their development 
in terms of processes of self-organization, where this refers 
to a process of order formation (coherence forming from non-
coherence). This assertion may seem to contradict the second 
law of thermodynamics but, in fact, it does not, for the 
second law refers to closed systems. The order which is 
created in the open system is accompanied by the creation of 
a greater amount of disorder outside the system. 
Consider the example of the rock of Earth's crust. The 
Earth's crust functions as an open system17 in that heat 
flows into it from the Earth's core, and it is in a feedback 
relationship due to its rheology (its flow behavior), that 
is, it is also a non-linear system. Not only does temperature 
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affect its rheology but it affects temperature: 
"Imagine that the rock cracks. The cracks will 
facilitate heat flow through the rock and the 
temperature of the rock will consequently change. 
The rocks do not simply respond to a change of 
the 'environmental parameters', they change their 
environment." [Harper. p.62] 
If we are prepared to go so far as to say that interaction 
with the environment is one of the fundamental features of 
life, and even if we add that such interaction must arise out 
of a dissipative structure exhibiting self-organization, we 
are forced to admit that rocks are equally as much a part of 
what is designated "life" as are human beings. Ca.t\ \Je -
even go further? Insofar as the cellular automata of computer 
simulations are modelled upon simple rule-governed 
interactions (allowing them to move in or out of two states 
only, alive or dead, on or off), and given that the essence 
of the "games" within which they exist is that system 
evolves, should we not be prepared to accredit life to them, 
even though they have no substance as such? Certainly this is 
where the concept of "Artificial Life" gets its point of 
access. 
The "Life" game invented by John Conway in 1970's, is held by 
many computational biologists, to mark the moment of the 
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birth of Artificial Life (A-Life) systems, before that, 
artificially created life was a fantasy of the type to be 
found in Pygmalion's Galatea, Rabbi Leow's Golem, and Dr 
Frankenstein's monster. Projects in A-life today show that 
the dream of artificially created life is not just possible, 
but realizable, and, moreover, that it is not any longer to 
be thought of in terms of animation, but of replication. 
Living organisms reproduce because they contain a coded 
program which instructs them to make copies of themselves, 
including copies of the program too. The instruction (in the 
genome, or instruction unit) does not have to contain itself, 
(if it did you'd end up in an infinite regress of self-
referentiality), it just needs to ensure that it gets copied. 
The program is translated and copied. The uninterpreted 
program is just raw data for the duplication, while if it is 
interpreted, it directs the duplication. 
Chris Langton (following von Neumann's lead), created a small 
cellular automaton which whilst being able to propagate 
itself, had a specific life-span (when it had no more space 
in which to propagate itself its instruction was erased and 
the next generation took over). He required that the 
information contained in the non-trivial unit be both 
translated and transcribed. 18 His self-professed aim was, 
"to build models that are so life-like that they 
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would cease to be models of 
examples of life themselves." 
Life p.26] 
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life and become 
[Sigmund. Games of 
20. Back to Sex: poly-sexual propagation and 
parthenogenesis. 
Although reproduction will eventually be possible wholly 
outside of the body, it remains a fact that for the 
foreseeable future, the human species will only be capable of 
propagating itself sexually. It is doubtless the case that 
many humans will become non-reproductive (though still 
sexually active) or asexual beings in the future as a result 
of our cultures move towards trans-gendering and poly-
sexuality. The need for eggs and sperm will however, for the 
foreseeable future, require that at least some humans retain 
their current biological status as chromosomal and (at least 
minimally) hormonal males and females (genital, neurological, 
psychological and behavioral anomalies will not matter). 
The repercussions of maintaining two separate sexes as 
producti ve bodies is important both in terms of earlier 
sections' considerations of the move away from binary sex and 
into a realm of polymorphous differentiation, and with 
respect to the previous sections concern with the necessary 
features for constituting life. 
There is no theoretical reason for assuming that having two 
sexes will benefit us (whomever "we" may become), 
teleomatically or teleonomically, any more than having three 
or more,19 and it is to be hoped that the possibility of 
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expanding our reproductive boundaries is a potential for 
humankind in its couplings with animals (animal body-parts), 
machines (pace makers etc.), non-conscious matter (silicone), 
microcircuitry (internal drug releasing devices), and 
eventually, beings from other worlds. Whilst such couplings 
will almost definitely not produce new beings in the way we 
currently reproduce, they are almost certain, in the long 
run, to create new (forms of) life. For the moment, however, 
whatever other diverse couplings occur, it will non-the-less 
be necessary for male and female genes to combine if 
propagation is to occur. 20 
The reality of the need for at least two chromosomally 
distinct sexes has been given very little attention by 
biologists and medical researches over the years. The most 
interesting finds in this area having arisen from work in 
infertility treatment and embryo experimentation, and 
increasingly (at a theoretical level) by those working in the 
area of artificial life. One of the most reasonable 
explanations for there being two sexes is that it is only by 
means of such a separation that outcrossing can be promoted. 
If organisms simply shed their gametes indiscriminately, the 
possibility of self-fertilization and its attendant risk for 
the offspring's genome cannot easily be avoided. 21 The 
gametes need a device to prevent them from fusing with other 
identical (or very similar) gametes. If a gamete of a 
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particular species develops such a device X (a chemical 
signal or some such), it will be prevented from self-
fertilizing. The advantage of the obligate outcrossing should 
then spread through some (not all) of the population. Another 
gamete, still at risk from self-fertilization develops a 
similar device Y to give it the protection it needs, but that 
doesn't prevent it from fusing with the X gamete. Y gametes 
that can fuse with X gametes will be better off than those 
that cannot. The other types of gametes will be outcompeted, 
and what remains are two distinct sexes. 
An alternative story for the separation into two sexes is 
provided by the biologist Laurence Hurst, who asserts that it 
is only when mating types manage to suppress warfare between 
mitochondrial genes that distinct sexes are constituted, and 
that where they only produce outcrossing, the result is 
incompatibility types. 22 The account runs as follows: Genes 
may promote their own propagation at the expense of the 
welfare of the collective. Fighting between genes is 
suppressed in the nucleus of cell because of the need for a 
double set of chromosomes. The cell produced from the fusion 
of two gametes, however, also inherits some genetic material 
which does not go into the nucleus, but is contained in the 
mi tochondria (or other organelles). Of these latter genes the 
cell does not need a double dose, one set of mitochondrial 
cells is sufficient. Genetic rivalry thus occurs over which 
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gamete is to provide these genes, a battle that must result 
in the elimination of the opposition. Nuclear and 
mitochondrial cells are thus differently orientated in their 
attitude toward other gametes. Nuclear genes avoid conflict 
and have an interest in shutting down their warlike 
mitochondrial escorts. The nuclei from two gametes cannot 
both shed their mitochondrial genes however, as one set will 
be needed after their fusion. Only one of the gametes then 
must disarm itself, and be sure, along the way, not to fuse 
with a similarly disposed gamete. The armored gamete, 
catching on to the move will fuse only with those partners 
without mitochondria. According to Hurst's account then, to 
be male means to produce gametes containing only genes from 
the nucleus. 
Yet another account is presented by the theoretical 
biologist, R.A. Fisher, who argues that the crucial 
explanation behind the separation of the sexes concerns the 
fact that sexual reproduction enables a population to evolve 
faster, by bringing together two beneficial mutations. This 
argument however, holds little ground today. Computation has 
shown that evolution is slower than expected, which means 
that in many cases the fate of the first mutation will have 
been settled before the second mutation occurs.23 
H.J. Muller, with whom Fisher sometimes co-wrote, points out 
that sexual reproduction acts not only to combine good genes, 
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but also to eliminate bad ones. In asexual reproduction, he 
argues, there arises a seemingly inexorable accumulation of 
mutations, a fate which can only be offset by sexual 
reproduction. But this is a dubious point, for an offspring 
may well be unlucky and inherit the deleterious genes from 
both parents, rather than being lucky and getting only the 
good genes from both. It is hard to see what an individual 
can expect from the fact that its mother had sex. It non-the-
less does seem to be the case that, as far as the whole 
population is concerned, the sexual reshuffling of genes 
works so as to remove deleterious mutations from some 
genomes, and leave those that accumulate in others to be 
eliminated by natural selection. As Muller claimed in 1932, 
"the essence of sex is Mendelian recombination". 
Despi te numerous attempts at its refutation, Fisher and 
Muller's position remains popular due to the stress it puts 
upon the eugenic role played by sex in restructuring a 
species' gene pool. From another perspective, however, it 
might seem that this position ascribes a kind of teleology to 
natural selection, an assumption that would, as we have 
noted, be unacceptable. Experience, after all, teaches us 
that where there is a clash between the group and the 
indi vidual, it is invariably the individual that wins out. It 
may nevertheless be the case that parthenogenesis occurring 
as a newly hereditary program in a species (a possibility 
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which will be examined shortly), is bound to extinction by 
virtue of an inability to adapt to environmental change 
and/or an inability to rid itself of deleterious mutations. 
Whatever the story concerning the emergence of two sexes, the 
fact that their reproduction occurs by both propagation 
(meaning that one divides into two) and sex (meaning the 
fusing of two cells) suggests either a bizarre and totally 
arbitrary, or extremely complex, and still not fully 
unravelled account of the history of human genetic 
development. The fact that human females are not 
parthenogenic leaves us with what John Maynard Smith refers 
to as the "twofold cost of sex", an expression better put by 
Karl Sigmund as the "twofold cost of outcrossing". 24 Sigmund 
compares the probable success of the parthenogenetic female 
to the female-male partnership: 
"The cost is essentially due to the needless 
production of male exploiters. If males, however, 
carry their full share of parental care, then both 
partners invest equally in their common offspring 
and can be expected to raise twice as many as the 
single mother. This would offset the disadvantage, 
for a new gene, of finding itself with only 50 per 
cent probability in an offspring. It can try twice 
as often." [Sigmund. Games. p.143] 
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It should be noted that, in this context, what is at stake is 
the biogenetics of sex and not social and cultural 
arrangements for the rearing of children. It is quite clear 
that in an open society it is perfectly possible for 
adequately financed single parents as well as gay and lesbian 
couples to bring up a sUbstantial number of healthy 
offspring. The. point here is that the procurement of 
offspring still, at a certain point back down the line, 
requires the presence of a male sperm producer passing on 
male genes. The biogenetic question as to the ultimate value 
of that male if one of its major roles is not the rearing of 
children, however, does have social consequences (especially 
gi ven the increase in the number of sperm banks and the 
possibility of storing usable sperm or embryos generated from 
such sperm for decades and maybe even generations25 ). 
Furthermore, one might argue, it will not be long before it 
is feasible to think about trying to produce a gene for 
parthenogenesis in females. When such a situation arises, and 
given that the genetic technology is there to ensure that 
randomly appearing deleterious genes are eradicated or remain 
recessive, we will be left with a difficult question 
concerning the future desire of the female, namely: Would 
reproductive sex continue in order to propagate males (given 
that parthenogenetic women would produce only female 
offspring)? 
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As an addendum to this point, it should be noted that 
parthenogenesis does not necessarily result in the production 
of mere clones, for, as has already been said, the inherent 
genetic potential in a cell (and equally in a human being) 
cannot be dissociated from its environment when considering 
how it will develop. Also, the development of mutant genes, 
which occurs on a random irregular basis, would add to the 
differentiation within 'families', which would become more 
pronounced in future generations. Moreover, genetic 
manipulation of eggs and embryos, conjugation with other 
species and with species from other worlds, and interaction 
at a cellular level with non-carbon life forms, will open up 
not close down the future dispersion of difference. 
Female parthenogenesis, as abstract as it may seem, is not 
however to be equated with the male intellectual dream of 
immaculate conception. If we think of parthenogenesis on a 
model of male self-generation we fall into error. Rosi 
Braidotti does this when she claims that parthenogenesis, in 
working against generational time, tends towards the denial 
of the importance of women's bodies as origins. There are two 
mistakes here, one is to fail to see the equation between 
generational time and the male kinship structures of 
patriarchy, the second is that in equating parthenogenesis 
with male immaculate conception one has already located the 
womb as source and made it a detachable, exchangeable organ 
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of the female body. 26 
The possible failure of parthenogenesis is protected against 
on the one hand by the eradication, in vitro, of deleterious 
genetic mutations, and on the other, by ensuring difference 
is introduced into the genetic equation from other 
(manufactured or existing) sources. The Final threat, that of 
failure due to an inability to adapt to new environmental 
changes, would seem to be an irrelevance where women are 
concerned. One only has to look at recent history to see how 
women as both mothers and workers far outdo their male 
counterparts in adapting their activities to suit the 
environmental challenges offered (something that one might 
reasonably assume may be reflected in the genes, before or 
after the fact). 
In opposition to this, an environmental adaption argument 
against parthenogenesis is presented by Graham Bell, who 
poses the hypothesis that sex is the most favorable form of 
propagation in that it hedges bets by diversifying throughout 
the environment. In what Darwin called the "tangled bank of 
a river" situation; where the environment is saturated, 
diversification by sex allows more niches to be occupied 
simultaneously. Part of the problem with this hypothesis is 
that it stresses spatial rather than temporal variation as 
the criteria for environmental adaption. 27 More importantly 
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still, it fails to take account of the fact that environment 
is not just surroundings, it also concerns the infestations 
inside the body. The presence of microbes and their very high 
rate of change points to the importance of the role of 
microbial diseases as agents of selection. 
Every higher organism is persecuted by viruses and microbial 
diseases. Its genetic array of immune defenses has to be 
constantly updated. The immune system acts as a combination 
lock which the parasites try to break. By trial and error, 
they always succeed; indeed they often succeed quite soon 
owing to their high turnover rate; their generation spans are 
usually much shorter than their host's. This means that they 
are always most efficient in attacking the most common 
immunotypes of their hosts. For the hosts, it can be deadly 
to adopt a combination code which is currently widespread in 
the population. It pays to belong to a minority. But then if 
it pays well in terms of genetically unmanipulated sexual 
reproduction, it will yield a new majority. Biologists tell 
us that the best chance for the host, who is kept under 
constant pressure to change the digits of its combination 
lock, is to engage in sexual reproduction in the hope that 
the, largely arbitrary, reshuffling of genes it produces, 
will afford some protection. 28 But there is no reason for 
assuming that, when it becomes feasible, high technology 
genetic manipulation in a parthenogenetic species will not 
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prove more successful. Indeed, given the benefits of 
parthenogenesis already ci ted, and the promise of 
diversification a non-speciesist approach to experimentation 
with different genetic types, and with non-carbon based life-
forms presents, it seems clear that evolution will take this 
latter path. Evolution in the post-modern environment must 
take adaption, interaction and the ready acceptance of 
difference as its primary mode of behavior. The 
parthenogenetic cyborg who is able to produce non-sexually 
and who is ready and willing to participate in genetic 
experimentation and hybridization of her offspring will lead 
the way into this poly-sexual future. A future which can only 
be conceived of as a maternal femi(nin)ist immaculate 
conception when fed back (as mirroring opposition and threat) 
to the patriarchal masculinist economy of generational male-
birth. 
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1. Molecular biology now tells us that we share 98.4% of our 
DNA with chimpanzees. The 1.6% genetic difference is less 
that the 2.3% gulf that separates the chimpanzees from the 
gorillas (and the 2.2% separating two species of gibbon in 
the same genus). 
2. The concept of Ethics being used here follows the general 
custom of assuming an intrinsic relation between internalized 
ethical principle and moral law. The misrepresentation of the 
positive side of ethics implicit in such use will be explored 
in later sections. 
3. with only lower brain activity a pa~ent may well be able 
to breathe unassisted for an unlimited period of time. Being 
"allowed to die" means removing sustenance tubes so that the 
persons heart eventually stops beating (a process that may 
take weeks), final expiration being due to dehydration and 
starvation. 
4. For instance, testing for the production of hormone 
production in the brain is rarely if ever carried out. 
5. Although the doctrine of the 'sanctity of life' claims 
that it is the essential spark of animus, of life itself, 
that is precious, the doctrine, in practice, applies 
exclusively to human life. 
6. In 1992 in Pittsburgh, Dr Thomas Starzl removed the liver 
from a healthy young baboon and transplanted it into the body 
of a middle-aged human male dying of Ii ver disease. The 
baboon, a healthy, sentient, intelligent, responsive animal, 
was killed immediately after the liver was taken; the patient 
died about two months later. [New York Times. 30th June and 
6th September 1992.] 
7. The word "person" comes from the Latin "persona", which 
initially meant a mask worn by an actor in a play, and later 
came to refer to the character the actor played. Epictetus 
introduced the term to philosophical discourse to refer to 
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the role one played in life. It was taken up by the early 
Christian Church and used by the Council of Nicea in 325 so 
solve the problem of the trinity. 
8. There are many well documented cases of both chimpanzees 
and gorillas who have learned to communicate in human sign 
language and who demonstrate higher reasoning skills and 
self-awareness than numerous human children and mentally 
deficient adults. Peter Singer even suggests that whilst "the 
evidence for pe:r:sonhood is at present most conclusive for the 
great apes, but whales, dolphins, elephants, monkeys, dogs, 
pigs, and other animals may eventually also be shown to be 
aware of their own existence over time and capable of 
reasoning." [Rethinking Life and Death. p.182] 
9. In 1935, the American geneticist and future Nobel laureate 
Hermann J. Miller was moved to write that the science of 
eugenics had become "hopelessly perverted" into a 
pseudoscientific facade for "advocates of race and class 
prejudice, defenders of vested interests of church and state, 
fascists, Hitlerites and reactionaries generally. II [Quoted in 
Kevles p.164] 
10. This concern arises almost exclusively from the memories 
and recounted tales of Nazi horrors during the 2nd World War. 
The sterilization of several hundred thousand people, human 
research into the genetics of individual and racial 
difference, and ultimately the Holocaust. 
11. Nazi eugenics was itself modelled upon the eugenic laws 
and programs operational in the USA during the first third of 
the C20th. Eugenicists, (predominantly the white male Anglo-
saxon protestant majority) considered that the lower results 
attained in IQ tests by white immigrants (mostly Catholic and 
Jewish, Eastern and Southern Europeans) determined the 
innately lower intelligence of the latter, which, together 
with their higher birth rates, seemed to indicate the spread 
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of inferior genes in the population at a rapid rate. Such 
theorizing was a major factor in the states consequent 
pushing through of new restrictions on the immigration of 
such peoples into the USA in the following decades. 
12. In the Beckers' case, Dolores Becker, pregnant at the age 
of thirty-seven, gave birth to a Down's syndrome baby. 
According to the Beckers' complaint, their physician had not 
informed them of the sharply higher frequency of such births 
among women over thirty-five, nor had he offered Dolores 
amniocentesis. 
13. As for the concern of some in the gay community over the 
claim of a few geneticists to have found a "gay gene" (a 
posi tion currently held in ridicule by most geneticists), 
even if such a gene were discovered, (and its dominance over 
cultural and social factors shown), there is no reason to 
assume that wi thin the poly-sexual postmodern community there 
would be a call for the gene's eradication. It is only from 
the moralizing position of the state that one is liable to 
hear the assertion that it "fairer" to be rid of 
homosexuality for the individuals concerned, in order that 
they better fit in with "normal" and "mainstream" sexuality. 
Indeed, contrary to gay fears that pinpointing the "gay gene" 
would lead to state pathologization of homosexuality, given 
the increasing concerns about overpopulation it would make 
more sense for the powers that be to insist that beings with 
the "gay gene" be favoured over heterosexed humans, in order 
that reproduction be slowed down! 
14. Human beings, in exception to other organisms, do have 
the ability to be able to plan the changes that may take 
place in their environment. Social organization does not 
reflect the limitations of individual biological beings, but 
on the contrary, is their negation: 
"No individual human being can fly by flapping his 
or her arms and legs. That is indeed a biological 
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limitation having to do with our size and the size 
of our appendages. Nor could human beings fly if a 
very large number of them assembled in one place 
and all flapped their arms and legs 
simul taneously • Yet I did fly to Toronto last 
year, and the ability to fly was a consequence of 
social action. Airplanes and airports are products 
of educational institutions, scientific 
discoveries, the organization of money, the 
production of petroleum and its ref ining , 
metallurgy, the training of pilots, the actions of 
government in creating air traff ic control 
systems, all of which are social products. These 
social products have come together to make it 
possible for us as individuals to fly." [Lewontin. 
p.121] 
Individual biological limitations understood from viewing 
individuals as isolated entities in a vacuum are not 
individual limitations for individuals embedded in society. 
It is not that the whole is more than the sum of its parts. 
It is that the properties of the parts cannot be understood 
except in their context in the whole. Parts do not have 
indi vidual properties in some isolated sense, but only in the 
context in which they are found. 
15. This is not to suggest that geologists have now find the 
right methodological approach to get at the truth of the 
matter. It remains the case that the performance of materials 
observed, from which are developed concepts of their 
behavior, is crucially dependent upon how the observer 
chooses to view them, that is, upon the experimental test 
condi tions and types of observation made. A geological 
example of this is the way in which sandstone can said on the 
one hand to be brittle, and on the other to flow: When a 
piece of sandstone is cut from a larger sample the 
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fragmentation that occurs upon the impact of cutting 
instrument and stone illustrates a macroscopic brittleness. 
However, if the sandstone is measured with electric 
resistance wire gages during and after impact, we find that, 
over the period of about 24 hours, the stone has expanded in 
size, it has flowed. When a different type of observation of 
the same event is made, however, this conclusion will again 
change. In this second observation small transducers are 
placed on the rock surface to measure acceleration; during 
the expansion of the stone after the cut it is observed that 
microearthquakes (within the sand particles themselves) are 
taking place at the rate of a few per minute. Such tiny 
cracking events occurring deep within the sandstone reveal 
that the flow is in part achieved by brittle fracture. 
16. As Harper points out in his article "Dead or Alive", 
there is little point in subjecting a sample substance to 
radically non-characteristic conditions, as we will not learn 
much about its behavior therefrom. Harper compares such 
experimentation with the fantastical hypothesis of how it 
would be possible for a human body to leave a room by exiting 
through the key hole. The experiment is theoretically 
possible using suitable pressure-measuring devices either 
side of the key hole and some form of flow-measuring 
apparatus by means of which a mathematical description of the 
body's flow characteristics could be identified. Not only 
would such an experiment leave one with a quantity of flesh 
bearing no resemblance to a human being, but it would not 
teach us anything about the characteristic behavior of the 
human body exiting a room. 
17. Characteristics of open systems include, energy 
dispersal, irreversible processes, non-equilibrium and 
macroscopic order arising in response to a random flux of 
energy or matter through the system. 
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18. Following Langton, John Byl went on to create still 
smaller automaton (of only 12 cells with 6 states and 57 
transi tion rules), where the distinction between transcribing 
and translating information was barely visible, and where von 
Neumann's complexity threshold (including the separation of 
trivial and non-trivial self-replication) where blurred 
beyond recognition. 
19. There are not many examples of multiple sexes in the 
animal kingdom (although in plant life there are numerous), 
one could however argue that creatures such as bees have 
three sexes--queens, drones and worker. The latter do not 
pass on their genes, at least not directly, but play an 
indispensable role in raising the offspring. Some slime 
moulds, incidently, have 13 sexes! 
20. As many biologists have stressed, the very fact of sexual 
propagation is based on a paradox: Propagation, indeed, means 
that one divides in two, while sex consists in fusing two 
cells to make one. 
21. outcrossing involves the mixing of genes avoiding the 
intrinsic risks present in incest and self-propagation of a 
deleterious, non-regressive gene being passed through 
generations to the point where it incapacitates or wipes out 
the whole line. 
22. outcrossing involves the mixing of genes avoiding the 
intrinsic risks present in incest and self-propagation of a 
deleterious, non-regressive gene being passed through 
generations to the point where it incapacitates or wipes out 
the whole line. 
23. It is mostly in very large populations that sex speeds up 
evolution, especially if the mutations are of small advantage 
only and occur at many different spots in the genome. 
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24. The temporal equivalent (put forward by Leigh van Valen), 
describes the permanent treadmill of evolutionary adaption. 
Almost any adaptive success of one species constitutes a 
deterioration of the environment of their rivals, their 
exploiters, and their prey. Every population is kept on its 
toes by others who are improving. If it manages to find as 
adequate countermove, it will only cause the others to try 
harder. 
25. The threat of massive male infertility only further 
ensures the continuation of these practices. 
evidence by Zoologist Theo Colborn suggests 
fertility of men is dramatically declining 
compelling 
that the 
under the 
influence of synthetic chemicals present 
plastics and detergents. The human body, 
in pesticides, 
over the last 
hundred years, has been swamped with chemicals known to 
disrupt the endocrine (hormone producing) systems. There is 
no evidence to suggest that there is any similar degradation 
occurring in female fertility, in the number or quality of 
eggs produced. According to Colborn and Myers, the average 
male sperm count has dropped from about 113 million per ml in 
1940 to 66 million per ml in 1990. Attempting to refute these 
statistics, Pierre Jouannet of the Centre d' Etude et de 
Conservation des Oeufs et du Sperme in Paris, recently 
carried out an analysis of 1,350 males known to be fertile 
(having produced one or more children) and was shocked to 
discover that the groups sperm count had dropped steadily at 
2% a year for the past twenty years. He reports "It will take 
70 or 80 years before it [the sperm count] goes to zero" 
[Robert Allen. The Last Generation]. 
26. The powerful force of parthenogenesis lies in the idea of 
gestational time as something very different from 
generational time. Gestational time is fundamentally 
interactive, it is experience on the boundary of inner and 
outer, being and environment, one and another. generational 
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time, on the other hand, begins only at birth, it is a linear 
tree which, after birth, one is designated as part of or made 
addendum to. Equating parthenogenesis with male immaculate 
conception merely names a new tree for the matriarchal 
generation, and is ultimately bound to reinvent the Moral Law 
through duty and respect to the mother ( instead of the 
father), here the power relations operate with the same 
degree of force and swing about the same axis of domination 
and suppression, only the name plaque on the trunk is 
different. 
"In the feminist analysis, this detachment and 
objectivity [of the male gaze] are connected to 
the fantasy of self-generation, of being 
father/mother of oneself, thus denying the 
specific debt to the maternal." 
[Braidotti Nomadic Subjects p.72] 
27. The temporal equivalent (put forward by Leigh van Valen), 
describes the permanent treadmill of evolutionary adaption. 
Almost any adaptive success of one species constitutes a 
deterioration of the environment of their rivals, their 
exploiters, and their prey. Every population is kept on its 
toes by others who are improving. If it manages to find as 
adequate countermove, it will only cause the others to try 
harder. 
28. An underlying fear of the upcoming annihilation of the 
male shows itself in many of these attempts to retain sex as 
the basis of propagation of the species. Karl Sigmund 
remarks, 
"The theory [of sex being necessary to reshuffle 
genes 
makes 
and 
me 
prevent microbial 
slightly more at 
disease takeover] 
ease about the 
continuation of my own kind within the human 
species. I can now tell people that we males are 
necessary for health." [Games. p.l53] 
302 
21. spinozai Consciousness and the Body. 
"Whatsoever disposes the human body, so as to 
render it capable of being affected in an 
increased number of ways, or of affecting external 
bodies in an increased number of ways, is useful 
to man; and is so, in proportion as the body is 
thereby rendered more capable of being affected or 
affecting other bodies in an increased number of 
ways; contrawise, whatever renders the body less 
capable in this respect is hurtful to 
man ••.. Whatsoever thus increases the capabilities 
of the body increases also the mind's capability 
of perception." 
[Spinoza. Ethics p.215] 
Benedict de Spinoza, writing in 1677, denounced the 
transcendent values expounded by the Judeo-Christian morality 
of his times. Spinoza understood the constraining mechanisms 
of such values as working against the fundamental force of 
Life. Despite our previous definitional structure for life as 
based around information, and its consequent deri vati ve 
values, in terms of interaction and association through 
thought and bodily experience; it remains true that in our 
era, life is often thought of as existence governed by 
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consciousness, such that there remains a tendency to align a 
teleologically conceived consciousness with the dictates of 
morality (the moral law, and its separation of man and 
nature). It is due to this privileging of consciousness and 
the portrayal of its operations as teleologically driven that 
ethics and morality have become seemingly inseparable, and 
any creative practice understood in terms of an ethos of the 
self free from transcendent dictates, a dangerous anarchistic 
nightmare. 
Nietzsche remarks that, 
"consciousness usually only appears when a whole 
wants to subordinate itself to a superior whole. 
It is primarily the consciousness of this superior 
whole of reality external to the ego. 
Consciousness is born in relation to a being of 
which we could be a function; it is the means by 
which we incorporate into that being." [Genealogy 
#17] 
Consciousness driven by a human-divine telos is that which 
legitimates our calls to the existence of Good and Evil in a 
culture that declares itself atheist (or at least agnostic); 
it is the transcendental glue of the moralistic community of 
man. 1 
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In his Ethics, Spinoza argues that basing the nature of the 
human being in the operations of the mind (consciousness) 
constitutes an anti-materialist position in that it refuses 
to take the body as a model. Privileging consciousness allows 
for a concretizing of ethics in the enterprise of domination 
of the passions, through a universalizable speciesist call to 
the Moral Law ~nd its dictates. Such a position is reliant 
both upon an implicit dualism and the denial of the power 
both of the unconscious of thought and the unknown of the 
body. Spinoza's position, used here in creative abstraction, 
opens up the possibility of positing thought and the body, 
not consciousness, as the locus of force, whose power 
relations remain to be analyzed. In this context, thought 
cannot be separated from the body and both surpass their 
simplistic cognizable limits; thought surpassing the 
consciousness we have of it; the body surpassing the 
knowledge we have of it. 
"The idea constituting the actual being of the 
human mind is the idea of the body (II.xiii.), 
which (Post.i.) is composed of a great number of 
complex individual parts." [Spinoza Ethics p.97] 
For Spinoza, these parts are not independent entities as 
such, but are constituted in relation to one another; they 
are constituted through a God whose Being is relation. Such 
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Being is not however, like the Being of the moral community, 
the stuff of relation, it is not an organizing principle; the 
Spinozistic God is rather the plane of relation. It is a 
plane of immanence, of immanent (evolving) rules for 
interaction and not a transcendent realm of laws dictating or 
predicting effects.2 
"there is necessarily in God [relation] the idea 
of each individual part whereof the body is 
composed (II.viii.Coroll.); therefore (II.vii.), 
the idea of the human body is composed of these 
numerous ideas of its component parts." [ Ethics 
p.97-8] 
The nature of the body thus lies in mutual affection. 
Affection is what brings bodies into existence and is always 
(as the basis of present and future relation) ahead of 
itself, not in terms of the nature of the conditions for 
interaction, but in respect of its realization, where 
interaction is always immanent to the activity of relation in 
the real. We may think of affection then in terms of 
Foucaul t's idea of force, whose manifestations, in power 
relations, is that which we term the real. Affection, as 
production and product of the relation of interactive bodies 
and ideas is spontaneous and contemporaneous, as producer, 
with its product (acting self-reflexively upon it). Such an 
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account, furthermore, allows us to re-introduce Merleau-
Ponty's notion of a "postural schema" as an experimental 
event of bodily competence, but without the determining 
factor of an underlying unifying subject-focus (focus 
imaginarius). 
When consciousness and the body are taken to express the 
limit of what is knowable (and where what is not knowable is 
excluded from the power/knowledge dynamic), what occurs in 
interactions between bodies and minds ( ideas), is not a 
potentially productive commercium, not a potential for future 
becomings, but an event of closure. In this scenario, it is 
the body or idea taken as its own effect that interacts with 
another body or idea, which is also an effect. What then 
occurs as an interactive event is a confrontation between 
effects which can have only one of two results. Spinoza 
characterizes these as composition or decomposition, not of 
a thing in relation to its environment, but the relations of 
each thing as effect internal to itself.3 What is composed 
or decomposed is thus the order of relations ensuring 
integrity and identity to the thing as isolated effect of a 
particular process. composition is thus taken to be a coming 
together into a union (a communio) of the two ideas or bodies 
in composition (a becoming more through reiteration), and 
decomposi tion, the threat to internal coherence and integrity 
of one or other of the bodies or ideas, as effects, in 
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confrontation (a becoming less). Composition of effects is 
valued then as a mirroring of that original unity of 
consciousness predicating an identity repeated in 
interactions, and decomposition is that which poses a threat 
to that unity. The unity and identity of the effect is taken 
as always already given insofar as it be made knowable, 
through rei teration, in the composi tional (and 
decompositional) effects of future interactions. 4 
Prior to the birth of the transcendental self of 
Enlightenment thinking, where consciousness is unable to 
posit itself as its own first cause through the postulation 
of an original Noumenally validated unity of apperception, 
the tendency is to invoke a God to legitimate the 
universalization of teleological consciousness through 
concepts of Good and Evil, bereft of any undetermined force. 
This is not the Telos we have already spoken of--the product 
of Humanist Enlightenment--but a Divine telos for man, which 
is, nevertheless a product of the threefold division man-
nature-divine, activated through the Moral Law. As spinoza 
remarks: 
"After men persuaded themselves that everything 
which is created is created for their sake, •.• they 
were bound to form abstract notions for the 
explanation of the nature of things, such as 
goodness, badness, order, confusion, warmth, cold, 
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beauty, deformity, and so on; and from the belief 
that they are free agents arose the further 
notions praise and blame, sin and merit." 
[Spinoza. Ethics. Part I. p.79] 
with the coming of Humanist Enlightenment thought, where the 
double-bind of the self is internalized in the form of a 
metaphysicaliy split subject, morality and consciousness 
become inseparable. The illusion of values is 
indistinguishable from the illusion of consciousness. When 
consciousness reigns over life, morality commands; rules 
become duties, guidelines for interaction become laws 
governing relations, and maps for interaction become diagrams 
of prohibition. According to consciousness the Moral Law is 
an Imperative, its only effect being obedience (respect). But 
the Moral law does not produce knowledge ( it is neither 
creative nor productive), it merely prohibits, or at best, 
prepares the ground for future prohibitions. And yet the Law 
takes the place of knowledge by placing itself in the 
position of relationality. The law makes itself the passage 
of command, usurping the sensuous passage, it makes itself 
the hardwiring in the communications system, interposed 
between man and god, the ultimate relation (mute, blind, 
deaf, daddy). 
Returning to Spinoza, we may define morality as the system of 
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rules and action referring existence always to transcendent 
values (the judgement of divine edict and the system of that 
judgement), whereas ethics is rather a typology of immanent 
modes of existence. Ethics and morality do not then simply 
interpret the same precepts in different ways, for whilst the 
Law is always the transcendent instance that determines the 
opposition of values (Good - Evil), knowledge operates as the 
immanent power that determines the qualitative difference of 
modes of existence (good -bad). But how are we to understand 
knowledge in relation to our legacy thought of as the 
Enlightenment project of the subject? How are we to push to 
the forefront a self for whom the project of desire is one of 
immanent critique? 
From Spinoza we may derive a notion of Life, in terms of the 
individual body, as a complex relation between differential 
veloci ties of a multitude, a composition of speeds and 
slownesses upon the plane of immanence. A dynamic description 
of this characterizes this complex mode as a capacity for 
affecting or being affected, (affection pertaining to the 
body or to thought). Affective capacity, with a minimum and 
maximum threshold is thus also the basis of differentiating 
between individuals (rather than form, function, or 
structural definitions of species, etc.). Each thing on the 
plane of immanence, that is the immanent plane of Nature, is 
defined by the arrangements of motions and affects into which 
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it enters, whether these arrangements are artificial or 
natural. No thing is ever separable from its relations to the 
world, the interior is only a selected exterior and the 
exterior a projected interior. It is the speed or slowness of 
metabolisms, perceptions, actions, and reactions linking 
together that constitute a particular indi vidual in the 
world, not some specular equivalent of a spatiotemporally 
continuous divine identity. 
Furthermore, Spinoza, enables us to enact a deliverance from 
the abject poverty and redundancy of the Moral Law a notion 
of ethics as a creative plane of immanence upon which we may 
be able to map the force of desire in its complex power-
relations upon models of bodies in becoming. The models of 
the body used are encoded mappings of desire, of the 
desiring, libidinal body, not a divinated theological 
geography of flesh or spirit. It is in this latter landscape 
that unified subjects are born, out of forms, upon a plane of 
transcendence territorialized according to laws of 
organization and development (progress understood 
teleologically). Upon the former, the plane of immanence 
(becoming), there is no form and there can be no subjects 
independent of specific power relations, (and there are 
always power relations). Upon the plane of immanence velocity 
is the driving force of interaction, exchange and couplings 
of matter and yet one is never free from the power relations 
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constituted therein by virtue of the emergence of new states 
of becoming (in combination and bifurcation events). 
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22. Foucault; Care for the Self. 
The subject in postmoderni ty is often characterized as a 
transient fold in the fabric of some or other system of 
representation; at the level of lived experience, a mere 
assemblage held together by nothing more permanent than its 
choice among' the currently existing range of lifestyles, 
vocabularies, modes of self-description, etc. Accompanying as 
a backdrop, or lurking beneath the shifting surfaces of this 
subject is more-often-than-not another, this time literary 
subject, whose purpose is the public (as opposed to private) 
occupation of the unifying role of aesthetic judgement, 
providing an image of the ideal (consensus-based) order of 
social existence. The problem with such accounts of the 
subject, whilst laudable in their pluralist intent, is that 
they leave no room for any argued or principled critique of 
consensus values, any notion that there might exist false, 
partial or distorted modes of consensus belief, and moreover, 
that the private/public dichotomy (theorized by Rorty and 
other postmodern liberalists) might count among the most 
effective means of holding such beliefs in place. 
Liberal, often proclaimedly pragmatic practitioners of such 
Neo-Kantian aesthetic ideology merely sustain the illusion of 
consensus values by projecting a substitute public sphere, a 
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realm of intersubjective agreement--with allowance for the 
vagaries of private self-invention--where real world disputes 
and conflicts of interest can be resolved in imaginary form. 
Michel Foucault is one of few politically inclined postmodern 
thinkers to have refused to travel this path and yet to have 
retained a firm belief in the need to formulate some theory 
of what it might mean to engage in an ethical practice of 
life in our era. 
In his later writing, Foucault revised his apparent earlier 
dismissal of the subject, by way of a re-engagement with 
Kantian Critique, in order to formulate an ethic of care for 
the self consistent with the general thrust of his 
materialist, anti-humanist concerns. Foucault excavated from 
his earlier archeological and genealogical investigations the 
seeds of an ethos which he termed "care of the self" and 
which, in the History of Sexuality, he traces back to the 
ancient Greeks. It is not until the coming of Christianity 
however, that the concept mutates into the paradoxical 
version with which we are familiar today. In Christianity the 
notion of Care for Self is on the one hand, the path to 
salvation, yet on the other, it tells us that salvation can 
only be achieved by way of a renunciation of self.5 
Progressively through his three Critiques, Kant attempts to 
re-shape this metaphysically split self replacing the 
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Christian belief in a necessary renunciation of the 
terrestrial self (as a means of becoming another redeemed 
self after death), with the notion of a Noumenal self co-
existing (outside time) with the empirical self of everyday 
existence (through the mechanisms of transcendental ideas, 
schematization and the consciously inaccessible 
transcendental unity of apperception). Inheriting this new 
di vision, many post-Kantian thinkers attempt to postulate the 
existence of the subject as a Humesque bundle of 
associations, de-centered, and scattered through 
discontinuous time. 6 At the same time they collapse the 
transcendental and transcendent (Noumenal) subject into one 
and the same thing (erring on the side of an aestheticised 
version of Spirit), whose existence, however mystical, 
unrepresentable and problematic, sUbstantiates ethical and 
political ideologies of a communitarian bent [as elucidated 
in sections 2 and 3]. The problem at the heart of these 
commendable yet naive attempts to sUbstantiate a politics of 
anti-Humanism, is an avoidance of the central role of the 
transcendental subject, either in its continuing operation or 
its absence. without such an explanation, the consensual, 
coerci ve or contractual basis of universal subjecti vi ty 
(needed for the postulation of a noumenal subject as anything 
other than a fiction of faith) remains mystical. More 
critically adept thinkers in this field, recognizing the 
fissure, none-the-less fail to resolve the issue, resorting 
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instead to a redundant call to a "being-in-common" located in 
relation to originary lack [Nancy], or in the postulation of 
an unrepresentable basis for ethico-political judgement (a 
differend) [Lyotard]. As a consequence, such post-modern 
attempts to de-center and disperse the subject by denying the 
power of transcendence, at the same time, rid us of any 
possible ethos of the self. 
Foucault's position does not simply following a Lyotardian 
path of drawing out the logic of Kant's position, seeking to 
drive a wedge between the truth-claims of Enlightenment 
reason and the project of ethical self-fashioning that 
survives the eclipse or demise of those claims. For Foucault, 
the claims of both modernity and countermodernity are born 
and maintained out of the tension and opposition between 
them. Where Foucault and Lyotard are in accord is in shifting 
the main burden of enquiry from the relationship between 
knowledge and ethics (as in the .QER and CPrR) to the 
relationship between ethics and aesthetics (as in the CJ). 
This is most clearly exhibited by Foucault in his use of 
Baudelaire to articulate an attitude of modernity (in his 
essay on Kant's "Was ist AufkHirung?"). This is not, however 
to suggest that Foucault's close alignment to an aesthetic 
elaboration of the self is grounded in the communal nature of 
society, on the contrary, as Christopher Norris points out: 
"For indeed there is evidence enough--some of it 
316 
near to hand--of what can happen when this desire 
to aestheticize morality and politics is made over 
into a wholesale doctrine of society as 
Gesamtkunstwerk, a spectacle arranged for the 
benefit of those with the taste or the courage to 
enjoy such concrete manifestations of the 
Nietzschean will-to-power." [Norris. 
Reconstructing Foucault p.96] 
What distinguishes the feasibility of a Foucaultian ethos 
from the failures of such thinkers as Nancy and Lyotard to 
articulate a sense of justice, and the tendency to 
underestimate him in relation to their failure by reducing 
his position to that of Rortyesque pragmatics, is ultimately 
concerned with the way in which one understands the birth of 
the modern subject, and thence the death of its post-modern 
heir. (The way in which one reads Kant and faces the end of 
the millennium.) 
Kant's Enlightenment project is expressed through the 
threefold question: What can I know? What should I will? What 
may I reasonably hope for? Foucault takes these questions 
resolutely onboard, yet poses them in genealogical terms, 
that is, as belonging to a certain, historically delimited 
configuration of knowledge and discourse. In doing so, he 
rejects the strong universalist premise that would hold such 
317 
values to be more than contingent, more than just a product 
of our own (waning) cultural attachment to the philosophical 
discourse of modernity. Foucault is not interested in 
preserving or rescuing from the Enlightenment project a 
theory, doctrine or permanent body of knowledge (whether 
accumulating or not), his interest lies elsewhere in the 
reactivation of an attitude. As he puts it, 
"an ethos, a philosophical life in which the 
critique of what we are is at one and the same 
time the historical analysis of the limits that 
are imposed on us and an experiment with the 
possibility of going beyond them" 
[Foucault. The Foucault Reader p.50] 
Enlightenment is thus taken as a symptom of the condition for 
which it was professed to be the cure. 
"criticism is no longer going to be practiced in 
the search for formal structures with universal 
value, but rather as an historical investigation 
into the events that have led us to constitute 
ourselves and to recognize ourselves as subjects 
of what we are doing, thinking, saying." [ ibid. 
p.45] 
For Foucault, the project of Enlightenment (specifically as 
articulated by Kant in his essay "Was ist Aufklarung?") is 
thus important to the ethos of modernity and the postmodern 
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condition. And this is indeed the case insofar as one must 
retain critique as the principle of permanent creation and 
transformation of self, yet a creation that is opposed to the 
general and simplistic thrust of humanism. Ethos, as a 
critical ontology of ourselves, is an attitude in which "the 
cri tique of what we are is at one and the same time the 
historical analysis of the limits that are imposed upon us 
and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them" 
[ibid]. Distinct from this vision of the liberated critical 
self, is the disturbed subject of postmodernity whose 
theorization, in equating Enlightenment (the event) with 
Humanism (the theory), is incapable of unburdening a 
historico-cri tical self from the weight of the humanist 
subject. 7 
Foucault's position regarding the subject is neither that of 
the pragmatically inclined anti-theorist, nor that of an 
Enlightenment humanist thinker seeking to provide general 
precepts or ethical standards bridging the public-private 
morality gap. And nor is he, as some have asserted, a quasi-
Nietzschean "aesthetic ideologist", a shaper of destiny 
sublimely unaccountable to commonplace standards of reality. 
Although to some extent still attached to a Kantian analysis 
of reason, Foucault's position requires a decoupling of 
ethics from any version of the old foundationalist paradigm~ 
the idea on the one hand that self-knowledge comes about 
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through an exercise of autonomous practical reason, and on 
the other that this involves a critical reflection on the 
powers and capacities--as well as constitutive limits--of 
human knowledge in general. s At no point does Foucault fully 
resolve the postmodern dilemma of the politically inclined 
subject, yet his development of an ethos of self enables us 
to pose the problem of the self in terms of a "limit 
attitude" characterized by way of an ethical engagement that 
is a practice of the self resisting those religious, 
pedagogical, medical and other institutions that have laid 
siege to it in seeking to convert its experimental aims into 
a teleology of the subject. This work, furthermore, does not 
entail the transformation of metaphysics into a science of 
being, but is an attempt to practice freedom, where freedom 
is not the empty dream propounded by Utopian libertarianism, 
but a state of resistance and becoming in the midst of power 
relations; an experimental freedom that cannot be divorced 
from a historico-critical attitude. 
"I shall thus characterize the philosophical ethos 
appropriate to the critical ontology of ourselves 
as a historico-practical test of the limits that 
we may go beyond, and thus as work carried out by 
ourselves upon ourselves as free 
[Foucault. The Foucault Reader p.47] 
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beings." 
By reading Foucault in this way we are able to see that, as 
distinct from following Rortyesque pragmatics of ethically 
bankrupt politicking, Foucault pursues the practice of ethos 
by problem.atizing thought in respect of past and present 
modes of conduct and belief, enabling us to continue a 
discourse that transcends its confinement to the currency of 
in-place consensus values--those culture-specific values and 
norms of a given situation or context--and attains a more 
properly ethical perspective. 
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23. The Philosophical Ethos. 
In accordance with Foucault's analysis we can articulate 
three main modes in the process of objectification of the 
self into a subject (tools of classical humanism that mayor 
may not be utilized as principles underlying Enlightenment 
thought): 1) Objectivisation through pseudo-sciences of 
language, economics etc., where inquiries are directed at the 
individual as speaking subject, laboring subject, etc. 2) 
Objectivisation through dividing processes whereby the 
subject is divided in him or herself from others, ego 
mad/sane, healthy/sick. etc. 3) Self-objectification through 
sexualization and gendering, where an individual turns him or 
herself into a subject by identifying themselves within a 
gendered and sexualized domain. 
The aim of this writing in opening up a space for the 
desiring self in post-modernity has been pursued less through 
an analysis of the internal organization and rationality of 
subject-producing ideologies than in the elucidation of the 
points of resistance in and against the power structures 
inherent in our societies and at work in the above procedures 
of objectification. 
As Foucault remarks; 
"there is no relationship of power without the 
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means of escape or possible flight." 
[power/Knowledge p.225] 
Power relations are part of our social structure, they are 
rooted in our social networks, our associations and 
interactions, they are not supplemental to them. Power cannot 
operate without an element of freedom. To understand and to 
transform the way in which power operates in society it is 
necessary to engage in strategies of resistance; to consider 
the agonistics of power relations and the intransitivity of 
freedom. 
This is not to suggest, by any means, that power is the only 
kind of relationship, it is but one of a range of 
interactions in which certain actions modify others. Power 
only exists when it is put into action, it is a mode of 
action acting not upon others but upon the actions of others; 
an action upon an action, upon existing actions or upon those 
which may arise in the present or future. Power is neither 
violence nor coercion. A relationship of violence is a 
relationship where power acts upon bodies or things and not 
upon other actions as such. In a relationship of violence one 
side is changed, mutilated or destroyed, whereas in power 
relations both elements are necessary for the relationship to 
exist. It is, of course, nevertheless the case that violence 
and coercion can be thought of as the instruments or the 
results of power relations (which they all too often are), 
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but it is a mistake to see them as constituting the principle 
or basic nature of power. 
Foucault tells us that the exercise of power is neither that 
of violence nor of consent: 
"It is a total structure of actions brought to 
bear upon possible actions; it incites, it 
induces, it seduces, it makes easier or more 
difficult; in the extreme it constrains or forbids 
absolutely; it is nevertheless always a way of 
acting upon an acting subject or subjects by 
virtue of their acting or being capable of action. 
A set of actions upon other actions." 
[power/Knowledge p.220] 
In a Foucaultian sense then, power is a question of 
government, where government is understood to consist in 
guiding the possibility of conduct and putting in order the 
possible outcome; structuring the possible field of action 
for others. Power is exercised over free, or partially free 
subjects, and only insofar as they are free. Upon close 
examination this means that power relations operate with 
subjects, or more accurately, that they produce subjects, 
which, as such, have limitations (because of their identity) 
with respect to what they can do or be. On the other hand, 
these subjects are free, that is, they (as individuals or 
324 
collectives) are faced with a field of possibilities in which 
several ways of behaving, several reactions and di verse 
comportments may be realized. 
According to Foucault, the human being is determined as a 
subject, but as a subject he is not determined to act in one 
particular way. When the determining factors saturate the 
whole there is no relationship of power. Freedom may appear 
as the condition for the exercise of power and disappear with 
its exercise. The relationship between power and freedom's 
refusal to submit cannot therefore be separated. Thus at the 
heart of the power relationship is resistance. 
It is in terms of resistance, in considering the function of 
the concept of woman and the work of feminism that we become 
better able to understand the repressive power of community; 
by investigating transsexuality (through practices of trans-
gendering and poly-sexuality) and sado-masochism (in its 
relationship with the law) that we more clearly view the way 
in which the concept of the body is appropriated and utilized 
by institutional power regimes; by looking at bio-medical 
life and death arguments, issues in artificial life 
engineering and theories of the two sexes distinction (in 
relation to parthenogenesis) that we are able to discover 
what is at stake in defining life. 
325 
If we are to try and understand the ebbs and flows, dams and 
tidal waves of desire in our era we must do it by looking at 
what it produces, that is, both the partial objects--the 
subjects--through which it is determined in accordance with 
power, and the points of resistance to that power in the 
production of struggles: men over women, parents over 
children, medicine over the population, administration over 
the ways in which people live. Such struggles aim at the 
power effects, and at those instances of power closest to 
those attacking or criticizing them, and they are 
transversal. What is opened up in through these struggles is 
a questioning of the status of the individual as subject in 
relation to the first mode of objectification, namely, the 
production of the subject through community. 
In this context, Foucault notes that people; 
"assert the right to be different and they 
underline everything which makes individuals truly 
individuals. On the other hand, they attack 
everything which separates the individual, breaks 
his links with others, splits up community life, 
forces the individual back on himself and ties him 
down to his own identity in a constraining way. t\ 
[Power/Knowledge p.212] 
The acti vi ties of individuals and associations acting as 
points of resistance thus operate in oppositional mode; 
326 
"an opposition to the effects of power which are 
linked with knowledge, competence and 
qualification: struggles against the privileges of 
knowledge. But they are also against secrecy, 
deformation and mystifying representations imposed 
on people." [ibid] 
What is being attacked is not a power source, not a "them" 
standing over and against and determining "us", but an 
articulation of power that is our enlightenment inheritance, 
a particular humanistically informed way of responding to the 
question "Who are we?" Attempts to address this question that 
cannot distinguish a practice of self from the evaluative 
legitimation of community, the body and life as institutional 
norms, are manifested in forms or techniques of domination, 
in the way in which power relations, by decree or naive 
assent, transform individuals into sUbjects. 
It is thus through the articulation of the first mode of 
objectification (disciplinary, institutional knowledge) that 
the second (identity in the face of difference) and third 
(self-imposition of identity), come about. The woman, the 
child, the invalid, etc, are known, examined and marked in 
their individuality which is attached to them, legitimating 
the imposition of a law of truth upon them which they must 
recognize and respect and which, in turn, requires others 
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recognize and respect of them. The individual is thus made 
subject in a three-fold manner: subject to his or herself in 
being tied to their identity by self-legislation, conscience 
and self-knowledge; subject to others by differentiation, 
control and dependence; subject, in being subjected to the 
power relation that brings this these modes of 
objectification and sUbjectivisation about. 
The target of resistance is two-fold, it is both the seeming 
source of repressive power, the state and other institutions 
and the real source of maintenance of that power, the subject 
of the state (subject-citizen). 
Foucault remarks that: 
"Maybe the target nowadays is not to discover what 
we are, but to refuse what we are. We have to 
imagine and to build up what we could be to get 
rid of this kind of political 'double bind' which 
is the simultaneous individualization and 
totalization of modern power structures. The 
conclusion would be that the political, ethical, 
social, philosophical problem of our days is not 
to try to liberate the individual from the state, 
and from state institutions, but to liberate us 
both from the state and from the type of 
individualization which is linked to the state. We 
have to promote new forms of subjectivity through 
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the refusal of this kind of individuality which 
has been imposed upon us for several centuries." 
[Power/Knowledge p.216] 
Distinct from the creation of a subject through the modes of 
objectification, the practice or shaping of the self allows 
for the individual to see differences within themself that 
are not simply oppositions, for although they may be 
contradictory, they become oppositional only through the 
disciplinary process of objectification that demands 
objective differentiation in respect of spatiality, that is, 
otherness: me healthy--him sick; me sane--her insane, etc. 
When these differences are held together in the individual 
they fail to constitute an institutionally defined identity 
that is projected onto others, rather, they are temporally 
marked as becomings in an ethos of radical presence to self. 
Power relations, as actions playing upon other actions, are 
interactional games of self experimentation. The conflict 
within the Kantian and post-modern quasi-Kantian subject, on 
the other hand, is not a game but a battle resulting from a 
coerced and threatened Freudian superego, a conscience, whose 
ethical choices orchestrate and articulate difference in a 
hierarchy of value and simple opposition of good and evil. 
Difference for such an individual is of the second and not 
the first order desire. 
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Kant and Freud alike maintain an attitude of principled 
respect for the truth-telling virtues of enlightened thought, 
its capacity to bring forth redemptive self-knowledge from 
the chaos of instinctual drives. As Norris remarks, if we are 
to understand the kinship of Kant and Freud we must; 
"comprehend the Freudian text as an ethical 
discourse marked through and through by the 
symptoms of the conflict between reason and 
desire, the dictates of internalized (social or 
moral) conscience and the promptings of 
instinctual gratification." [Reconstructing 
Foucault p.101] 
Moreover, he tells us, 
"What separates Foucault from both Kant and Freud 
(not to mention Lacan) is his aestheticized 
version of the ascetic imperative, that is to say, 
his understanding of ethical discourse as premised 
on a constant exploration of new possibilities, 
new modes of being whose aim is solely to enhance 
or intensify the pleasures of \ autonomous I 
selfhood." [ibid. pp. 101-2] 
The conflicts that arise within the pursuit of a Foucaultian 
ethos are thus radically different from those struggles 
between internal pleasures or desires and external (but 
internally imposed) order of properly ethical principles and 
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values, that are the feature of a Kantian and Freudian 
outlook. For Foucault, such conflicts cannot move beyond the 
process of intensifying self-cultivation and experiment. 
Norris' use of "autonomous selfhood" in respect of the 
practices of the self is however, misleading. Foucault was 
well aware that in the destruction of god, as displaced 
vision of human desires for autonomy and centrality in the 
universe, there was also effected the destruction of that 
autonomous self as inventor dependent upon his own fictive 
creation. It is no longer possible to allude (however 
vaguely) to an idealized human conception of a fully 
integrated psychically whole self. Man has created a vicious 
circle that he is finding it hard to escape from: he invented 
a god who was to make man's position central in and to the 
world and who would act as powerful deflection of desires to 
have control over all that he saw, all that he perceived as 
a threat to his new-found identity. Man however, found 
himself unable to live up to the image of mirrored-god ("more 
than man") and thus came to despise himself; even more so 
once he was forced to acknowledge (through the demands of 
self-knowledge) that his god was merely that displacement of 
his desires. 
Humanism allowed man, through a false opposition of life 
versus the transcendence of human values, to posit a system 
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of dialectic, by means of which he is able to harmonize, on 
the one side, his self-loathing and on the other, his 
essential idealized noumenal subject-status beyond the human 
condition. In this manner, life was resolved into the 
meanings man so desired. The Humanist definition of life is 
a definition in flight from that which it purports to define. 
The flows of matter and desire in and through our bodies and 
in our relations with other bodies can be neither united nor 
unified. 
Practices of the self in the post-human condition are not 
exercises in autonomous subjectivity but engagements in the 
becoming self(ves) that the interactions and associations in 
life present us with. There is no inherent contradiction in 
positing a de-centering and dispersion of the subject, whilst 
at the same time insisting upon the creative and experimental 
exercise in becoming of the self. 
In the conscience of internalized reason, under the 
accusation of moral responsibility and the guilt occasioned 
by unfulfilled Humanist Enlightenment promises of progress, 
man creates a desperately idolized version of himself, a 
Deity, that he tries to emulate in order to become more than 
himself; in the words of Immanuel Kant, to become more than 
man. In this narcissistic quest of the fragile ego the 
penalty for both failure and success is exacted upon the 
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landscape of desire in the construction of real, ideal and 
abstract domesticating structures, or in sanctifying spaces 
wherein these structures are deemed to have been lost. 
The tradition of demanding both silence and confession of the 
body, its sensuality and its sexuality has played a large 
part in the effectiveness of desire's incarceration. As we 
speed towards the end of the millennium, however, the old 
taboos are being broken, and not just in private. Our culture 
is one obsessed with the performance, analysis, documentation 
and exploration of sex, accompanied by a glorification of the 
body which has moved beyond the space of the confessional 
box, breaking both the internal and external barriers of 
silence. The fear of a resulting free-form anarchic desire 
pervades paranoid postmodern discourse: 
"For centuries desire has been conditioned to 
salivate like a dog whenever there is something to 
be transgressed. Prohibitions though, have lost 
most of their power. Were they to fade out any 
further, desire as we experience it may well break 
down altogether." [Sylvere Lotringer. p.275 
Polysexuality] 
These concerns must be addressed if we are to prevent a 
reactive re-domestication of desire, carried out in the name 
of its own survival. Desire is not a mode of action or 
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thought in need of protection, it is not a protected species 
whose existence would be threatened by releasing it back into 
the wild. Desire does not function only in relation to the 
instantiation of restrictions for it to transgress. Desire is 
its own medium. Forces of Being and Becoming shape desire in 
teleomatic, . teleonomic and teleological orders, producing 
beings in whom the transcendental potentials for self-
transformation are immanent to their existence, their thought 
and their actions. 
"One must realize that representing desire, 
putting on stage, in a cage, in prison, into a 
factory, into a family, being boxed in are 
desired, that domination and exclusion are 
desired; that extreme intensities are instantiable 
in these assemblages too. " 
[Lyotard Libidinal Economy p.12] 
The landscape of desire is neither an isolated island nor a 
sani tized space for production and progress. Whilst the 
transcendental conditions for its becoming are immanent to 
its production (with no nasty transcendent surprises), it 
suffers, as do all processes, from the occasional occurrence 
of unheralded noise. Unpredicted tornadoes, tidal waves, 
droughts and squalls can wreak havoc upon structures of being 
and re-configurations of becoming alike. Noise, is an 
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irregular and largely unpredictable element in life; the 
unusual and intense interactions it makes possible that may 
seem to have been determined by some outside force are rather 
instances of freedom within the system. 
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24. Post script on feminism. 
This thesis has emerged partly out of an engagement with two 
feminist theories which can be characterized as follows: 
Firstly, from Luce Irigaray, an account of the feminine sex 
as a space of unmarked linguistic absence within the 
masculinist economy; the impossibility of a grammatically 
denoted substance, leading to the exposition of that 
substance as an abiding and foundational illusion of a 
phallogocentric discourse. Secondly, from Monique Wittig 
(and before her Simone de Beauvoir), for whom it is 
explicitly and exclusively the female sex that is marked, the 
female sex as \lack' or 'other', immanently and negatively 
defining the subject in its masculinity. 
This latter position has been encouraged to run its course, 
leading to an annihilation of male subjectivity, although 
wi thout re-· instating in its place the birth of a new 
universal female subjecti vi ty. The former, meantime, has been 
followed through its exposition of the workings of a feminine 
symbolic of Woman, operating both transcendentally and 
transcendently in the structuring of (male) consciousness and 
the social, cultural, economic, moral and political values 
that accompany what is referred to as the rational mind or 
sensus communis. What has been attempted in this move is a 
differentiation between the positive force of Enlightenment 
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critique and the negative pursuit of, or reaction to humanist 
Enlightenment theoretizations which re-enforce the supremacy 
of male subjectivity (in the constructions of community, the 
body and concepts of life), in terms of their ideal or real 
Being or their Lack. These moves, as has been shown, lead 
inexorably into the post-modern miasma of postulating a 
Baudrillardian unrepresentable feminine seduction or 
Krockeresque apocalypse vision. 
In taking seriously the materiality of its assumed feminism 
and in joining the forces of the two feminist positions 
stated, this writing has endeavored to move out of and beyond 
the limits of the classical representational system as such. 
Through a complexity of alliances and associations the 
attempt has been made to clear away the architectural and 
institutional debris from a large area of the landscape of 
desire in order to enable new rhizomatic configurations of 
rigorous critical materialist feminism to take root. 
The poly-sexual trans-gendered future, by virtue of its being 
rooted, is unable to escape participation in a critique of 
historical formations and the practices of political 
expediency. Politics is a necessary part of freedom where 
domestication and colonization are deemed unproductive. What 
feminist materialism pitches is a politics of coalition, but 
not one which posits an ideal unifying structure that would 
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guarantee unity as the outcome in advance. The insistence in 
advance on coalition unity as a goal assumes that solidarity, 
whatever its price, is a prerequisite for political action. 
The coalition politics of the post-human condition has no 
agreed-upon identities or dialogic structures and thus can 
have no a priori or absolute historically established 
identities as place holders for commercium. Identities no 
longer constitute the theme or subject of politics but rather 
come into being and dissolve in accordance with the concrete 
practices constituting them. 
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1. Recently, in the case of the sixteen children murdered in 
DUi"blane, the invocation of "evil" in political, academic and 
media reports and discussions, was almost universal. Calling 
upon this term allowed its invocators to free themselves of 
any guilt or responsibility over the conditions making such 
action possible. By making this move, moreover, there was 
brought about a moral community of innocent onlookers, 
legi timated in accusing any who would not join them as 
potential collaborators, or at least unwitting facillitators 
of the event of evil. 
2. The Spinozistic God is not something other, something more 
or less, than the commercium of bodies (and as such, of 
ideas). His Being is not the binding determinism of the moral 
law which, as the condition for and of communio, posits 
consciousness as the universal criteria for the being of 
animate, thinking flesh. 
3. These results in terms of the interaction of effects, can 
be translated into a Kantian framework by re-describing them 
as the harmonious and disharmonious action created in respect 
of the interaction of the faculties of the mind (as in the 
Critique of Judgement), both of which are necessary for the 
sublime experience from out of which emerges a fully 
constituted, disciplined subject. 
4. The most obvious example of this being the ten 
commandments of Christianity. 
5. The Christian "love of self" is merely an extension of 
renunciation of self in that it involves a projection of self 
onto external goods which must in turn be denounced as 
worldly attachments. 
6. Hume's reflection on the self led him to a point where 
identity dissolved into a flux of transient impressions, 
memories, desires, anticipations and such like evanescent 
mind-states~ a stream of consciousness whose unity--or the 
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comforting illusion thereof--could only be explained in terms 
of associative linkage. For in the end these phenomena 
invol ved nothing more than contiguity in space and time, 
allied to mere force of habit and the influence of ingrained 
social convention. There was thus, he concluded, no "deep 
further act" about the nature of human selfhood, no 
integrating principle that would constitute the subject as a 
locus of autonomous thought, agency and will. 
7. Enlightenment, as Foucault remarks, is 
"an event or a set of events and complex 
historical processes, that is located at a certain 
point in the development of European societies. As 
such, it includes elements of social 
transformation, types of political institution, 
forms of knowledge, projects of rationalization of 
knowledge and practices, technological mutations 
that are very difficult to sum up in a word, even 
if many of these phenomena remain important today. 
The one ..•• that seems to me to have been at the 
basis of an entire form of philosophical 
reflection concerns only the mode of reflective 
relation to the present." 
[Foucault. The Foucault Reader p.43] 
Humanism, on the other hand, is a theme or set of themes that 
occur on several occasions over time (with varying content 
and values) and are tied to value judgements, serving as a 
critical principle of differentiation. Since the seventeenth 
century, humanism has relied on certain conceptions of man 
borrowed from religion, science or politics, serving to 
colour and justify these conceptions. As such, it has little, 
if indeed any use as an aid to reflection. 
8. Kant's Conflict of the Faculties underlines the claim that 
the Enlightenment project is concerned primarily with 
attaining intellectual and moral maturity through the 
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exercise of criticism in its various modes, whether applied 
to issues of theoretical reason (where intuitions must be 
brought under adequate concepts), to questions of an ethical 
or political order (where practical reason supplies the 
rule), or again, to issues in the sphere of aesthetic 
judgement where the relevant tribunal can only be that of an 
intersubjective community of taste appealing to shared 
principles or criteria of value. For Foucault, this doctrine 
of the separation of the faculties is itself a transcendental 
illusion, unsustainable in the ensuing battle between 
modernism and its countermodernist other. 
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